

**Transparency Theories and Strong Intentionalism:
A Philosophical Investigation**

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Transparency Theories and Strong Intentionalism: A Philosophical Investigation

submitted by me for the award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Arts at Jadavpur University is based upon my work carried out under the Supervision of -----
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And that neither this thesis nor any part of it has been submitted before for any degree or diploma anywhere / elsewhere.

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Preface

The main purpose of my thesis is to defend the question i.e. how the intuition of transparency supports the claim of strong intentionalism. In this connection I have shown that in many cases of perceptual experiences the transparency intuition of experience cannot defend strong intentionalism satisfactorily so we need to refer to the transparency account of self- knowledge.

While defending the claim of strong intentionalism by appealing to the transparency intuition we find that there are two groups (broadly) of philosophers who differ in their opinions. Some philosophers suggest that the phenomenal character of experience is nothing over and above the representational properties of experience. On the other hand, there are philosophers who believe that the phenomenal characters of experience cannot be explained entirely in terms of the representational properties of experience. Hence we need to accept the distinctive existence of the phenomenal character of experience, which is sometimes referred to as 'qualia'. 'Qualia' is also accepted as the intrinsic property of experience. This debate gives rise to some further questions which will be discussed in the course of exploring the arguments of the thesis. These are the following questions which will be discussed in the subsequent chapters of my thesis.

- What is the intuition of transparency and whether the intuition of transparency can be explained satisfactorily only in the context of representationalism?
- Whether the philosophers who adhere to strong intentionalism necessarily accept the intuition of transparency?

- Whether we need to accept the existence of ‘qualia’ separately for explaining the perceptual experience from the subjective point of view? Does the distinctive existence of ‘qualia’ reject the intuition of transparency?

The purpose of my thesis is to delve deeper into these questions so that it can provide an authentic analysis to the primary questions as discussed above.

Chapter One

Introduction

The thesis is concerned with the issues related to awareness of perceptual experience from the first-person perspective. The awareness of perceptual experience involves the idea of the nature of objects/things/entities that are encountered from a subjective point of view. What does introspective awareness reveal to a subject while undergoing certain experience? The awareness of perceptual experience is understood here as a conscious phenomenal state. The subject-matter of the thesis belongs to the domain of philosophy of perception. Broadly it includes the issues that are discussed in the area of philosophy of mind. The higher-order mental states (belief, judgment, etc.) and its connection with sensory states (perception) are explored with reference to self-knowledge. The discourse of self-knowledge is quite prominent in the domain of philosophy of mind. The thesis does not explore the possibility of self-knowledge, but discusses its relevance/role in the context of perceptual experience.

The issues related to perceptual experience from the subjective point of view has been discussed with reference to strong intentionalism (Tye 1992; Crane 2000, 2007) representationalism (Tye 1992, 2002, 2008, 2014; Dretske 1997), transparency (Evans 1987; Harman, 1990; Tye 1992) phenomenism¹ (Block 1996, 2003) and qualia (Jackson 1986; Block 1996). These terminologies will be introduced and the relevance of these terminologies will be analyzed in the introduction and the subsequent chapters of the thesis.

¹ Block, N. (1996). Mental Paint and Mental Latex. *Philosophical Issues, Perception*, 7, p. 20.

Ordinarily we believe that a perceptual experience represents something. From the subjective point of view, we find that the perceptual experience has both representational properties, i.e. properties in virtue of which it represents something and phenomenal character, i.e. 'what it is like for us to undergo such experience'. There is a debate whether the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience depends on the representational property or not. Some philosophers have defended the thesis that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience depends on the representational properties by appealing to the intuition of transparency. The transparency intuition suggests that the phenomenal character of experience is nothing over and above the representational properties of experience. The phenomenal character is exhausted by the intentional or representational properties. For instance, suppose I am perceiving a flower vase made of glass. The perceptual experience represents the flower vase having certain properties. The representational property of a flower vase includes its color, shape, texture etc. According to some philosophers the subject's awareness of perceptual experience reveals to the objects and its properties represented in the experience. They establish the claim by appealing to the intuition of transparency available in this regard. On the other hand, there are philosophers who believe that the phenomenal character of experience cannot be explained with regard to the representational character of perceptual experience. Subject's introspective awareness of experience requires the access to intrinsic properties of experience. This intrinsic property of experience is distinct from the representational character of perceptual experience. It is sometimes referred to as 'qualia'. Perception is a representational state but it has other aspects which cannot be explained in terms of the objects and its properties represented in experience. Representationalism fails to capture the subjective feel or 'what it is like to undergo a particular experience'.

In philosophy ‘representationalism’ is a loaded term. The usage of this term has been restricted to a particular context of perceptual experience. The theory of representationalism upholds only the views of those philosophers who have questioned the distinctive existence of the phenomenal character of experience.

1.1) Representationalism (Philosophy of Mind)

The theory of representationalism is widely discussed in philosophy of mind. Mental representations signify the role of cognitive aspects of mind. Mental states are considered as the cognitive states. Cognitive states presuppose the role of sense experience for acquiring knowledge (conceptual state). This is usually thought to be a rudimentary stage for acquiring knowledge. The sense – experience further generates second – order mental states like thought, belief, desire and so on.

These mental states are referred to as intentional states of mind. Intentional states represent objects. They are representational states of mind. Mental representations may represent objects with semantic properties. The semantic properties of objects include referent, truth – value, content etc. The Representational Theory of Mind (RTM)² suggests that mental representations have propositional content. The propositional content is expressed in terms of propositional attitudes. A proposition has truth value. It can be assessed as true or false. The instances of propositional attitude involve intentional states like belief, desire, fear etc. Propositional attitudes signify mental states having attitudes like belief, hope etc. Mental states having such attitudes are expressed via propositions which are true about some states of affairs or the content available in that regard. For example, Jonathan believes that the bottle on a table contains wine. Here belief is the

² Jerry Fodor (1975, 1981, 1987, 1990, 1994, 2008).

intentional state. Intentional state like belief represents a state of affair i.e. the bottle on a table contains wine. The propositional content expresses that Jonathan's belief is about that particular state of affair. If the liquid in the bottle tastes similar to wine then the proposition can be assessed as true. The propositional attitudes constitute the content of mental state.

The source of literature of RTM is found in the writings of Descartes (1641), Locke (1689) and many other philosophers. In contemporary philosophy the writings of Fodor (1975, 1981, 1987, 1990, 1994, 2008) is also considered as a popular source of literature regarding RTM. According to Fodor individual's propositional attitudes serve a great purpose for predicting human behavior. Intentional states of individuals are the reliable indicator for anticipating human actions. This is sometimes mentioned as 'folk psychology'. RTM as suggested by Fodor (1975, 1981, 1987, 1990, 1994, 2008) implies that mental representations can be understood as computational relations. The computational relation signifies the role of cognitive state. The cognitive states are representational and they transform the information from mind to brain. Thus, RTM is often understood in terms of 'Computational Theory of Mind'. Fodor in his book *The Language of Thought* (1975) also suggests that intentional states presuppose a mental language. Mental language is referred to as 'mentalese'. 'Mentalese' has its own syntax and semantics. Although Fodor's (1975, 1981, 1987, 1990, 1994, 2008) discussion of RTM has a similarity with Dretske's (1997) view on accepting all mental events as representational (see chapter 2), it is not particularly concerned with the phenomenal state of perceptual experience. Hence, RTM as advocated by Fodor will not be touched upon in the thesis.

1.2) Classical and modern representationalism (perceptual experience)

The theory of representationalism has its roots in modern western philosophy. The source of representationalism is found in the literature of Descartes (1641/1998), Locke (1690) and many other philosophers. This view is often referred to as ‘classical representationalism’ (CR). The debate which has been briefly touched upon in the above discussion of ‘modern representationalism’ (MR). The section deals with the historical development of the issues related to the above mentioned debate. The analysis is done with reference to CR.

Intentional states like perception, belief, fear etc. stands for objects or states of affair. These objects are intentional objects. Intentionality is usually defined as the power of mind to represent something. The sense of ‘object’ as used by CR and MR is different. According to CR ‘the objects of thought’, ‘objects of touch’ the phrases like these do not entail the direct perception of physical objects as such. The objects which we encounter in the awareness of sensory experience are not the physical objects or the objects of the external world. The sense of the phrase ‘object’ is somewhat different from the sense that we use in contemporary common sense.

CR suggests that introspective awareness gives access to mental entities. We directly perceive the mental entities like ideas, sense-data, image, impression etc. In particular CR endorses the view that in the process of perception we are directly aware of ideas. Ideas are necessarily mental. This is called indirect realism.

Descartes (1641/1998)³ suggests that the awareness of perceptual experience does not reveal the physical objects or objects of the external world directly. The awareness of experience encounters the sense – data which is also referred to as ‘ideas’ by Descartes (1641/1998). The objects of the external world are accessed by the subject through ideas regarding it.

According to Descartes (1641/1998) ideas or the mental entities must be caused by something. In this connection Descartes shows that ideas can have two kinds of reality i.e. formal reality and the objective reality. Formal realities are the realities which the thing possesses in virtue of its being an actual or an existent thing. For instance, a rose is an actual or existent thing or object. Therefore it has formal reality. Whereas, the objective reality are the realities which the thing or the objects possess in virtue of its being a representation of something. For example, the idea of rose represents the object rose to mind.

According to Descartes (1641/1998) the ideas are the mode of mind. ‘Mode’ is defined as the temporal property of substance (mind). They are not the essential properties of substance. Descartes suggests two senses of the word ‘idea’. The material sense of idea suggests that it is the operation of mind. The material sense of ideas implies that the source/originations of ideas can be explained by referring to the subject (agent) itself. Material sense of ideas suggests that it is just a mode of mind. Alternatively, ideas can be understood in an objective sense. The objective sense of ideas presupposes the things which are represented by the operation of mind. It can also be referred to as an idea.

³Descartes, R. (1998). *Meditations and Other Philosophical Writings* (D. M. Clarke, Trans.). Penguin. (Original work published in 1641)

Hence, Descartes (1641/1998) distinguishes between the act of representation and the things or the objects represented by the act of representation.

Since the different ideas represent different objects to subjects which are external to subjects, it entails that the cause of ideas either contain as much reality as or more reality than the ideas themselves. In other words the formal reality of ideas must contain either an equal amount of reality or greater amount of reality than the objective reality of ideas, if the objects of ideas have any actual existence. The reality of ideas means the content of ideas or the subject-matter of ideas i.e. what it is or what it stands for. The objective reality of ideas is also referred to as intentional reality of ideas. The whole picture of perceptual experience as proposed by Descartes (1641/1998) suggests if ideas are caused by something which has an actual existence the subject cannot have any direct access to that cause. The cause is represented by the ideas. Mind can be directly aware of ideas only. The perceptual experience of this type is also representational but it does not give access to the mind-independent objects and properties of the external world. This view suggests that the mind can get access to internal intentional impressions. MR, on the other hand, holds that the awareness of perceptual experience can directly access the intentional objects and its properties represented. In conclusion Descartes' (1641/1998) suggested representationalism shows that we can only be directly aware of our mental states or perceptual states.

John Locke (1690) also accepts that the mind accesses certain ideas while encountering the empirical world. John Locke in his book *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690) states that ideas are the objects of mind. The source of ideas can be explained by following the operations of mind, i.e. sensation and reflection. In the process of sensation the mind receives ideas passively. Whereas the act of reflection implies that the mind

becomes active while reflecting on the content that is received in the process of sensation. Both the sensation and reflection entails that the mind is conscious.

Locke (1690) also admits to the representational aspect of ideas. He holds that reality can be captured by encountering several ideas. The type of representationalism as suggested by Locke (1690) is referred to as 'representational realism'. He also advocates the view called indirect realism. According to Locke the physical objects or the substance can be perceived by mind by encountering several ideas. The mind perceives physical objects by perceiving the qualities or properties of the substance. As suggested by Locke (1690) the substance in itself is unknown to human minds. The view therefore denies that the awareness of perceptual experience gives direct access to the physical objects.

The physical substance can have two types of qualities, i.e. primary and secondary qualities. According to Locke (1690), primary qualities (extension, volume) are the qualities which subsist in the substance. Whereas secondary qualities are the qualities (shape, color, size) of the mind's ability to perceive those qualities in the substance. Primary qualities correspond to the qualities that exist in reality represented by the object. They generate certain ideas in mind which in turn produces secondary qualities in the mind of the perceiver. Therefore, Locke also admits that in the process of perceptual experience we encounter the mental entities. The perception of secondary quality is subjective.

Locke's (1690) view on 'representational realism' raises a significant question which is addressed in the context of MR. The question is, if the perception of secondary qualities varies from person to person it entails that the awareness of secondary qualities cannot be entirely determined by the objects represented in the experience. The perception of primary qualities involves the perception of extrinsic properties of experience. On the

other hand, it seems that the perception of secondary qualities presupposes the perception of certain intrinsic properties of experience.

Following Locke (1690) we may conclude that ideas indirectly represent the objects of the world which constitute the part of reality. Mind encounters the ideas of physical objects of the external world via the properties represented by physical objects. Secondary qualities are not the essential or the real qualities of the objects. The phenomenal state regarding the perception of secondary qualities adds something more to the objects represented by the experience. The perceptual states access the primary qualities and primary qualities in turn give access to perception of the secondary qualities. Therefore, we may conclude that the perception of secondary qualities cannot be directly accessed by mind by encountering physical objects. It implies that the subject needs access to intrinsic properties of experience. Many contemporary philosophers hold that the representational character of experience fails to exhaust the phenomenal character of experience.

1.3) Research questions

Following the above discussion we can state that conscious intentional states indicate the sensory states, mental image, episodes of thought, emotion etc. For example, in the process of perceptual experience of seeing a red rose, the experience appears to me in a particular way. The experience entails that I am in a particular state i.e. a conscious state. My phenomenal state of perceptual experience is conscious in nature. Further, suppose I am thinking about a movie. I am thinking about the characters and the plot of a movie. Intentional state here also presupposes that I am in a conscious state. The same is also applicable in the case of imagination. The subjective experience of imagination implies that the subject is in a conscious mental state.

Although intentional states or being in a conscious state involve the experience of intentional objects and its properties represented, being in a conscious state may imply ‘what it is like to have an experience’ for a person. According to some philosophers ‘what it is like to have an experience’ is different from the representational states or representational character of experience. The person needs to access the intrinsic features or ‘qualia’ in order to explain ‘what it is like to have certain experience’ or conscious phenomenal state. This view is often referred to as ‘phenomenism’ (Block, 1996, 2003) by some philosophers. On the other hand, some philosophers believe that the intentional objects and its properties or the intentional content determine the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. The thesis discusses this very view by referring to ‘strong intentionalism’. According to them the representational properties of intentional objects or the representational content is fundamental for explaining the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. The philosophers who accept strong intentionalism and those who reject strong intentionalism both have appealed to the intuition of transparency.

Intentionalism has been defined by different philosophers from various points of view. The dissertation primarily refers to Tim Crane’s (2000, 2001, 2009) view on intentionalism.

It focuses on two main research questions:

- (i) whether the transparency intuition is correct
- (ii) whether it supports strong intentionalism.

1.4) Modern representationalism (MR) versus phenomenism

MR supports the view that the representational character or the intentional content determines the phenomenal experience of a subject. In order to explicate this claim made

by MR we need to understand how the philosophers have accepted the different types of intentionalism.

Crane (2000, p.53-54) suggests that intentionalism can be of two kinds, i.e. restricted and unrestricted intentionalism. The distinction is made with reference to the intentional states (perception, mood, sensation) that are accepted by philosophers (see chapter 2). Further distinction is also suggested between strong and weak intentionalism. The purpose of this differentiation is to showcase whether all intentional states can be explained in terms of intentional content (see chapter 2). Crane in his book *Elements of Minds: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind* (2001) has defined three versions of strong intentionalism. The aim is to show that not all philosophers identify strong intentionalism in the same way. Tye (1992, 1995, 2002, 2008) accepts that representational content is identical with the phenomenal character. He suggests that all intentional states can be explained in terms of the representational character of experience. Tye (1992, 1995, 2002, 2008, 2014, 2017, 2021) appeals to intuition of transparency in order to establish his view on strong intentionalism. The transparency intuition of experience suggests that the awareness of perceptual experience reveals to the intentional objects and properties represented by them. The introspective awareness does not access any intrinsic property of experience. Crane (2000, 2001, 2009) holds that intentional content cannot wholly determine the awareness of perceptual experience. He suggests that that 'mode' can relate the subject to the appropriate content of the perceptual experience. 'Mode' is neither intrinsic nor extrinsic property of the perceptual experience. For example, S believes that p, belief is 'mode' and p is the 'content'. The same content of experience can be accessed by a subject by several modes. For example, S believes that p, S hopes that p, S desire that p etc. Hence Crane (2000, 2001, 2009) concludes that the awareness of perceptual experience is determined by both 'mode' and the 'content' of perceptual experience. He refutes the view

that the perceptual experience is transparent to its objects and the intentional content represented.

The thesis primarily addresses the claim of strong intentionalism following the view of Harman (1990), Tye (1992, 1995, 1998 2002, 2008, 2014, 2017, 2021), Byrne (2001), Dretske (1997) and Crane ((2000, 2001, 2009). Among these strong intentionalists philosophers Harman (1990) and Tye (1992, 1995, 1998, 2002, 2014, 2017, 2021) directly appeals to the intuition of transparency. Byrne's (2001) view on strong intentionalism indirectly invokes the intuition of transparency. Dretske (1997) does not mention the intuition of transparency in his view on representationalism. Byrne (2001) and Dretske's (1997) theory of strong intentionalism is supported by the transparency account of self-knowledge (Evans, 1982). Gareth Evans' method of transparency as introduced in his book *The Varieties of References* (1982) is strongly connected with the view of strong intentionalism upheld by both Byrne (2001) and Dretske (1997). These philosophers accept representationalism in the context of perceptual experience for defending strong intentionalism. The thesis also includes the view of philosophers like James John (2005) and Jeff Speaks (2009) who support representationalism.

Dretske in his book *The Naturalizing Mind* (1997) discusses that introspection signifies the representational aspect of mind. He identifies the human mind's representational aspect as a neurophysiological system. The sensory experience is received by the respective sense-organs. The external stimuli stimulate the nerves and it carries the information to the brain. The information gets processed in the brain and the perceptual experience occurs. The perceptual experience thus represents certain states of affairs. Introspection coordinates between two types of representations. The coordination between sensory representation and conceptual representation is required in order to understand the

representational aspect of mind. The coordination between these types of representations can successfully explain the claim of strong intentionalism. Dretske's (1994, 1997) view of strong intentionalism is supported by the transparency account of self-knowledge (Evans, 19982).

On the other hand, there are philosophers like Martin (2002) who accept transparency intuition but reject the claim of strong intentionalism. Martin's (2002) paper "The Transparency of Experience" (2002) expounds that transparency cannot be properly understood in the context of strong intentionalism. He explicates that strong intentionalism fails to capture the perspectival features of perceptual experience (see chapter 3). Moreover, strong intentionalism also cannot distinguish between veridical and non-veridical perceptions. The phenomenal states between these two types of perception are different. Phenomenal transparency as accepted by Martin (2002) differentiates these two types of states. Martin (2002) has defended phenomenal transparency in the context of disjunctivism. His view on disjunctivism supports transparency by accepting the distinctiveness of phenomenal character of experience.

Block's 'phenomenism' (1996, 2003) rejects both strong intentionalism and the intuition of transparency. Block (1996, 2003) has provided the cases of inverted spectrum, bodily sensations, hallucinations and illusions and so on to prove the claim of strong intentionalism and transparency as false. Block's view on phenomenism accepts the role of 'qualia'. He suggests that the representational properties and the representational character of experience cannot explain the perception of something which is entirely observer-dependent. Following representationalism we can hardly explain the subjective experience of color and bodily sensations. The subjective experience of this sort entails the perception of intrinsic properties of experiences themselves.

Frank Jackson's (1982)⁴ argument against strong intentionalism has also been touched upon. Jackson (1982) argues that the physical information which is representational facts cannot capture the perception of color. He also rejects both strong intentionalism and transparency.

The dissertation analyses Andy Egan's (2006) view on centered-world content. The purpose of this content is to accommodate a subject's spatio-temporal location in the world. The thesis examines whether such content as advocated by Egan (2006) restores the claim of both strong intentionalism and transparency or not.

1.5) Overview

- The first chapter deals with a brief sketch of the aim of the thesis. The chapter explicates how the issues related to the problem of perception are partly connected to the philosophy of mind. It particularly refers to Fodor's (1975, 1981, 1987, 1990, 1994, 2008) RTM in this regard. The gradual development of the arguments proposed by strong intentionalists and phenomenists discussed in the thesis can be traced back to the history of modern western philosophy. The problem in this regard has been discussed with reference to Descartes (1641/1998) and Locke (1690). The chapter provides a short introduction of the theories of the philosophers discussed in the subsequent chapters of the thesis.
- The second chapter argues how transparency supports strong intentionalism by introducing the first notion of transparency and connecting it with the transparency account of self-knowledge (Evans, 1982).

⁴ Jackson, F. (1982, April). Epiphenomenal Qualia. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 32(127), 127-136.

- The third chapter questions the claim of the second chapter. Many philosophers like Martin (2002) state that transparency of experience does not support strong intentionalism.
- Martin's (2002) argument fails to prove the claim of strong intentionalism as false. Dretske's 'displaced-perception' (1994) which accommodates the transparency account of self – knowledge rejects Martin's (2002) argument of phenomenal transparency.
- The third chapter of the thesis points out that some philosophers (Crane, 2000, 2009) who adhere to strong intentionalism refuse to accept transparency. According to Crane transparency is incompatible with strong intentionalism.
- The fourth chapter discusses various objections raised against strong intentionalism.
- Finally, the intuition of transparency of experience avoids these objections against the claim of strong intentionalism by connecting it with the transparency account of self- knowledge (Evans, 1982). Both strong intentionalism and transparency intuition are thus restored.

1.6) Methodology

The thesis has two aspects, one is explanatory and the other is investigative. The explanatory part deals with the analysis of the theories and arguments and a proper presentation of the same. Whereas the task of the investigative approach is to check the logical consistency of different views and theories, compare, contrast, critique and provide feedback.

Chapter Two

Transparency and Strong Intentionalism

2.1) Introduction

This chapter introduces the notion of transparency. The chapter discusses two ideas of transparency theses, they are, transparency intuition of experience (Tye, 1992, 2002) and the transparency account of self-knowledge (Evans, 1982). The aim is to show that the intuition of transparency supports strong intentionalism. Representationalists like Tye (1992, 2002, 2014, 2021) have accepted the role of transparency in support of representationalism. The term ‘representationalism’ has been used very widely in philosophy. The term ‘representationalism’ has been used in a restricted manner in this chapter and throughout the thesis. This is done to explain the phenomenal state of the perceptual experience from the subjective point of view. The thesis of representationalism in this regard analyzes the fact whether we need to accept the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience over and above the representational character of the experience. In the process of perceptual experience the subject encounters the objects and its properties represented in the experience. Tye (1992)⁵ states that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is nothing over and above the representational properties of experience. The representational properties of experience includes the objects and the properties that the objects (intentional) instantiates while undergoing the experience. The representational properties constitute the representational content of the experience. The representational content represents the intentional objects and its properties. The claim of strong intentionalism is that the content of the experience determines the phenomenal

⁵ Tye, M. (1992). *Visual Qualia and Visual Content* (T. Crane, Ed.; First ed.). Cambridge University Press.

character of the experience. Tye (1992) accepts the role of transparency for defending the claim of strong intentionalism.⁶ Whereas, many philosophers like Byrne (2001), Dretske (1997) have not explicitly mentioned the role of transparency while accepting representationalism. This chapter deals with the theory of strong intentionalism as adhered to by Tye (1992, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2008, 2014, 2017, 2021), Byrne (2001) and Dretske (1994, 1997). This chapter shows how the intuition of transparency supports the view on strong intentionalism.

Section 2.2 deals with the terminologies like intentional content and phenomenal character. The distinction between strong and weak intentionalism has also been discussed. These are the concepts required for the explanation of the basic claim- that the transparency intuition is compatible with strong intentionalism. The transparency intuition has been introduced in section 2.3 along with the reference to a source of transparency that is found in Moore's (1903) literature on transparency. Section 2.4 discusses the argument for transparency intuition. The argument for the intuition of transparency is used to support the claim of strong intentionalism which explores Tye's (1992, 1995, 1993, 2002) view on representationalism. Section 2.5 will analyse whether the intentional content necessarily determines the phenomenal character of the experience or not. This point has been discussed with reference to Byrne's (2001) view on strong intentionalism. In section 2.6, discussions regarding Dretske's (1994, 1997) view on representationalism has been touched upon. According to Dretske (1997) sensory information and thought are both representational properties of the experience. Dretske (1997) explains the phenomenal character of experience in terms of the properties represented by the object The sensory

⁶ Tye (2014, 2017, 2021) later on accepts property representationalism. He states that the perception of hallucination, illusion cannot be explained in terms of content representationalism. In my thesis I have discussed that Egan's (2006) 'self-locating belief' can handle this problem. Thus content representationalism can be restored in the context of strong intentionalism (see chapter 4).

organs receive sense data and from the external world and it represents the sensory information accordingly. He suggests that if there is anything like phenomenal character of experience or qualia it can be considered as the content of sensory representations. The chapter proves that intuition of transparency supports Dretske's (1997) view on representationalism. His view is supported by the transparency account of self-knowledge (Evans 1982).

2.2) Types of intentionalism and the phenomenal character

Various notions like, intentional content, distinction between strong and weak intentionalism and phenomenal character of the experience has been dealt with in this section.

If I look at a tree on a sunny afternoon, the experience represents to me, the number of objects. For example, the mind-independent particular (object) i.e. the tree and the property that it instantiates, like the color, shape, etc. Throughout what follows, I will be using the term 'object' to refer to such particulars and their properties. The property in virtue of which the experience represents these objects is its representational property. Representational property is not an intrinsic property of an experience. This is because a representational property involves a relation. The perceptual experience relates the subject to the content of the experience outside us. The content of experience includes the objects represented and its properties.

The question is, whether there are intrinsic features of experience which are distinct from the representational properties. One kind of intrinsic property is called the phenomenal character. The phenomenal character of experience is sometimes referred to as qualia.

With reference to Jackson (1982)⁷ I will discuss the following example. For example, Nilopher is a brilliant scientist and she lives in a black and white room. She acquires knowledge about the world via black and white television. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and has all the scientific and physical information about color perception. Now, if Nilopher is released from the black and white room and is exposed to the world where she perceives different colors, will she learn something new? It is plausible that when she perceives a color for the first time, she will experience something new, i.e. ‘what it is like to see a color’, which is distinct from the physical information of color perception that she has.

Intentional states are representational states of mind. Intentional states have intentional objects. When we perceive the tree, the experience is about the tree that is part of the intentional content of the experience. The content of experience or the object that is represented in experience may not have real existence. An example given by Harman (1990, p.34)⁸ shows that a person named Ponce De Leon was searching for a fountain. The water of the fountain preserves the youth. So, if anybody drinks the water of that fountain, he/she will remain young forever. But in reality, there may be no such fountain. Now, it does not mean that he was not looking for anything. Therefore, his search has an intentional object. The object for which he was searching was an intentional object but it has no real existence. The content of experience is defined as the non-intrinsic property of experience. In virtue of intentional content the intentional state represents the objects in a particular way. Now the content has been described as an intentional property of experience. Intentional content in that sense is considered to be the representational

⁷ Jackson, F. (1982, April). Epiphenomenal Qualia. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 32(127), 127-136.

⁸ Harman, G. (1990). The Intrinsic Quality of Experience. *Philosophical Perspectives, Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind*, 4, 31-52.

content of perceptual experience. Hence the representational content has an intentional object and this content determines the subject's perceptual experience.

According to Crane (2000, 2001), intentionalism can be interpreted in two ways, restricted and unrestricted intentionalism. Unrestricted intentionalism holds that all mental states including bodily sensations, certain kinds of moods, emotions are intentional. Philosophers like Tye (1995, 2008) believe that moods, primary emotions are also intentional states. Tye (1995, 2008) states that emotions are directed at things or persons. For instance, the presence of a person *x* can make a dog angry. The dog may bark and show his anger whenever he sees *x*. On the contrary, the dog may show his affection or happiness whenever he sees the subject *y*, who often treats him with biscuits. The dog rapidly wags his tail whenever he sees *y*. Hence the pattern of behaviour that the dog displays towards *x* is different from the pattern of behaviour displayed towards *y*. It means it is via the perceptual experience that the dog's anger or happiness is exhibited towards a person. Hence, Tye (1995, 2008) concludes that primary emotions are determined by the external manifestation of the behaviour and it is revealed throughout the perceptual experience. Tye (1995, 2008) also explains that emotions are directed on things in two ways. Via perceptual experience and thought/memory or mental image about them. Suppose, yesterday I ate mangoes and while reading the newspaper today I read that eating too much mangoes can cause an upset stomach. Now, suddenly I started feeling pain in my stomach. Here the intentional state is not directed towards the objects/things directly via perceptual experience. It is directed towards the things/objects via the mental image of the things/objects. Therefore, the form of unrestricted intentionalism as suggested by Tye (1995, 2008) shows that not only the sensory perception but emotions are also intentional states. Those who adhere to restricted intentionalism do not accept this view on

intentionalism. Restricted form of intentionalism is applicable to certain kinds of mental states like, perceptual experiences. According to them, the phenomenal character of bodily sensations (pain, itch, etc.) are not determined by their intentional content. In other words, intentionalism is not applicable to bodily sensations like pain, itch etc.

Following this interpretation, a further distinction can be made between, weak and strong intentionalism. According to weak intentionalism, all mental states are intentional but some have non-intentional conscious properties. These non- intentional conscious properties are referred to as ‘qualia’. Weak intentionalists say that two experiences can have the same intentional content yet there can be differences in their phenomenal character (Crane, 2001, p. 83)⁹. Hence the phenomenal character of the experience may not be entirely determined by the intentional content. We can discuss it by the following example. For example, pain is an intentional state. The awareness of pain can be felt at a particular region of the body. A weak intentionalist accepts the role of qualia for determining the felt aspect of pain. Hence, the awareness of conscious experience of pain sensation is determined by the felt region of the body that the experience presents as its object and qualia.

According to Crane (2001) strong intentionalism can be explained into three ways

- a. Conscious nature of the mental state can be determined by the intentional content. Hence, any difference in the conscious character happens due to the differences in the intentional content. The nature of perceptual experience is believed to be representational in general and the idea of representations involves in representing things or particulars as objects. Whether the objects actually exist or not, the mental

⁹ Crane, T. (2001). *Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind* (First ed.). Oxford University Press.

state (perception, belief, etc.) represents an object or has the object. In section one of this chapter, I have already explained the term ‘object’ which refers to particulars like, table, chair and the properties that they instantiate. Now, in a perceptual experience the way the objects of representation are represented is defined as the content of the experience. Following this interpretation it can be said that the objects of experience determine the content of experience. This claim can be proved by the following instance of veridical perception. For example, suppose I see a beautiful painted ceramic jar in a store. The brightness, shades of color, the texture of the jar all these properties are represented in the perceptual experience. The content of experience represents the jar as a bright colored object. Now, if there is any phenomenal character of mental state represented in the experience, it is determined by the intentional content. Therefore, following this claim we can say that if there occurs any change in the intentional content of an experience it would lead to changes in the conscious or the phenomenal character of the experience. Therefore, if I shift my eyes from a ceramic to a silver jar it would lead to the changes in the conscious or the phenomenal character of the experience accordingly.

- b. Conscious character of mental state can be understood in terms of intentional mode i.e. the subject’s relation to that content. Mode is not an intrinsic feature of an experience. The way the individual is related to the content is mode. In a perceptual experience a subject can be related to the content via mode. For example, when I see the bright painted ceramic jar, I also find it as hard textured. It is the mode (sight or touch) of the experience which helps me relate to the content of the experience appropriately. Hence, from the subjective point of view if there is anything like a conscious character

of the mental state it should be understood in terms of mode and not in terms of the content.

- c. If there is any conscious or phenomenal character of experience it is determined by both mode and content. According to this interpretation of strong intentionalism the phenomenal character of the experience is determined by the intentional properties. Qualia is identified as non- intentional property. Hence the interpretation of this sort refuses to accept qualia. They assert that the intentional state of a subject is connected to its content via mode. Suppose a person holds a plastic ice box and while holding it she undergoes both the tactile and visual experience simultaneously. Now the difference in the experience is determined not solely by the content but by the difference in the mode. The differences in mode lead the person to experience it differently, which in turn gives her access to the content. Hence, if there is any conscious or phenomenal character of experience it is determined by both mode and the content of the intentional state.

Therefore, it follows that change in the intentional state can happen due to the change in their content, their modes or both.

Tye (1992, 1996, 2002) accepts the first claim which has been denoted as representationalism by Crane (2001). According to Tye (1995, 2017) intentional state including pain state can be explained in terms of the representational character of the experience. Tye's (1995, 2008) version of intentionalism is applicable to the cases of pain sensations too. Third interpretation of intentionalism is defended by Crane (2000, 2001, 2007). Both Tye (1992, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2008, 2014, 2017, 2021) and Crane (2000, 2001, 2007) are strong intentionalists but their interpretations differ from each other.

2.3) Transparency intuition

The source of transparency is found in Moore's article "The Refutation of Idealism"(1903). He has discussed the transparency intuition in the context of Idealism. Transparency is here referred to as diaphaneity. Moore (1903) in his article "The Refutation of Idealism", says that,

the moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what, distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous. Yet it can be distinguished if we look attentively enough, and if we know that there is something to look for. (Moore, 1903, p. 450).

Idealists believe that the object and the experience of objects are the same. For instance, Idealists suggest that while perceiving a color i.e. the color blue there cannot be any distinction between the object which is the color blue and the experience of blue. Moore denies that these two things are identical. According to Moore, transparency motivates Idealists to accept this view. Though Moore discusses the transparency intuition but he himself rejects it. He ultimately accepts the sense-data theory which will not be touched upon in the thesis. In the next section we will only focus on the discussions of transparency intuition by the contemporary philosophers.

This section provides a descriptive view on transparency. It also shows how the intuition of transparency rules out the possibility of intrinsic features of experience.

The transparency intuition suggests that whatever may be the phenomenal character of experience it is nothing in addition to the representational properties of the experience.

Suppose, I am looking at a diamond necklace. The shape and the cutting of the diamonds and the reflection of light on them are all represented in my perceptual experience. Now, there is something like ‘undergoing such an experience’, which constitutes the conscious character of my experience, the thing which suggests what is so distinctive to that conscious experience. But according to the transparency intuition, when we try to introspect or try to reflect on our perceptual experience we cannot find any property such as the phenomenal character but only the properties that are represented. The introspective awareness cannot reveal anything more (intrinsic features) which cannot be explained in terms of the objects represented in the perceptual experience. The awareness of perceptual experience is not the awareness of the experience itself. The awareness of perceptual experience is the awareness of the representational character of the experience. More generally, the objects that are represented by the perceptual experience. We do not attend to the experience itself apart from the content of experience. This is called the transparency of experience. Hence any difference in the representational property determines the change in phenomenal character of experience. Contemporary philosophers like Tye (1992, 2002, 2014, 2021) defend the intuition of transparency in the context of perceptual experience.

Those who reject the intuition of transparency hold that the perceptual experience of an after- image, inverted color perception etc. suggests that there is ‘something it is like to undergo a certain experience’, which cannot be explained in terms of the representational content or the objects represented by the experience. For instance, after looking at a bright red light if we now shift our eyes on a white surface we see a red round spot on that surface. Since there is no red round object before us, the experience of the after- image cannot be explained in terms of the intentional content or the intentional object of the experience. Hence the experience of the after-image suggests that we need to accept the

existence of qualia over and above the representational content. One might argue against this position by saying that an after-image is also a separate instance of perceptual experience with its own content or representational features. In the following paragraph, I will be placing Tye's argument (1992, 1995), which is similar in intent to what I just stated. In short, an after-image is not the original perception of the bright light but is rather a complex neural phenomenon produced as an effect of the original perception. It has its own representational content and that content is determined by brain or neural activity. So, it may be doubted whether this example suggests that introspective awareness accesses the intrinsic features of the experience, namely, the qualia.

As Tye (1992) states that, while perceiving something like 'red round spot' as an after-image we don't perceive the intrinsic features of the experience. According to Tye (1992), the after-images are not the intrinsic properties of the experience. After-images also have the representational properties like 'red' and 'round' and these properties can be explained with reference to the representational or intentional content. Tye is trying to show that, when we see the bright light (stimulus), it stimulates the particular optic nerves and those nerves produce the impression. The impression continues to exist even when eyes are no longer experiencing the original stimulus. This is basically a photochemical activity of the retina. Thus following Tye it can be said that the region stimulated acts as the content of the experience. The neurons in the retina are responsible for producing the after-images. Therefore, without referring to the optic nerves how can we explain the experience of the after-images? Tye says,

One plausible hypothesis is that vision is modular in the sense that it generates representations of a certain class of properties of distal stimuli via

perceptual processes that operate on the retinal input in a largely fixed, autonomous manner.

On the standard computational approach, the receptor cells on the retina are taken to be transducers. They have, as input, physical energy in the form of light, and they convert it immediately into symbolic representations of light intensity and wavelength. These representations are themselves made up of active nerve cells. Hence they are physical. (Tye, 1996, *Ten Problems of Consciousness*, p. 102).

According to Tye (1992), the same is also applicable for the perceptual experience of sound. The experience of sound like, ‘loud’ or ‘high-pitched’ sound generates changes in the phenomenal character of experience. To the person who listens to the ‘high-pitched’ sound, the experience represents the sound as ‘loud’ or ‘high-pitched’. So it means that ‘loudness’ or being ‘high-pitched’ are representational properties of that experience. These representational properties have the graphical representations of the experience. It represents the frequencies which in turn generate the changes in the phenomenal character of the experience. So the frequency of a sound is not the intrinsic property of the experience. Whatever changes occur in the phenomenal character of the experience with respect to the changes in the frequency of the sound need to be explained in terms of representational properties i.e. the graphical representation of sound. Therefore, Tye in his article, “Visual Qualia and Visual Content” suggests,

Suppose you look at a bright light and turn away. You have an after-image that is red and round, say. In this case you are subject to a visual experience but your experience has no representational content. What it is like for you,

then, cannot be determined by aspects of the content of your experience. Rather it must be due to visual qualia.

It seems to me no more plausible to take the terms 'red' and 'round' as they apply to an after-image, as denoting intrinsic qualities of the image than it is to take the terms 'loud' and 'high-pitched', as they are employed in the connection with the graphical representations of sounds, as denoting intrinsic qualities of oscilloscope readings. People who work with such readings frequently use terms like 'loud' and 'high-pitched' in application to the readings themselves. It is obvious that in this usage what the term really means are 'represents loud' and 'represents high-pitched' respectively. Analogously it seems to me that what the terms 'red' and 'round' signify, in application to an after-image, are representational properties of the after-image experience. One who has a red, round after-image is subject to a visual experience produced by looking at a bright light, the content of which is that something – typically a region or space. – is red and round. There is, then, I claim, a definite content to the visual experience after all. (Tye, 1992, p. 162-163)

How does the intuition of transparency work here? Keeping Tye's idea in mind, one can say that the properties experienced in case of after-images are the properties represented in the experience. The production of such properties are explained in terms of the neurons in the retina which get stimulated by the stimulus. It means that optic neurons and the stimulus together act as the content of the experience. The stimulus and the optic nervous system both determine the changes in the phenomenal character of the experience that a person undergoes while seeing the after-images. Hence in case of after-images also the

representational character exhausts the phenomenal character of the experience. There is no need to refer to qualia for explaining the experience of after-images.

Similarly, the experience of 'loud' and 'high-pitch' sound are the representational properties of the experience. The graphical representation of the properties of sound helps us to know the frequency of sound. Hence to explain the phenomenal character of the experience of sound which is the frequency we need to refer to the graphical representation i.e. the content of the experience. Therefore, by appealing to the content of the experience we can explain the change in the phenomenal character. Hence, frequency is the representational property which is determined by the content. Frequency of sound is not the property of the experience itself. In both cases we see that it is by appealing to the intuition of transparency that we can explain perceptual experience in the context of representationalism.

The above view is supported by the following example of auditory experience. For example, in Indian classical music we know that seven notes or swaras (Sā,Re,Gā,Mā,Pā,Dhā,Ni) are the components of the Saptaka. These seven notes or the components of Saptaka can be considered as the objects represented by the auditory experience. A Saptaka is a set of musical notes which are ordered in terms of varying frequency. Every Saptaka is ordered in an ascending and descending frequency scale. There are three Saptakas: Madhya, Mandra and Tār Saptaka. The basic Saptaka is Madhya Saptak, Mandra saptak belongs to a system of notes in lower frequency and Tār saptak is composed of notes in a system of higher frequency.

All the seven notes or swaras are present in the three Saptakas as described above. So, the same seven notes generate three different saptakas by varying the frequency or pitch. The frequency denoted by each note is viewed as the represented properties of the object

(swara). The audience experiences the differences in frequencies or pitch (high-pitched or low-pitched sound) which originates from the same seven notes. The properties of the objects i.e. the different frequencies, leads to the changes in the phenomenal character of the auditory experience. Therefore, when a person listens to the same seven notes, which are used throughout in all the three Saptakas, he experiences them differently. Hence, the same notes produce the differences in the conscious character of the experience. Thus the same representational content can lead to the changes in the phenomenal character of the experience. It seems that the change in the phenomenal character is something distinct from the representational content of the experience.

The graphical representation shows that the note which is used in Mandra and Madhya Saptaka, when used in high-pitched or Tār Saptaka it changes its frequencies. For example, when the note Re is used in Madhya Saptaka, the graphical representation shows the frequency as 270 Hz. But when the same note is used in Tār Saptaka it shows the frequency as 540 Hz. Therefore, the graphical representations show that the frequency of the same note gets changed in two different saptakas. Since the properties of the represented objects i.e. the frequency gets transformed in Madhya and Tār Saptaka respectively. As a result we can say that the same note constitutes two different representational contents of the auditory experiences. The graphical representation of the notes show how the content of auditory experience determines the high-pitched or low pitched sound. Therefore, we conclude that the frequency of sound is not the property of the experience but the property belongs to the objects represented by the experience. In the case of auditory experience we see that the phenomenal character of the experience i.e. high-pitched can be explained by appealing to the content of the experience i.e. the graphical representation of the frequency of the note. So, following the intuition of

transparency we can say that the phenomenal character of the auditory experience is nothing over and above the properties represented in the experience.

There is an argument that may seem to go against the above view of transparency. The argument is approached from the idea of introspection. Those who accept the distinctive phenomenal character, qualia or the intrinsic qualities, in addition to the representational character of the perceptual experience hold that transparency is incompatible for explaining the intrinsic features. According to them the introspective awareness captures the intrinsic features over and above the representational character of the experience. Now the transparency intuition itself fails to explain these intrinsic features in terms of representational character of experience. There is a need to accept the existence of qualia separately. For example, perceptual experience can be viewed as seeing a picture. We find that while seeing a picture we not only perceive the colour but the shades of colour, the spatial relation, the colour distribution i.e. where the colour goes dark and where the colour goes light are also experienced by us. It means that the perception is not merely about perceiving things or objects. There is also some phenomenal character over and above the representational character. Intentionalists like Harman reject this view. According to him, in the case of painting, a person is aware of the objects being represented in the painting. She is also aware of the features of painting like colour, shades etc. in virtue of the way the painting is represented on the canvas. This does not prove that while seeing a painting the person is aware of some intrinsic features of painting. Moreover, the introspective awareness does not capture the pattern of painting as some intrinsic features which are over and above the representational character of the perceptual experience. Harman says,

I am comparing mentally picturing something with a picture of something, not with a perception of a picture. An awareness of a picture has its

intentional object a picture. The picture has its intentional object a unicorn. Imagining a unicorn is different from imagining a picture of a unicorn. The intentional object of the imagining is a unicorn, not a picture of a unicorn. (Harman, 1990, p. 34).

Hence, the view on transparency traced above rules out that the intrinsic properties like qualia are captured in introspective awareness. This dismisses the idea that the transparency fails to explain the intrinsic features of experience in terms of the representational content.

A criticism is raised against the notion of transparency by the following example. If we take the instance of blurred vision, the blurriness does seem to be an intrinsic feature of experience. Block (2002) gives the following example. Suppose there is a blurry image. Now we perceive that blurry image on a movie screen. Here we can clearly perceive the blurry image. In the second case, there are two clear images. One, of the programme and the other of the theatre. We may imagine ourselves reading a programme in a theater after that when we look at the screen the images seem blurry. The images may or may not be actually blurry but we have a blurry impression of them. After we unfocus our eyes the objects of representations (image) seem blurry. There occurs a change in the phenomenal character of the experience. The objects represented in the experience may not actually be blurry but we see them as blurry. Following representationalism we know that the change in the phenomenal character of the experience can only happen if there is a change in the representational or intentional content.

This highlights the point that the philosophers who support representationalism fail to distinguish between a clear impression of blurry images and the blurry impression of a clear image. When we are aware of the blurriness, the introspective awareness accesses the

intrinsic features of the experience. Now the difference between seeing things blurry and blurred out images may imply that blurriness is a part of the phenomenal character of the experience. Hence, if blurriness is a feature of experience then the transparency intuition becomes false.

Tye (2002) suggests that blurriness is not a part of the phenomenal character of experience. There is a difference between the case of seeing objects blurrily and blurry images of objects. When a person sees a sharp object as blurry he experiences its indistinct contour and boundaries. But this does not happen when someone unfocuses his eyes or simply takes off his spectacles. One loses the information here. In case of seeing a blurry image of an object a person simply undergoes sensory representations that cannot specify where the contour and boundary lies. Hence, there is less definite information about contour, boundary etc.

Tye (2002) suggests that in these two cases the difference occurs due to the degree of representational indeterminacy in the experience. While seeing something blurrily the experience of that person is less determinate about boundary, contour, surface details etc. On the other hand, while seeing something clearly one's experience catches the blurriness of the image accurately. Conceptually the person knows that the representational content is not blurry but the objects appear as blurry.

Hence, Tye (2002) concludes that the difference occurs due to higher-order consciousness. Levels of representation are, therefore, admitted by Tye. sensory representation and thought. These differences occur between realizing that one is seeing blurrily and realizing that one is seeing an image as blurry. According to Tye, this is extrinsic and non-

phenomenal. Extrinsic as opposed to intrinsic as admitted by supporters of qualia. Extrinsic and representational at a higher level of representation. Tye says,

Still is there really any phenomenal differences between seeing blurrily and seeing as blurry or between seeing blurrily a clear thing and seeing clearly a blurry thing? To be sure, there is a difference in higher-order consciousness, between realizing that one is seeing blurrily and realizing that one is seeing as blurry, but this is extrinsic and non-phenomenal. There is also normally an associated phenomenal difference connected with the presence of characteristic bodily sensations involved in the region of the eyes when one sees blurrily (one's eyes 'feel' different). And seeing as blurry may well be accompanied by a linguistic, auditory image of oneself saying (in one's native tongue) that the relevant thing is blurry. That image, like other images, will have phenomenal features. (Tye, 2002, p. 148.).

The representational indeterminacy as suggested by Tye (2002) shows that the less determinate information regarding the boundaries, contour leads a person to see something blurrily. Tye's suggestion on blurriness can be interpreted in two ways. For instance if a person has poor eyesight since birth then naturally she gains less determinate information about the representational content in comparison with the person who has normal eyesight. Due to the defect in the sense organs, the perceptual experience accesses the representational content in a less determinate way. It ultimately gives rise to changes in the phenomenal character of the experience accordingly. Hence, for explaining the phenomenal character as blurry in this case we need to refer to the way the person accesses the representational content. The person here lacks the actual information of the representational content due to her poor eyesight. So here we can say that the change in the phenomenal character is not something which can be explained in terms of the intrinsic

features of the experience. It can be explained in the way the representational content is accessed by the person in her introspective awareness. Therefore the transparency intuition can be accepted as correct.

Even if a person's eye sight is not poor by birth such conditions can be obtained later on. In that case though the person had the actual information regarding the content of her introspective awareness may give rise to a distorted view of the content while encountering the perceptual experience. Hence the distorted view of the content generates the changes in the phenomenal character of the experience. On the other hand, when we see a clear impression of a blurry thing, we access the blurry representational properties of the image of the object. Hence the content accessed in the perceptual experience is represented as blurred. Therefore, the representational content determines the change in the phenomenal character. In both the cases we find that it is not by appealing to the intrinsic features of the experience that we explain the blurriness of the visual experience. The reason for blurry appearance is different in the two cases i.e. the blurry impression of clear images and the clear impression of the blurry images respectively. Both the cases can be explained in terms of the representational content. The awareness of blurred representational content leads to the awareness of the phenomenal character of the experience of being blurry. Therefore, Block's example of blurriness cannot be counted as an objection against the transparency intuition.

2.4) Transparency and representationalism

In this section I will discuss how the intuition of transparency supports Tye's (1992, 1995, 1996, 2002) view on strong intentionalism for understanding the awareness of perceptual experience.

In contemporary philosophy, a representationalist like Tye (1992) says that if we want to explain what is given in our introspective or reflective awareness, the only way to pin down the phenomenal character is to look into the various properties that the experience represents. Apart from the representational content there is nothing which can be called the intrinsic property of the experience. In this context, Tye (1992) provides an example while perceiving the blue ocean. My experience of the ocean represents the property of the ocean, namely its blue colour.. The experience of the ocean itself is not blue. Whatever property is represented in the perceptual experience are all properties of the object of experience. Hence, the phenomenal character of experience is exhausted by the intentional or representational properties of the perceptual experience. This is called the ‘transparency of experience’. The transparency of experience suggests that in the process of perception we attend to the objects of perception themselves. Moreover, we do not attend to anything other than it. In introspective awareness we do not attend to any experience itself or its phenomenal character over and above the objects of perception themselves. Therefore, apart from the intentional content there is no intrinsic property of the experience.

Tye’s argument may be stated in the following manner:

- i. Properties represented in perceptual experience are properties of the object but not of the experience itself.
- ii. When we try to introspect an experience, we are only aware of the represented properties. The properties that are represented by the experience are not intrinsic features of the experience.
- iii In introspection we are only aware of the properties of the object, not anything that belongs to the experience itself.

- iv. If there is any phenomenal character of the experience , it will be necessarily captured through introspection.
- v. But, if there is something that we are aware of in introspection, it must be reducible to the represented properties themselves.
- vi. Therefore, if there is any phenomenal character of the experience it is exhausted by the representational properties of the experience.

Let us take an example and check whether Tye's argument for the intuition of transparency supports the claim of strong intentionalism. A few days ago I came across a very rare, beautiful, colourful and vibrant painting of the famous singer Gauhar Jaan on a matchbox. It was made in Austria. Now, after seeing the painting there occurs a change in the phenomenal character of my perceptual experience.

The change in the phenomenal character of the experience can be interpreted in two ways. Suppose there is a person named Dolly who has never heard of Gauhar Jaan. She sees the painting of Gauhar Jaan on the matchbox. Her introspective awareness accesses the representational properties like the bright colour, the painting of a beautiful lady, etc. Hence, her phenomenal character of the experience also reflects the properties of the represented object which is a beautiful painting of a lady on a matchbox. Whereas seeing the same painting on the matchbox, I might remember the several gramophone companies' masterpieces sung by Gauhar Jaan and some other facts that I know about her. Hence, my introspective awareness of the experience accesses the same representational properties of the experience. But the changes in the phenomenal character of the experience are different from Dolly's. The same representational properties of the object are generating two different phenomenal characters in two different persons. This implies that the

properties represented in the experience are not the properties of the object. Therefore, the phenomenal character of the experience cannot be determined by the representational properties of the experience. From the above example it could be concluded that this instance dismisses Tye's (1992, 2002) argument in support of transparency. Is there any intrinsic property of the perceptual experience itself? Can we explain the changes in the phenomenal character of two persons by referring to that intrinsic property of the perceptual experience?

The fact is that there is a change in the phenomenal character of the experience. By appealing to the representational properties of the object which is the painting on the matchbox, one can only explain the change in the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience. In the case of Dolly we see that the representational properties of the object which is the painting on the matchbox generates the change in the phenomenal character of the experience. Thus, her introspective awareness reflects on those properties and she finds the painting as the representation of a beautiful lady. On the other hand, in my case also the memories of Gauhar Jaan are generated after seeing the representational properties of the object. The change in the phenomenal character of the experience or the songs by Gauhar Jaan which I remember has a connection with the properties represented by the object. Therefore, in this case the memory or the change in the phenomenal character of experience takes place by appealing to the representational properties of the object. I cannot explain the change in the phenomenal character of the experience by appealing to any of the properties of the experience itself. Therefore, it proves Tye's premise (i) properties represented in the perceptual awareness are properties of the object but not of the experience.

While seeing the painting on the matchbox both Dolly and I are aware of the represented properties of the experience. My phenomenal character of the represented properties of the object generates certain thoughts but the source of the thoughts can be explained in terms of the representational properties. For me the representational properties of the experience lead to another cognitive level of the mental states i.e. memory. Therefore, in the case of introspective awareness both Dolly and I are aware of the representational properties of the experience. The introspective awareness does not give access to any intrinsic features of the experience. Therefore, it proves Tye's premise (ii).

The example shows that introspection does not give access to the intrinsic features of the experience. The change in the phenomenal character of the experience happens with respect to the properties represented by the object of experience. Therefore, it implies that in introspection we are only aware of the properties of the object. Hence, it proves Tye's premise (iii).

The change in the phenomenal character is determined by the representational properties of the object. Since introspective awareness accesses the representational properties of the experience, it means that the change in the phenomenal character is captured in introspection. Therefore it supports the claim of the premise (iv).

The memories depend on several facts which have representational content. This has been discussed in detail in the next chapter. The awareness of the representational properties of the objects in both the cases generates the change in the phenomenal character of the experience. According to this, in introspection if there is something that we are aware of, it has to be reducible to the represented properties themselves. Hence, this proves the premise (iv).

The changes in the phenomenal character of the experience can be explained with reference to my memory in this regard. The introspective awareness of a beautiful lady can be reduced in terms of the represented properties of the object. Hence, it means that the phenomenal character of the experience is exhausted by the representational properties. There is no need to accept the phenomenal character of the experience over and above the representational properties.

2.5) Byrne's view on strong intentionalism and the transparency account of self-knowledge

The strong representationalism suggests that whatever may be the changes in the phenomenal character it takes place due to the change in the intentional content. Why is the role of content so important for determining the changes in the phenomenal character? Perceptual states represent states of affairs. It is the content which conveys the information regarding the state of affairs to the subject. Hence, according to some philosophers the perceptual states act as an informational state to the subject. The awareness of the experience is involved as well as it involves the awareness of the states of affairs themselves.

The purpose of strong intentionalism is to show that representational facts are fundamental. It means that the phenomenal character ultimately depends on the representational content of the experience. That is why in order to understand 'what it is like to undergo such experience' we need to refer to the content. According to strong intentionalism, there is nothing to attend to the experience itself. Hence, the content determines the phenomenal character of the experience. Perceptual experience represents

the world or the states of affairs the way they appear to the subject. In this way, the perceptual states pass the information regarding the states of affairs to the subject.

According to Evans (1982)¹⁰ the same is applicable to thoughts like belief, judgment etc. Evans' transparency method (1982) states that a mental state of type M is transparent iff an agent can know that she is in a state of type M by attending to the pieces of evidence that bear on the content of M. Therefore, if someone asks me, "Do you believe that it is raining outside?" I can answer this question correctly and reliably just by looking outside and considering the evidence that bears on the question whether it is raining outside. The idea is, in order to gain the knowledge about our own mental state we need to reflect on the content of experience. Evans (1982) suggests that sensory experiences are informative but they are non-conceptual. The thoughts (belief, judgment) based on this information are conceptual. The information gets processed by acquiring several concepts. Hence, conceptualization is not directly a sensory process. But the knowledge of our mental states needs the coordination of both the sensory process and conceptualization.

Particularly, it is important to know how Evans' transparency method works to determine 'what it is like to undergo such an experience'. We need to verify whether it supports the claim of strong intentionalism.

The idea of transparency is that the phenomenal character is exhausted by the representational properties of the experience. Hence, any change in the phenomenal character of experience occurs due to the change in the content of experience. This is the basic claim that we need in order to enquire about whether transparency supports strong intentionalism.

¹⁰ Evans, G. (1982). *The Varieties of Reference*. Clarendon Press, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

I will explain three cases from Byrne's paper "*Intentionalism Defended*" (2001) and analyse whether it can successfully prove the claim of strong intentionalism by using the argument of the transparency intuition.

A. A subject is competent in the sense that she has perfect memory. If she experiences two events consecutively, she can differentiate between them. She has the cognitive ability to detect the changes in the phenomenal character of the experience. The subject undergoes two consecutive experiences e and e^* respectively. The experience e ends at t , and e^* occurs after that. It follows that e and e^* have different phenomenal characters. Since the subject has no cognitive shortcomings and her memory is perfect, she can successfully retrieve the information or misinformation from her memory. Hence, she can identify the changes in the experience that occur after t . It follows that whatever information she gains at t ; she can remember it while experiencing e^* . Therefore, the subject will notice a change after t and thus she will report the change in the phenomenal character of her experience after t . Hence, it can be stated that:

Strong Intentionalism (SI): Any change in the phenomenal character of experience happens due to the change in the content.

Let me explain this argument in the following manner:

- i. If two experiences are distinct, then a subject whose memory is perfect, can recognise the changes in the phenomenal character of the experience.
- ii. There are two distinct experiences like, e and e^* and they occur at different instances of time.
- iii. The subject's memory is perfect and she can memorise the fact of e while experiencing e^* .

- iv. Therefore, she will recognise the changes in the phenomenal character of the experience.

If somehow she fails to recollect facts of e then the conclusion becomes false. Does that prove, strong intentionalism is false? As a supporting argument we can say that if the subject fails to recollect the fact of experience e , it means that she has failed to recollect the intentional content of the experience e . If she fails to recollect the content, she will not be able to notice the change in the phenomenal character consequently. Therefore, this supports strong intentionalism and the transparency intuition.

B. Suppose there is a subject observing a sculpture in an art gallery. She is so absorbed by the sculpture that somehow she fails to notice the fact that a guard is standing on the other side. The guard leaves the scene at t . Since she fails to notice the fact that the guard left. She reports that there is no change in the phenomenal character of her experience after t . However, after narrating the incident to her she can recollect it. Hence, once she is informed about the fact she can remember it. She concludes that her earlier experience differs in the phenomenal character from the later one. It can be pointed out that the subject cannot notice the change spontaneously but a careful recollection is required to notice the change. Hence, it can be stated in the form of the following argument.

- i. If there are two distinct experiences with two different contents then the subject will notice the change in the phenomenal character accordingly.
- ii. There occur two different experiences with two different contents but the subject cannot spontaneously notice the change in phenomenal character of her experience.

- iii. Therefore, we can conclude that the change in the content of experience may not lead to change in the phenomenal character of her experience.

The claim of strong intentionalism can be restored by using Evans' transparency method introduced in his book *The Varieties of References* (1982). Evans is not concerned about the phenomenal character of experience. We can refer to his transparency method in defense of the claim of strong intentionalism.

Evans' transparency method: a mental state of type M is transparent iff an agent can know she is in a state of type M by attending to the pieces of evidence that bear on the content of M.

Evans says,

The crucial point is one I have italicized: in making a self-ascription of belief, one's eyes are, so to speak, or occasionally literally, directed outward- upon the world. If someone asks me 'Do you think there is going to be a third war?', I must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering the question, 'Will there be a third war?' I get myself in a position to answer the question whether I believe that *p* by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether *p*. (Evans, 1982, p. 225).

When the subject is asked to recollect her previous experience, accessing the information in her memory does not happen through looking at the experience itself. She needs to go through the states of affairs or representational facts which correctly represent her previous experience. The fact which constitutes the content determines 'what it is like to undergo such experience'. Hence, in this case when the subject is asked to look at her

internal informational state, she needs to refer to the content first. On the basis of the change in the content she can only realize what change in the phenomenal character of the experience has taken place. Therefore, transparency intuition can support the claim of strong intentionalism, i.e. the change in the phenomenal character of experience depends on the change in the representational properties of the experience.

C. Suppose there are two chips and they differ slightly in colour. These two chips are presented to a subject simultaneously. If one chip is replaced by the other the subject is unable to trace the change in the phenomenal character of the experience; the change which occurs due to the replacement of the chip. Hence, the following argument can be formulated:

- i. If there is a change in the content of the experience then the subject will notice a change in the phenomenal character of the experience.
- ii. There is a change in the content of the experience but the subject is unable to trace the change in the phenomenal character of the experience.
- iii. Therefore, the phenomenal character of the experience is not exhausted by the content of the experience.

In support of strong intentionalism it can be argued that if the chips are so similar then it would be hard to admit the fact that there is any change in the phenomenal character of the experience. Since the subject fails to notice the change in the intentional content of the experience, she fails to notice the change in the phenomenal character of the experience as well. If the chips were clearly distinguishable in colour then the subject would notice the change in the phenomenal character of the experience. Hence, this proves that the phenomenal character of the experience is exhausted by the intentional content. The transparency intuition, therefore, supports the claim of strong intentionalism.

Byrne's (2001) aim is to prove the fact that any change in the phenomenal character of the experience occurs due to the change in its representational content. While defending the claim of strong intentionalism, Byrne (2001) indirectly invokes the intuition of transparency. At the same time while doing so he appeals to a very different kind of transparency. The notion of transparency is different from the intuition of transparency that we use in the common context of perceptual experience. This type of transparency is also distinct from the intuition of transparency accepted by Tye (1992, 2002) for defending the claim of strong intentionalism. Byrne by implication uses the transparency account of self-knowledge.

The transparency accepted in the context of perceptual experience is the claim about the phenomenal character. It states that when we introspect we do not find any intrinsic properties of the experience over and above its representational properties. On the other hand, the model of transparency accepted for self-knowledge suggests that one can learn about her recent and past mental states by reflecting on the very contents of those mental states. The transparency account of self-knowledge suggests that a mental state is transparent in the sense that by reflecting on its representational content we can learn about the mental state itself.

How are these two intuitions of transparency connected? Strong intentionalism as defended by Byrne (2001) suggests that it is the content of experience which determines the phenomenal character of the experience. Therefore, with reference to memory when a person undergoes certain changes in the phenomenal character of the experience she needs to refer to the content of the memory first. The content which appropriately represents the facts of memories also relates the subject to the states of affairs that she needs to recollect. Hence, in the case of memory as well when we introspect we do not find any intrinsic

properties over and above the properties represented in the experience. The representational properties constitute the content related to the memory. The knowledge related to memory is a collection of several representational facts. The fact which represents the intentional objects and their properties ultimately constitutes the content of the memory. With regard to memory, therefore, the question arises as to how the content of the experience determines the phenomenal character of the experience.

Let us consider an example and check whether the intuition of transparency is compatible with strong intentionalism in this context. Suppose, at the breakfast table I have been served some chapatis with curry. I taste the curry a little bit and find it unusual in taste. There is something which is missing and it differs from the usual taste of the curry. So there is a change in the phenomenal character of the experience. After some time I figured out that the taste or the smell of asafoetida is missing in the curry. In that particular curry the asafoetida is not added making the taste of the curry seem different.

Asafoetida is one of the ingredients (objects of experience) of the curry and it represents certain properties (smell, taste, etc.). The curry with all its ingredients represents the content of the experience. Therefore while explaining the change in the phenomenal character i.e. the taste of the curry without asafoetida, I need to recollect the relevant facts (states of affairs) related to the content i.e. the curry and the usual ingredients constituting the gustatory experience of that curry. The usual ingredients refer to the general way that this curry is prepared. The content regarding memory is constituted by the intentional objects i.e. the ingredients of the curry and the properties represented by the objects i.e. the smell or taste of asafoetida and other ingredients. The introspective awareness of my memory does not reflect on any intrinsic properties of the experience. It reflects on the represented properties of the object of the experience. The instance assumes that I have the

relevant information about the taste or the smell of asafoetida. This is the most significant point while explaining the connection between these two kinds of transparency intuition.

Similarly, in the case of self-knowledge we can see the role of transparency for knowing our mental or intentional state. Suppose, All India Radio (AIR) is broadcasting a programme on Ustad Bade Ghulam Ali Khan. AIR is broadcasting some of the brilliant performances of Hindustāni Rāgas by Ustad Bade Ghulam Ali Khan. Now, if someone asks “Do you believe that the person singing is Ustad Bade Ghulam Ali Khan?” How do we know that this is Ustad Bade Gulam Ali Khan and how do we verify it?

I can correctly answer this question by attending carefully to the performance by Ustad Bade Ghulam Ali Khan. I can also say that All India Radio declared the name of the performer before the programme started and I paid attention to it. I can go through the online programme chart in order to confirm the fact. Providing a correct answer presupposes that I am familiar with the voice of Ustad Bade Ghulam Ali Khan. Therefore, I can recognize his voice immediately. It also assumes that my cognitive ability is fine so I can remember the name of the performer which has been declared at the beginning of the programme. I also have the ability to check the online programme chart of AIR. Hence, the instance suggests that in order to answer the question correctly, I need to remember and also refer to the facts which appropriately represent the state of affairs related to my belief state. I can answer this question correctly by attending to the evidence which bears on the content of the question i.e. whether the person singing is Ustad Bade Ghulam Ali Khan. Therefore, following the transparency intuition we can say that by reflecting on the content we can know about the mental state (belief state) itself.

In both cases we find that sometimes the content that we perceive provides the evidence for the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience and the mental state itself.

Whereas, sometimes the mental state or the intentional state presupposes background cognitive abilities like memory, application of the relevant concepts for explaining the facts or states of affairs in this regard.

The intuition of transparency suggested by Tye (1992, 2002) actually fails to show that in many cases the information about the states of affairs depends on the application of the relevant concepts. The sensory experience and the relevant concepts for explaining the perceptual experience can only constitute the content of the experience. That is why Evans while explaining self-knowledge states that the sensory experience is non-conceptual but the judgment (thought, belief) is both informative and conceptual. Hence, only the coordination of both can explain knowledge of our mental states successfully.

To explain this further, let me take a further example. The perception or the introspective awareness of the perceptual experience of a basil plant may generate two different phenomenal characters in two different people. The layman may perceive it as an ordinary plant as having certain properties like shape, colour etc; while a botanist may perceive the plant with some other intentions. In both cases the experience will generate a change in the phenomenal character of the experiencer/subject accordingly. The botanist being an expert, while looking at the plant may think about some drugs which are made from it. Hence, the botanist can believe that the drug is useful for curing certain diseases. Therefore, the representational content determines the phenomenal character of the experience. By reflecting on the representational content the botanist gains knowledge of her own 'internal informational' (belief) state.

Therefore, by reflecting on the content of self-knowledge we can learn about our mental states. Self-knowledge can thus be understood in this manner.

In conclusion, Byrne (2001), while defending strong intentionalism indirectly appeals to the transparency account of self-knowledge rather than appealing to the transparency intuition of perceptual experience.

The following examples imply that strong intentionalists agree that a difference in the phenomenal character happens due to the difference in the intentional content. In terms of perceptual modalities strong intentionalism can be classified into two types: *intramodal* and *intermodal intentionalism*¹¹.

- i. Intermodal intentionalists hold that the difference between perceptual modalities like, the difference between visual or olfactory experience occurs due to the difference in the content. Dretske (1997), Tye (1992, 1995, 1996, 2002) and Byrne (2001) support this view.
- ii. Intramodal intentionalists hold that the difference in the phenomenal character occurs not due to the difference in the content but the difference should be explained functionally. Lycan (1987, 1996) supports this view.

Perceptual modalities are to be understood the way the mode of perception is individuated in the phenomenal character. Modality means the different sensory modalities, like visual, olfactory, auditory etc.

Now Peacocke (1983)¹² attacks the view that all intrinsic properties of the experience are determined by the intentional content of the experience. For instance, a subject may perceive two trees of the same height. The trees are located at different distances from the subject. The tree which is nearer to the subject will occupy the larger visual field. Hence,

¹¹ Byrne, A. (2001, April). Intentionalism Defended. *The Philosophical Review*, 110(2), 199-240.

¹² Peacocke, C. (1983). *Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and their Relations*. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

the subject will experience it as larger in size. While the tree which is situated at a distance, the size of the tree will seem smaller to the subject. Here the experience represents that the trees are the same in size, but the phenomenal character is different. So, all the features of experience cannot be determined by the content of the experience.

In support of Byrne (2001) we can say that while experiencing the tree the subject perceives the size differently from two different distances. The tree which is located close to the visual field seems larger, the experience of the tree represents the size as larger. While the tree which is located at a distance the experience of the tree represents the size as smaller. The subject experiences the tree from a different location or distance. It implies that the subject experiences two different contents. Now with the variation of the content the phenomenal character also varies.

The changes in the phenomenal character of experiences that occur due to variation in sizes can be determined by the intentional content.

The perception of a tree which is close to the subject stimulates the optic nerve. The representation of the tree appears as larger. The same process is applicable for the perception of a tree located at a distance from the subject. The retinal nerve is responsible for the appearance of the tree as different from different locations. In the earlier section it has already been discussed that our optical nerve can function as the content of perceptual experience. After getting the sensory inputs from the stimulus (location of trees at different distances) the retinal nerves immediately convert them to the symbolic representations. Thus the representations of trees appear to the subject as larger or smaller from different locations. Depending on which distance the subject is located the representation of the size of trees as received by the retinal nerve varies. The variation of these two trees of the same height cannot be explained by looking at the experience itself

or by considering the intrinsic features of perceptual experience. It can be explained with respect to the neurophysical visual system.

Therefore, even in the same sense-perceptual modality the variation in the phenomenal character is determined by the variation in the perceptual content.

The above discussion implies that the content represents the facts or information of the world. Transparency intuition also states that apart from the content there is nothing which we can call the phenomenal character of the experience separately. The representational content necessarily determines the phenomenal character. Hence, phenomenal character depends on the representational content. In that sense representational content is fundamental for explaining the awareness of the perceptual experience and it necessarily determines the phenomenal character of the experience.

2.6) Representationalism, introspection and transparency

Dretske (1997)¹³ holds that there can be no fact which is subjectively accessible ('what it is like to undergo a certain experience') to a person. He accepts that if there is anything which is identified as the phenomenal character of experience or 'qualia' then it should be identified with the properties exemplified by the objects represented in the experience.

Dretske says,

If, in accordance with the Representational Thesis, we think of all mental facts as representational facts, the quality of experience, how things seem to us at the sensory level, is constituted by the properties things are represented as having. My experience of an object is the totality of ways

¹³ Dretske, F. (1997). *Naturalizing the Mind*. A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England.

that object appears to me, and the way an object appears to me is the way my senses represent it. (Dretske, 1997, p.1)

Drestke (1997) suggests that the facts about mental states or phenomena can be explained in terms of physical processes (neurophysiological and behavioral data). According to Dretske, an object may look phenomenologically different to two subjects. For example, a dog that looks like a poodle, may appear to a subject S in two ways:

1. The dog appears to S as a poodle, the way poodles usually appear to S.
2. The dog appears to S as different from all other dogs like, bulldog, golden retriever etc.

We may refer to this second clause as the discriminatory clause. To a person who is half-blind this second clause cannot be fulfilled as to him all dogs look alike. Even if two persons can efficiently discriminate a poodle from other breeds it does not mean that the poodle looks the same to them. Suppose, Arthur can differentiate a poodle from all other dogs so a poodle looks like a poodle to him. On the other hand, a toad may also differentiate a poodle from other dogs. But it does not mean that the poodle looks the same to Arthur and the toad. Does this mean that we need some reservation for qualia? Dretske's (1997) answer is no. According to him, a toad's visual system is different from ours. It cannot represent poodles, the way our visual system represents it. The difference is due to the difference in our neurophysiological system. Hence, with respect to the same content, an object (representational facts) may appear different to two persons. This does not mean that it occurs due to the phenomena of 'there is something it is like to undergo such an experience' which constitutes the conscious character of the experience. It is the

visual system which represents the experience in the above manner. It is thus a neurophysiological system; we do not need to accept qualia for this.

Dretske (1997) claims that whatever is conveyed in our perceptual experiences is representational in nature. Thus, all mental facts are representational. He has referred to his representationalism as 'representational naturalism'. Representationalism as advocated by Dretske claims that mental facts are representational and all representational facts are facts about informative functions. Therefore, we need to explain the relationship between the representation and the function: "a system, S, represents a property F, if and only if S has the function of indicating (providing information about) the F of a certain domain of objects." [16] The meaning of function has been defined in two ways. The function of senses is referred to as biological function. The biological function provides information. The indicator function generates natural representation in the organism.

According to Dretske (1997) there are two kinds of indicators: conventional and natural. The function of both the conventional and the natural indicators is to represent something. The conventional representational system gets their intentionality from their inventor or the person who designs them. Gadgets like thermometer, ECG, mobile, etc. are some of the instances of conventional representational systems. Thermometer represents the temperature because human beings have designed it for that particular purpose. Hence the thermometer obtains its representational function from the designer. The function of a thermometer is to provide information about the temperature of a room or bodily temperature. On the other hand, the natural indicators obtain their representational functions from their biological or evolutionary history. Human beings' perceptual mechanism is thus one of the natural indicators. They represent information about the world.

Dretske (1997) identifies qualia as representational properties of the objects represented in the experience. The represented properties can be explained in terms of representational states and the function they play while representing those properties. Therefore, in order to know what properties are being represented in the experience we need to see whether the representational system is functioning properly, the way it is supposed to work. In the case of the conventional representations, we need to see what purpose they serve and for this we need to look at the purposes and intentions of the creators or the inventors. If we want to know the representational properties of a watch then we need to check whether it is representing the time properly or not. The same is applicable for living beings too. This is the reason for Arthur not to represent poodles as something else. Even if the representation may appear different to different people the difference does not lie in the discriminatory powers of the beings. We can imagine two persons having the same discriminatory power yet they can have different experiences about the same representational fact. The difference lies in the function that conveys the experience. Suppose, there are two persons Susan and Arthur. Susan can identify poodles and can distinguish them from bulldogs. Hence, following the perceptual state she has the discriminatory power. Arthur has never seen a poodle hence he lacks the perceptual state. He cannot identify the dog as a poodle. Though both have the discriminatory power but they experience it differently. Since Arthur has no access to the perceptual state he thereby lacks the concept. Hence there is no need to accept any phenomenal character to explain the difference in experience. The difference is due to the fact that they occupy two different levels of representational state. Therefore, qualia can be physically defined or explained.

Nagel (1974)¹⁴ says that subjectivity of the experience or the phenomenal character of the experience can be explained by referring to the point of view of experience, which can be construed as the way in which the experience is connected with the world. Suppose the radar at Delhi and Varanasi represent the geographical location and topographical points in their vicinity. They represent different objects in the world and they have different points of view consequently. Now just by looking at the screen it is impossible to know that they have differences in their point of view. According to Nagel, the difference in their point of view is determined by which part of the sky they represent. It is not a fact about how they represent their part of the sky. The difference lies in the different perspectives of their view, the way they are connected to the world. Hence their perspective differs due to the fact of the different ways of being connected to the world. Thus, they represent different parts of the world. The differences occur not because they are experiences of different objects but because they create two different points of view.

Dretske (1997) replies by stating that the difference in experiential state does not result from the point of view that connects the experience to the world. It happens due to the way the points are viewed. Since they occupy two different locations it leads to the differences in their points of view. Hence, we can say two systems represent two different objects. Suppose there are two representing systems and they represent the same object differently. Can we explain the difference with reference to the representational system that they have? S_1 represents the object distinctly and S_2 represents the same object indistinctly. The reason is S_1 has the better version of the system and so it can represent the object clearly. For example, two mobile phones having the same megapixel camera can capture the same object differently. The quality of the pictures differs in terms of the clarity. The difference

¹⁴ Nagel, T. (1974, October). What Is It Like To Be A Bat? *The Philosophical Review*, 83(4), 435-450.

lies in the inbuilt mechanism that they have. Hence for explaining the differences in the point of view we do not need any phenomenal characteristics. It can very well be explained by following the representational properties of the experience.

Dretske (1997) has suggested that the indicator functions and the natural representation can be characterized in two ways: *systematic* and *acquired*

Systematic indicator

The function of the systemic indicator is inherited or “phylogenetic” and it generates “systematic representation”. “Phylogenetic” can be defined as being ‘based on natural evolutionary relationships.’¹⁵ This is denoted as representation_s.

Acquired indicator

The function of the acquired indicator is “ontogenetic” (related to the development of the individual throughout the entire lifespan) and it generates acquired representation. This is denoted as representation_a.

According to Dretske (1997) following the above picture painted by the representational theory of mind we can hold that the object-perception and fact-perception involves two different modes of perceptual representation. They are ‘the sensory mode of representation’ or “non-conceptual representation” (representation_s) and ‘the conceptual mode of representation’ (representation_a). The sensory mode of representation is defined as the way experience represents the object. It occurs while encountering the objects of the external world. Dretske holds that sensory perception is explained in terms of neurophysiological process. Hence it is referred to as “phylogenetic”. On the other hand,

¹⁵ Merriam-Webster (<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/phylogenetic>).

the conceptual mode is may be said to be the manner in which thought (belief, judgment, etc.) represents facts about the objects. For example, one can know that the stick immersed in water is straight (conceptual representation) while at the sensory level the stick appears bent to the person.

Therefore, our perceptual experience is the coordination between both the sensory and the conceptual modes of representation. For instance, when a child perceives the tree for the first time, he would have the same representation: representation_s as the adult have. Additionally, an adult would have more information which we can call representation_a, i.e. the belief that this is a tree with such and such properties. Hence representation_s represents the sensual properties. But the adult develops additional conceptual information about trees which we call representation_a. This is a basic distinction between phylogenetic and ontogenetic which distinguishes between thought and sensory experience.

Both Tye (1992, 1995, 1996, 2002, 2008) and Dretske (1997) accept intentionalism in the strong sense. Tye's (1992, 1995, 1996, 2002, 2008) version of representationalism states that intentional content provides evidence directly for explaining the representational features of visual experience. Therefore, by looking at the 'object of experience' we can determine the phenomenal character of visual experience. Whereas not for all cases intentional content can provide direct evidence to determine the awareness of perceptual experience. Given that all mental facts are representational how do we explain introspection?

Dretske (1994) defines introspective awareness as displaced perception. It means that perceptual fact is displaced from the perceptual object. For instance, by looking at a book I cannot say that the book contains 400 pages. This is denoted as representation_a by Dretske.

I need to check the content of the book in order to know the number of pages. But I can assume the fact. At the sensory level I can only see certain properties of the book. Following Dretske this is called representation_s. The role of introspection is to reveal the relation that holds between the two types of representations i.e. representation_s and representation_a.

According to this view introspection reveals nothing which is an intrinsic property of the experience itself. Whatever we access in the introspective knowledge is the representational aspect of the fact. Introspection along with a connecting belief that experiences of F (fact) are reliable indicators of F, provides the information to the subject. In the case of perception of the fact 'the book has 400 pages' I believe that the content of the book is a reliable indicator of the fact. Hence introspection is not systematic representation that is representation_s. It should be referred to as the cognitive representation or conceptual representation, i.e. representation_a. Thus we don't need to accept the role of any intrinsic features of experience even if the objects of experience do not provide direct evidence for the visual experience. Intentional objects motivate the second order representation and both ultimately determine the awareness of perceptual experience. Hence transparency intuition fits perfectly in establishing the intentional content as fundamental for determining the phenomenal character of experience.

Consequently the question arises about how Dretske's (1997) view on strong intentionalism supports the transparency intuition. Evans (1982) suggests that sensory experiences are informative but they are non-conceptual. The thoughts (belief, judgment) based on this information are conceptual. The process of conceptualization is initiated by taking the subject from one informational state to another. The information gets processed by acquiring several concepts. It takes the subject to another cognitive state (belief,

judgment) with the conceptual content. Thus, conceptualization is not a sensory process. This is a general process by which human beings enrich their domain of knowledge.

Therefore the question stands as how the method of transparency is related to the process of conceptualization? If someone asks me, ‘do you believe that it is raining outside (F)?’ I will look at the external world and answer the question accordingly. In order to give a correct answer I need to believe that outward observation of F is a reliable indicator of F. It means that I can reliably answer by looking at the supporting evidence which confirms the fact. I have the relevant concepts i.e. representation_a in order to answer the question correctly. As advocated by Evans (1982) this is defined as the transparency method. Thus, the subject in order to have experience requires the coordination of both the informational state and the relevant concept which she acquires in the process of gaining knowledge about the informational world. Therefore, following both Evans (1982) and Dretske (1997) we can say that experience is the package of both sensory representation and conceptual representation.

2.7) Conclusion

The chapter begins with the question whether transparency intuition is compatible with the claim of strong intentionalism. We find that transparency can be proved as true in the context of representationalism. The chapter primarily explores the opinion of Tye (1992, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2008) Byrne (2001) and Dretske (1994, 1997) and their different grounds for accepting representationalism. The purpose of this chapter is to bring out the thought that the philosophers who are accepting strong intentionalism in the context of representationalism are basically defending their thesis by appealing to the intuition of transparency. The intuition of transparency discussed in this chapter shows that apart from

the thought expressed by Tye (1992, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2008) the idea of transparency is implicit in the writings of Byrne (2001) and Dretske (1994, 1997).

Tye (1992, 2002) has strongly recommended the intuition of transparency for defending strong intentionalism. Though Tye (1992, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2008) has accepted the intuition of transparency in some cases it becomes difficult to understand how the intuition of transparency of experience works in the context of representationalism and strong intentionalism. For example, as we have discussed in section one, the perceptual experience of perceiving a tree reveals the particular object which is the tree and certain properties such as the color of the leaves, the shape etc. associated with it. Apart from these representational properties there are no intrinsic properties which can be accessed by looking at the experience itself. It can therefore be said that the representational properties of the object or the representational character of the experience exhausts the phenomenal character of the experience.

In some cases the representational content or the representational properties of the object cannot properly explain why the phenomenal character of the experience needs to be determined in terms of representational content. The perception of the properties of objects represented by the experience or by looking just at the representational content is not enough to explain this fact. The type of transparency accepted by Tye (1992, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2008) fails to explain this fact.

With reference to the case of illusion where a stick is immersed in the water appears as bent. The same representational content or the representational properties of an object will generate two different thoughts in the mind of an adult and a child. A child may believe that the stick is actually bent while the adult will not accept it. The same representational

content leads to two different phenomenal characters of the experience. The transparency intuition accepted by Tye (1992, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2008) cannot explain the differences between these two experiences. The access of information regarding a state of affairs needs some background of concepts. The child lacks the appropriate information regarding the state of affairs and thus believes that the stick is actually bent. Hence the transparency intuition of experience here sometimes provides us incomplete information. It becomes difficult to understand how the representational content determines the phenomenal character of the experience.

Byrne (2001) has also defended the claim of strong intentionalism by appealing to the transparency intuition indirectly. Byrne (2001) in his defense of strong intentionalism has not explicitly mentioned the role of transparency. Therefore in this chapter I have advocated how Byrne's (2001) claim of strong intentionalism is grounded on the intuition of transparency and it has a strong connection with the transparency model accepted for self-knowledge. Byrne's (2001) claim of strong intentionalism i.e. the representational content of experience necessarily determines the phenomenal character of the experience as advocated by Evans' (1982) model of transparency for self-knowledge.

Evans' transparency method (1982) suggests that sensory experience helps us to access the evidence in the external world which correctly represents the states of affairs. In this chapter I have elaborated upon Evans' transparency method (1982) which suggests that the sensory experience along with the conceptual background can successfully explain the perceptual experience in the context of representationalism. Therefore, the problem faced by Tye ((1992, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2008) in his thesis is solved.

Finally in Dretske's theory of representationalism (1997) we find that the perceptual experience is the combination of both sensory and conceptual representation. Dretske (1997) in his thesis did not mention the role of transparency for explaining his theory of representationalism. This chapter suggests that Dretske's displaced perception (1994) and the two modes of representation accepted for defending strong intentionalism appeals to the model of transparency used for explaining self-knowledge. I have discussed how the method of transparency used in self-knowledge can defend the claim of strong intentionalism more appropriately rather than the intuition of transparency accepted in the context of perceptual experience.

So far I have discussed that the transparency intuition is compatible with the claim of strong intentionalism. Now the question arises whether transparency can be explained only in terms of representationalism? Can the intuition of transparency be challenged by the philosophers who accept strong intentionalism? These questions will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter Three

Representationalism and Opacity

3.1) Introduction

This chapter will discuss how some philosophers reject the idea of transparency explained in the context of representationalism. The chapter explores two different views on transparency. Some philosophers like Martin (2002) state that the intuition of transparency cannot be explained in the context of representationalism. He rejects the claim of strong intentionalism and accepts phenomenal transparency. On the other hand, Crane (2000, 2009) accepts strong intentionalism but rejects the transparency intuition.

In section 3.2 Martin's (2002) argument for phenomenal transparency is introduced. The purpose of this argument is to show that the intuition of transparency and strong intentionalism cannot go hand in hand. Section 3.3 deals with how naïve realism helps us to identify changes in the conscious character of perceptual experience that occur in veridical and non-veridical perception. The differences between naïve realism and intentionalism will also be discussed. The section 3.4 explores the type of naïve realism adhered by Martin (2002) and its advantage to explain the distinctiveness of the phenomenal character of experience. Dretske's (1994) displaced perception has been referred to in section 3.5 in order to examine whether we can restore the claim of strong intentionalism in connection with transparency. Section 3.6 suggests that Martin's phenomenal transparency (2002) can be rejected on the ground that perspectival features of experience can be explained in terms of displaced perception (Dretske, 1994). It is supported by the transparency intuition and ultimately it defends the claim of strong intentionalism. Crane's (2000, 2009) argument for accepting mode for determining the

phenomenal character of the perceptual experience has been discussed in section 3.7 of the chapter. He rejects the transparency intuition for explaining strong intentionalism. Finally in the last section which is 3.8 the argument from intermodal perception has been used to prove that the perception of the same object can lead to the perception of different representational properties. It ultimately determines the phenomenal character of experience. Conclusively there is no need to accept mode for determining ‘what it is like to have some experience’.

3.2) Phenomenal transparency

In the first place, let me introduce Martin’s (2002)¹⁶ argument for phenomenal transparency. The purpose of this argument is to prove that strong intentionalism fails to capture the perspectival features of perception.

Martin (2002) raises an objection against strong intentionalism by exhibiting that while undergoing perceptual experience we do perceive different qualities like spatial relation, qualities of physical objects etc. Strong intentionalists conclude that introspection does not give us access to any kind of direct or intrinsic features of experience. The things which are either presented or represented to us by the experience are not over and above the representational character of experience. However, Martin (2002) suggests that following this picture of perceptual experience we cannot say that while undergoing the perceptual experience whatever we get can be reduced into the representational content. Rather perceptual experience gives access to some relations between us i.e. the subject and the external world.

¹⁶ Martin, M. G.F. (2002). The Transparency of Experience. *Mind and Language*, 17(4), 376-425.

According to Martin (2002), perception ultimately depends on the relation (that exists) between the subject and the external world¹⁷. The transparency model accepted by Martin (2002) is referred to as ‘phenomenal transparency’. The idea of phenomenal transparency, as accepted by Martin (2002), states that the subject’s experience relates her to the mind-independent world in a non-representational manner. For instance, when I look at my image in the mirror my image reflects to me as wearing a particular dress, having spectacles on my eyes etc. But there are other ways also through which I can relate myself to the image in the mirror. Such as now that I am growing older, the changes in my skin color, the change in the thickness of my hair which are not directly given in the representational content of the experience. The perceptual experience has certain relational features which cannot be reduced to the representational content (objects and its properties). When the subject undergoes certain experiences the conscious character of experience also involves the perception of these relational features. Therefore, representational properties which constitute the content cannot entirely determine the phenomenal character of the experience. According to Martin, if I shift my eyes from the mirror and try to reflect on the experience itself then the subject-matter of my experience does not instantiate any inner property of my mind. Hence, the experience reveals the awareness of mind-independent objects but it occurs in a non-representational manner.

Martin’s (2002) suggestion for perception of the perspectival features can be explained using another example. If I look at an antique watch of my grandfather, I relate to the experience of the watch in a particular way. The perceptual experience of the watch relates me to the mind-independent object i.e. the object and the properties it instantiates. There

¹⁷ Martin, M. G.F. (2002). The Transparency of Experience. *Mind and Language*, 17(4), 376-425.

are other aspects as well through which I can relate myself to the experience of perceiving the watch. The perception of the watch may lead to the perception of the aspects like the age, the antique value, changes in the color of the metal etc. The perception of it may generate several memories that I have regarding the watch. According to Martin, these aspects of perceptual experience cannot be explained in terms of the representational character of perceptual experience.

Martin says,

When I stare at the straggling lavender bush at the end of my street, I can attend to the variegated colors and shapes of leaves and branches, and over time I may notice how they alter with seasons. But I can also reflect on what it is like for me to be staring at the bush, and in doing so I can reflect on particular aspects of the visual situations: for example that at this distance of fifty meters the bush appears more flattened than the rose bush which forms the boundary of my house with the street. When my attention is directed out at the world, the lavender bush and its features occupy centre stage. It is also notable that when my attention is turned inwards instead of my experience, the bush is not replaced by some other entity belonging to the inner realm of the mind in contrast to the dilapidated street in which I live. I attend to what it is like for me to inspect the lavender bush through perceptually attending to the bush itself while at the same time reflecting on what I am doing. So it does not seem to me as if there is any object apart from the bush for me to be attending to or reflecting on while doing this. (Martin, 2002, p. 380).

Martin (2002) defends the perceptual experience of the mind-independent objects that appear before the subject with their properties and other relational features. There may not be any intrinsic features of the experience. The other aspects of perception like the relational features cannot be grasped only by the representational content or the properties of the objects of experience. The introspective awareness gives access to the experience of mind-independent objects and the way the subject is related to the mind-independent world. This relation cannot be merely explained in terms of representational content. The experience is transparent in the sense that it is related to the mind-independent objects or the external world.

According to Martin (2002), transparency explained in the context of strong intentionalism cannot grasp the perspectival features of experience. It related the subject to mind-independent objects and its properties without accommodating the perspectival features of experience. The distinctive phenomenal character of experience of the perspectival features adds something more to the representational content of experience. Therefore, Martin (2002) concludes that the transparency intuition remains unexplained in the context of strong intentionalism.

3.3) Naïve realism and strong intentionalism

This section elucidates how naïve realism showcases the distinctness in the phenomenal character of an experience of a subject that occurs due to the actual presence of an object which is the veridical perception. It implies that the phenomenal character of an experience will change in case of non-veridical perception. The purpose of naïve realism is to show that strong intentionalism fails to discriminate between the veridical and non-

veridical perception. With reference to this discussion a connection between naïve realism and intentionalism has been established which basically states that perception cannot have any intrinsic properties.

According to Martin (2002), in strong intentionalism a common kind of mental state is found in the perceptual experiences like veridical perception, hallucination and illusion. For example, the perceptual experience of seeing a tree can occur following three cases like; veridical perception, hallucination and illusion. Transparency in the context of strong intentionalism fails to discriminate between a veridical and non-veridical perception. Martin (2002) rejects intentionalism and suggests that naïve realism can offer a good explanation for accepting transparency in case of perceptual experience.

According to naïve realism veridical perception is a genuine perception in nature and its relation to ordinary objects. Perceptual experience establishes a genuine relation between the subject and the ordinary objects. For example, if I see a red ball on the table now if I want to know why the thing is appearing as a red round object to me, then as per naïve realism, there is an actual instance of red round object before me¹⁸.

Naïve realists also accept that perception has representational features but the phenomenal character of experience is not determined by the representational content. It is the actual presence of the objects of experience which determines the phenomenal character of the experience. The subject's awareness of experience in relation to the actual presence of the objects of the world is fundamental for explaining the phenomenal character. This explains why veridical and non-veridical perceptions generate different phenomenal characters to

¹⁸French, C. (2018). Naïve Realism and Diaphaneity. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. CXVIII(Part 2), 149-175.

the subject. It follows that naïve realism is associated with two thoughts. Firstly, a perceptual experience is relational, where a subject stands in a perceptual relation to the mind-independent objects. Secondly, the mind-independent objects are constituents of the perceptual experience and its presence forms the conscious character of the experience.

The view adhered by naïve realism is different from strong intentionalism. As the supporters of strong intentionalism believe even if there exists no real objects of perception, the perceptual experience represents something (see chapter 2). Naïve realism holds that the conscious phenomenal character as generated in the presence of perceptual objects is different from the conscious phenomenal character which is not generated in the actual presence of objects. Following strong intentionalism we cannot differentiate between these two phenomenal states of perception.

It may seem that this is the best alternative for explaining phenomenal transparency of perception. Whereas Martin (2002) states that the cases from hallucinations and illusions make naïve realism false.

The point being both naïve realism and intentionalism holds that there are no intrinsic features of the experience that we are aware of. Naïve realists try to explain the phenomenal character in terms of the relation that holds between the subject and the actual existence of the object. On the other hand, representationalists corroborate the phenomenal character in terms of representational properties. Therefore phenomenal character can be explained either in terms of representational properties or in terms of certain perceptual relations.

3.4) Disjunctivism and phenomenal transparency

Is there any other alternative following which we can explain the transparency account?

This section deals with Martin's (2002) view on certain inadequacies of naïve realism.

Since naïve realism fails to explain cases of hallucination, illusion and other non-veridical states of perception, Martin (2002) suggests that naïve realism is inadequate for explaining phenomenal transparency. Martin suggests,

If a naïve realist adopts disjunctivism, then he can avoid the conclusions of the argument from the illusions. If the naïve realist offers a competing account of phenomenal immediacy from the intentionalist theorist, then the naïve realist form of disjunctivism proposes a different conception of the phenomenal character of experience from that given by the intentional theory. (Martin, 2002, p. 395)

Martin (2002) offers disjunctivist theory of perception which also supports the argument of naïve realism. He concludes that veridical and non-veridical perception form different phenomenal mental states by appealing to phenomenal transparency. For example, in the perceptual experience of a table, the experience presents the mind-independent object to the subject. The experience can be viewed as a relation between the mind-independent object and the subject. Martin suggests that the mind-independent objects and its properties are the constituent of the experience. If the perception is veridical then the objects and its properties partly generate the phenomenal state of the experience. According to this notion of perception we cannot say that in the absence of the same perceptual objects and its properties the subject would have perceived the same phenomenal state of experience. The actual presence of perceptual objects and properties

generates a different phenomenal character of experience which cannot be experienced in a similar way in the absence of those objects.

Martin (2002) shows that there is a difference between sensory imagination and sensory experience which establishes the distinctiveness of the phenomenal character of the experience. The distinction has been explained in the later part of this section.

Disjunctivism denies the view that perception forms a common kind of mental state in cases like veridical perception, hallucination and illusion. If one adheres to disjunctivism then she can defend naïve realism and can offer an alternative account to phenomenal transparency of perceptual experience. The idea is that perceptual experience is either veridical or not veridical, hence it has a different phenomenal character. It holds that veridical perception and hallucinations etc. are different in nature. Both the disjunctivists and naïve realists hold that objects of experience are mind-independent and they are the constituents of the experience. The awareness of perceptual experience is generated by the presence of mind-independent objects. In the case of hallucination, we cannot grant that the objects of experience are the constituents of the experience. According to the disjunctivist in case of veridical perception the occurrence of the experience is guaranteed by the presence of the object of perception. Following intentionalism we cannot hold this view since intentionalism allows that objects of experience may not actually exist.

In the process of analysing perceptual experience we introduce two accounts of transparency. They are sensory imagination and sensory experience. An internal connection can be found between a sensory imagination and a sensory experience. For example, to visualize an orange means to imagine a visual experience of the orange. By sensory imagination we understand something like the distinctive episodes of imagining or

imaging. This is how our visualization corresponds to perception (seeing). While making a possible move during playing chess I may visualize the possible moves and after that I can take the decision accordingly. The memory also plays a significant role in the case of imagery. While visualizing the possible moves of chess I need to remember the correct strategy required in playing chess.

In the case of imagination there is a correspondence between the sensory imagination and the sensory experience. There is a correlation between the objects of vision and the objects of visualization. To visualize an orange means to imagine how it would look. Therefore, if the perception is veridical to visualize something successfully means that it has to be visualized in the very same way that it is. According to Martin (2002), the thesis can be claimed as Dependency Thesis:

To imagine sensorily a means – to imagine experiencing a –¹⁹

Dependency thesis (Martin, 2002, p. 404) explains the connection between sensory experience and imagining. Following the dependency thesis it can be said that we visualize the objects by imagining the experience of the thing. Visualization of an object involves conscious activity with the phenomenal character of the experience which corresponds to the visual experience of that object or scene. According to Martin, the visualization of the object is neutral. Whether the object is actually present before the subject or not is not a matter of concern. If there is no object it does not mean that the visualization is misleading. The object has to be imagined the way it is. The phenomena of the sensory, imagistic character of the episode of visualizing represents the conscious character of visual experience in a distinctive manner.

¹⁹Martin, M. G.F. (2002). The Transparency of Experience. *Mind and Language*, 17(4), 376-425.

Similarly, we can talk about or think about feeling an itch on some part of the body without actually feeling it. Martin (2002) suggests that this way of representing an itch need not be an itch which is imagined from the inside. One can imaginatively project the sensation of itch. In that case the sensation will be less determinate.

Martin (2002) states that the visualization of perspectival features like visualizing point of view happens through imagining (the visual experience) the point of view. It is relative to the perspectival features imagined in that case. According to Martin (2002) when we visualize the perspectival features we may not suppose that the experience is related to us or anyone else as a perceiver of the experience. While visualizing I might suppose that there is no one to perceive the visualized scene related to that imagined experience.

Martin (2002) claims that when one represents the distinctive kind of conscious character of experience of an object, the visual experience represents the imagined experience. Therefore, when one visualizes lights one represents the light in a distinctive way by representing the conscious character of the experience of lights. The distinctive representation does not imply that we need to suppose a subject in the imagined situation having a visual experience of those lights.

For example, I can imagine myself enjoying the beautiful scene of a sunrise from the seashore. Now apart from the properties instantiated by the objects represented, there are certain relational aspects of the experience. The perspectival features of the imagination may include the viewpoint from where I can enjoy the best view of the greenery and the surrounding of the seashore. I can also visualize that if I walk a few kilometers away I can watch the beautiful reflections of sun rays on the ocean. Now all these aspects of the experience are related to me in a certain way.

The visualization of the scene in this regard can be interpreted in the following way. I may imagine something completely new or I may imagine something about which I have knowledge or that I am familiar with. The parts of which we imagine sometimes formulate beliefs or generate thoughts about it. Apart from the objects of experience the beliefs in this regard also include the perspectival aspects of the perceptual experience.

Martin (2002) points out that there are differences between the experience of perspectival aspects in case of imagination and sensory experience. Strong intentionalism cannot capture the difference in an appropriate manner. In the case of imagination the perspectival aspects are revealed to us in a less determinate way. The reason being in case of imagination we are not encountering those relations the way we encounter them in case of sensory experience. Even when the visualization happens in an appropriate way the difference may occur.

Since strong intentionalism forms a common kind of perception following all the cases of hallucination, illusion and veridical perception it cannot explain the above mentioned differences that occur between the imagination and the sensory experience. Martin's (2002) view on disjunctivism can accommodate this distinction between the imagination and the sensory experience. The transparency intuition here attaches a sense of first-person authority and claims that the perspectival features cannot be felt in the right manner in case of imagination. It can be captured well in case of sensory experience (veridical).²⁰

When one represents the feeling of itch from inside one represents the conscious character of itch in a distinctive way. This type of feeling is not equivalent to making conjecture or

²⁰Martin, M. G.F. (2002). The Transparency of Experience. *Mind and Language*, 17(4), 376-425.

belief about the visual experience. Supposition regarding visual experience can be made without actually visualizing it. Similarly, supposition about itch on one's thigh can be made without actually imagining it from inside "what it would be like to feel it".

Therefore, the imagination of an object can be made without the actual presence of the object. In the process of visualization one has to imagine an object the way it is. The imagination may not suppose the existence of the subject or individual as related to the experience. Martin (2002) says that, in order to visualize a hallucination, one needs the non-imagistic supposition that it is an experience of the hallucination²¹.

Martin says,

Why should we think that imagining is sensuous in terms of what is imagined rather than, as with sensory experience in terms of the way the mental state itself is? A clear reason for accepting this move comes when we consider certain kinds of case such as imagining bodily sensations. Consider, for example, the case of imagining an itch. Normally we think feeling an itch to be a necessary condition of the existence of an itch (note the claim is only that one should feel the itch, not that one should attend to or notice it), and we are also inclined to think that the feeling of an itch is sufficient for the existence of an itch (Martin, 2002, p. 406).

Therefore, by sensory imagination we understand something like the distinctive episodes of imagining or imaging. For example, imagining an itch is less determinate than feeling one. In order to have the sensation of an itch we do not need the actual itch. So the

²¹ Soteriou, M. (2016). *Disjunctivism: New Problems of Philosophy*. Routledge. p. 74.

imagination of an experience in some respects, being experiential in itself is nonetheless different . Why is the distinction between the sensory imagination and sensory experience significant for explaining phenomenal transparency? The answer lies in the fact that in the case of transparency of experience we find an immediacy. This immediacy is not present in the very same way in the case of imagination.

The above view as advocated by Martin (2002) suggests that in both the cases of veridical and non-veridical experience there exists a relation between the mind-independent objects (world) and the subject. Martin states that this relation cannot be perceived by the subject in the similar manner. The subjective feeling of relatedness of perceptual experience differs in terms of ‘immediacy’ or the ‘vividness’. The subjective feeling of ‘immediacy’ can be accessed by looking at the relational or perspectival aspects of experience. This relational aspect entails the distinctive phenomenal character of experience. Transparency relates the subject to a mind-independent world which leads to a distinctive phenomenal character of experience. If the experience is veridical then phenomenal character of experience is felt as vivid and if it is non-veridical the subject perceives the experience as less vivid.

Therefore, disjunctivism can successfully explain that the objects of perception are constituents of the experience if the experience is veridical. In the case of imagination the feeling is there though there is no actual itch. We can access the feeling in a less determinate way but not in a representational manner. They are transparent in a non-representational manner. Here transparency attaches a sense of first-person authority which gives access to the distinctive phenomenal character of experience.

3.5) Representationalism and ‘displaced perception’

Does Martin’s disjunctivism (2002) make strong intentionalism false? Dretske’s idea of ‘displaced perception’(1994) has been used in order to restore the claim of strong intentionalism. The purpose of displaced perception is to show that the perception of perspectival aspects depends on learning several concepts and these concepts are ultimately representational states.

Dretske’s theory of ‘displaced perception’ (1994) which is supported by the transparency account of self- knowledge (see chapter 2) can be a solution to Martin’s (2002) objection against representationalism. According to Dretske (1997) all mental events are representational states. Dretske (1969) makes a distinction between perceiving and ‘perceiving as’. This is a distinction between epistemic perception and non-epistemic perception²². A perceptual experience can be considered as a sensory representation of objects or states of affairs. We may perceive an object without having any further information or thought (belief, judgment) about it. This type of representation is non-conceptual. Dretske (1969) refers to it as ‘non-epistemic’ perception. Whereas the perception of an object may generate certain thought about the object. It assumes that we have acquired certain information about the object. In the course of encountering objects or states of affairs repeatedly we may learn several facts about it. These facts are representational and conceptual. Dretske (1969, p.35) refers to it as ‘epistemic perception’.

The perceptual experience of an object is connected with the information or beliefs about that object. Dretske (1993) states that there is a distinction between a perceptual

²² Dretske, F. (1969). *Seeing and Knowing*. Routledge and Kegan Paul, The University of Chicago.

experience of *x* and a perceptual belief about *x*. The perceptual experience of an object may not entail the perceptual belief about that object²³.

Dretske says,

By contrasting our awareness of things (*x*) with our awareness of facts (that *P*) I mean to be distinguishing particular (spatial) objects and (temporal) events on the one hand from facts involving these things on the other.”
 “Things are neither true nor false though, in the case of events, states of affairs and conditions we sometimes speak of them as what makes a statement true. Facts are what we use in making true statements about things. We describe our awareness of facts by using a factive- complement, a that-clause, after the verb; we describe our awareness of things by using a (concrete) noun or noun phrase as direct object of the verb (Dretske, 1993, p. 264).

The awareness of objects may not entail the facts about those objects. Facts are expressed by sentences in making true statements about objects. For example, let us take a sentence, “John is reading a book”. We are aware of objects like, John, a book, John’s reading a book. We are also aware of the fact that he is reading a book . Dretske (1993) refers to objects like, John, book, John’s reading a book as things and ‘that John is reading a book’ as a fact. Hence, there is awareness of things and awareness of facts about those things.

We can be conscious of an object (*x*) by seeing, hearing, touching etc. Here seeing, hearing etc are referred to as ‘sensing a thing or fact’. Consciousness of facts means

²³ Dretske, F. (1993). Conscious Experience. *Mind*, 102(406), 263-283.

deployment of certain concepts. For example, if a subject S is aware of an object x and also aware of fact about the object i.e., x is F, it means that S has the concept F and S applies the concept F in her awareness of x. For instance, if a person hears the sound of boiling water he thereby becomes aware of the fact that the water is boiling. It means that the person must have the relevant concepts in order to make a judgment about the fact. The person understands what is meant by the boiling of water and other relevant concepts in order to (Dretske, 1993, #)become aware of the fact that the water is boiling. Dretske (1993, p. 263-283) suggests that our awareness of facts is involved in acquiring relevant concepts²⁴. The learning of relevant concepts generates thoughts or beliefs regarding those concepts in the mind of a person. The memory also plays a significant role here. Whenever the person hears the sound of boiling water she becomes aware of the fact that the water is boiling. She believes it and makes the judgment accordingly.

We perceive many things around us but often we are not aware of the facts about those things. For instance, when for the first time we look at an unknown animal in a zoo we simply lack the relevant information about it. Though we are aware of the presence of the animal, we cannot say that we are aware of the facts about it. The awareness of facts about the animal requires the relevant information about it. This implies that the animal has such and such properties. Dretske (1993) concludes that S is conscious of x is not equivalent to saying that S is conscious about the fact about x. The awareness of things does not entail believing facts about those things. That is why Dretske holds that looking at the object or being perceptually aware of the object does not entail that a subject is aware of the fact about that object.

²⁴ Dretske, F. (1981). *Knowledge and The Flow of Information*. MIT Press.

The perception that “x is F” may not happen by perceiving x directly. It may require other relevant concepts (y) in order to conclude that x has such and such properties (F). This is called ‘displaced perception’ as formulated by Dretske (1994).

Perceptual experience involves both the role of ‘the sensory mode of representation’ or ‘the non-conceptual representation’ and ‘the conceptual mode of representation’²⁵. The way the experience represents the object is used as an explanation for the sensory mode of representation. On the other hand the conceptual mode is referred to as thought (belief, judgment, etc.) which represents facts about the objects. Our perceptual experience is the correlation between both the sensory and conceptual modes of representation. The perception of an object for the first time by a child would have the same sensory representation like an adult. Although in order to have the conceptual mode of representation she needs more information about that object. The relevant information then gradually develops thought in the mind of the child regarding the object. Hence, when an infant comes across her mother she is unable to identify her mother as a human being.

3.6) Rejection of Martin’s phenomenal transparency

To reject the intuition of phenomenal transparency, Dretske’s idea of ‘displaced perception’(1994) can be used as shown above. The perspectival features which according to Martin (2002) are relational aspects of perception can be explained in terms of representational properties of the experience. The connection between the sensory

²⁵ Dretske, F. (1997). *Naturalizing the Mind*. A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England.

imagination and sensory experience also shows that it depends on several background beliefs which are representational states.

In response to Martin's (2002) objection, if we try to restore the claim of strong intentionalism, we can do so in the following manner.

When we see our image in the mirror the perceptual experience helps us in relating to the mind-independent object i.e. the image. The changes or the perspectival features which are not directly given to the representation of the image, the perception of those features occur due to several concepts that we learn gradually. We come to know the changes in the representation through several perceptions. All these perceptions are representations of some sorts. For example, while looking at the image in the mirror I cannot say that my hair is getting thin until and unless I have the image of my hair from a younger age. The changes captured in the image are basically dependent on other facts. These are also representational facts. By comparing the images or the impression which I have in my mind of my younger self or the memory, I can conclude that my hair is becoming thinner or getting white. It implies that I am getting older. In the case of perceptual experience we find there are representational properties. Along with it there are some perspectival properties as well i.e., how the objects are presented.

Perspectival properties include memories, comparative representations etc. When I am perceiving an object it may happen I am just perceiving that very object. I may not perceive it as related to me in any particular way. When the perception is related to me in a certain manner then there is a kind of implicit judgment. The judgment is dependent on other information that I already have. The information is related to the existing belief that I have and these beliefs are representational states. The perspectival features of perception

can be well explained in the context of representationalism. Therefore, following ‘displaced perception’ (Dretske, 1994) we can accommodate transparency in the context of representationalism.

Martin (2002) suggests that there is a connection and difference between sensory experience and imagination. A successful visualization means that the object has to be imagined the way it is. Whenever visualization of an object occurs some background beliefs work as a support. This in turn leads to the successful visualization of that object. Also, when we visualize something the background assumption is there. We believe that the experience is related to us. These background beliefs are representational states which give rise to the changes in the phenomenal character of the experience accordingly. Hence, transparency in the context of strong intentionalism can also accommodate the perspectival features.

Phenomenal transparency as referred by Martin (2002) fails to explain why the perspectival features seem to be less determinate in case of imagination. With reference to successful visualization the background beliefs and assumptions are supported by both the sensory and the conceptual representation jointly. The coordination between them results in the successful visualization of an imagined situation. The representational character of the experience explains the less determinate appearances of the perspectival features in the context of strong intentionalism.

Therefore, my purpose is not to reject Martin’s (2002) phenomenal transparency. An explanation has been provided to showcase the difference between imagination and the sensory experience. The distinction can be made by appealing to the different modes of

representations that are conceptual and non-conceptual in the context of strong intentionalism.

According to Martin (2002), in case of veridical perception a sense of immediacy is felt by the subject. Although it is difficult to determine the fact that in all cases of a real sensation, a subject will always feel immediacy. Even if we admit that the immediate feeling of a sensation is present in case of a real sensation then it happens not due to the conscious or phenomenal character of the experience. The immediate feeling of sensation is a physical condition. The feeling of immediacy must be accepted as a neurophysiological process (Dretske, 2005)²⁶. Hence, the feeling of immediacy can be explained in the context of representationalism as well

Conclusively, Dretske's (1994) 'displaced-perception' is based on two different modes of representations namely the sensory and the conceptual modes of representations. These two modes of representations are supported by the transparency account of self-knowledge. Therefore, the intuition of transparency defends strong intentionalism and rejects the idea of phenomenal transparency as suggested by Martin (2002).

3.7) Strong intentionalism and the rejection of transparency

According to Crane (2000, 2007) strong intentionalism is incompatible with the transparency intuition. There are some philosophers who accept the claim of strong intentionalism but reject transparency. I have mainly discussed Crane's (2000, 2009) view which holds that perceptual experience is related to the subject via 'mode'.

²⁶ Dretske, F. (2005). *The Epistemology of Pain* (M. Aydede, Ed.). The MIT Press.

As suggested by Crane (2000, 2009) the representational content cannot wholly determine the phenomenal character of experience. The change in the phenomenal character of experience can happen without any change in the representational content. It is compatible with strong intentionalism. He dismisses the idea of transparency²⁷.

Intentional state has intentional content. Each intentional state corresponds to an intentional content. For example; belief is always about something. Even if the object of belief does not exist it must have an intentional content. Therefore, the object of thought also has a relational aspect to the content (Crane, 2000, 2009).

If the content is propositional then it can be assessed as either true or false. The relation of intentional content is called mode. For example; in the case of belief or desire, the belief or desire that p; here p is the intentional content and belief or desire is the mode. Crane (2009) rejects the view that all content is propositional. He states that there are many intentional states whose contents are not assessable as true or false like object-directed attitudes of love and hate²⁸.

Crane says,

Intentional states are therefore relations, relations to content. Where propositional content is involved-that is content is assessable as true or false- thinker could relate to a content by standing in the relation of believing it to be true, or considering whether it is true, or hoping it is true, and so on. So to fix the nature of an intentional state, two things must be

²⁷ Crane, T. (2000). Introspection, Intentionality and The Transparency of Experience. *Philosophical Topics*, 28(2), 49-67.

²⁸ Crane, T. (2009). Intentionalism. In B. P. McLaughlin, A. Beckermann, & S. Walter (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind* (pp. 474-493). Oxford University Press.

fixed: the intentional content and the relation in which the thinker stands to the content.

I call this relation the intentional mode. So, for a belief that *p*, *p* is the intentional content and belief is the mode. (I have chosen the example of belief, because it is such a familiar example of an intentional state. But note that I am not assuming here that all intentional states have the propositional content, that they are all propositional attitudes). This is the general character of an intentional state; anything which is an intentional state must have this structure (Crane, 2000, p.53)²⁹.

The same intentional object can be the object of different mental states. Crane points out that the difference is observed in terms of the intentional mode. The particular way in which the intentional object is presented is the content of the intentional state. Intentional state has both the intentional content and intentional mode. The nature of intentional state is exhausted by its content and its mode. Crane refuses to accept the view that intentional object determines its content. He believes that various intentional states can have the same intentional content whether their objects exist or not. Crane says,

Every intentional state must have an intentional content in this sense. This is because the intentional object of a state is what the state is directed on; but a state cannot be directed on something without that thing being represented in one way or another. There is no such thing as a state of mind which has an object represented in no particular way- what could this possibly mean? The idea of representation itself implies the representation

²⁹Crane, T. (2000). Introspection, Intentionality and The Transparency of Experience. *Philosophical Topics*, 28(2), 49-67.

in a particular way: in representing something in language or in pictures, one has to choose some particular way of representing it. The particular way in which the intentional object is represented is what I call the content of the state. So for a state to have a content is for it to have an object represented in a particular way. Intentional content is representational content.

Intentional states, then, involve both intentional mode and intentional content. (Crane, 2009, p. 6)

Crane (2007) describes intentionalism in two kinds: strong pure intentionalism (Tye, 1992, 1995, 1996, 2002, 2008) and weak pure intentionalism (Byrne 2001). Strong pure intentionalism holds that the phenomenal character of a mental state is identical with the representational content. On the other hand, weak pure intentionalism suggests that if two experiences share the intentional content then they will share the phenomenal character of the experience. Crane goes on to reject the above described case of strong pure intentionalism and weak pure intentionalism. Following the cases of pure intentionalism if the content is held to be identical with the proposition then it will be problematic for cases like, pain sensation. The phenomenal difference between seeing and feeling the bodily damage in case of pain sensation cannot be explained in terms of the difference in the content of the experience. Since the content is the same for both the disorders that it represents. The difference is felt in terms of the mode. Thus, he discards strong pure intentionalism.

Crane (2009) argues that weak pure intentionalism (Byrne, 2007) is problematic. The argument of weak pure intentionalism can be summarised as follows³⁰:

- i. If a subject undergoes two different experiences with different phenomenal characters then the subject notices a change.
- ii. Provided the subject notices a change in the phenomenal character of the experiences then it seems to the subject that there are actual changes.
- iii. The way things seem to the subject is defined as content. If two experiences share the content then the way the experiences seem to the subject is exactly the same.
- iv. Therefore, the difference in the phenomenal character happens due to the difference in the contents of the experiences.

Crane (2009) points out that the way things seem different to the subject may refer to the aspects of the phenomenal character of the experience itself. The way things seem to be can be explained in two ways. They are, ‘the way the world seems to be’ and ‘the way experience seems to the subject’. It means that the perception involves the subject’s point of view.

Weak pure intentionalists Byrne (2001) accept that the phenomenal character supervenes on the representational content. They believe that ‘what it is like to have an experience’ can be explained in terms of the objects of the experience that we perceive. Whenever we try to reflect on the phenomenal character of the experience, we find only the properties that are represented or the objects that are represented in the perceptual experience. We do not find any phenomenal character of the experience over and above the representational

³⁰ Crane, T. (2009). Intentionalism. In B. P. McLaughlin, A. Beckermann, & S. Walter (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind* (pp. 474-493). Oxford University Press.

properties of the experience. Byrne (2001) says ‘what it is like to have an experience’ means ‘things are represented’ which ultimately depends on the representational content.

According to Crane (2009) the way ‘things seem to the subject’ is also a kind of intentionality. The way things seem is not only the matter of objects of experience that is represented in the experience. The way things seem in the experience implies that the way it seems to the subject. It cannot be grasped only by encountering the objects of the experience. In other words, the phenomenal character cannot be determined by the representational content. Crane suggested a kind of intentionality, namely, ‘impure intentionality. It states that the phenomenal character of an experience is determined by its intentional nature: in particular, by its mode and its content.

Both pure and impure intentionalists emphasize on the claim that all mental states are intentional. The impure intentionalists suggest that the phenomenal character of the experience which is subjective cannot be wholly reduced into the representational content. Mode is neither the intrinsic property like qualia nor is it an extrinsic property like the objects of the experience. The impure intentionalists by accepting ‘mode’ explains the distinctiveness of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. Thus, ‘what it is like to have experience’ cannot entirely be exhausted by the representational content.

Crane (2000) shows that two dimensions of variation can be found in case of variation in an intentional state of a given subject. These are variation in content and variation in mode. Crane says,

This is most illustrated by the case of cross-modal perception. Suppose one holds a wooden cube in one’s hand, and one also sees the cube in one’s hand. One is having an experience of a cube in one’s hand, and

experiencing it through sight and touch. Now suppose one could isolate the tactile experience of the cube from the visual experience of the cube, by shutting one's eye; and suppose one could isolate the visual experience from the tactile experience by (say) anesthetizing one's hands. What would the difference be between these two isolated experiences? One might try and say that there is a difference in content, but it is hard to express exactly what this difference is? The content, on the face of it, is that there is a cube in one's hand, in both cases. The difference is that in one case one is seeing that there is a cube in one's hand, and in the other one is feeling by touch that there is a cube in one's hand. This is a difference in mode (Crane, 2000, p. 60)

The above is an instance of a cross-modal perception. Suppose, one holds a wooden cube. While doing this he also sees and touches the object. The person is going through the experience of sight and touch. One may isolate the tactile experience from the visual one by shutting his eyes. Or he may distinguish the visual experience from the tactile one by anaesthetizing his hands. Crane suggests that the difference between these two experiences can be understood in terms of mode and not in terms of content. In one case a person sees a cube and in the other case he feels it. According to intentional mode a person is related to the intentional content. Therefore, the change in intentional mode can give rise to phenomenal differences. It rejects the transparency of experience. Hence denies the view that all differences in phenomenal character can lead to the differences in intentional content.

3.8) Intermodal intentionalism and the transparency intuition

Going back to Byrne (2001) the argument of intermodal intentionalism³¹ shows that the modal differences are actually the differences in the representational properties of the experience. The argument suggests that with the difference in the modalities the subject experiences certain mutually exclusive representational properties. This ultimately proves that these properties are content specific. Certain representational properties gained by one sensory experience cannot be gained by another sense experience. For example, in the case of perception one cannot see with their hands. Sight is the feature of the visual experience and not the touch. The different representational properties lead to the perception of the different content of experience even though the object is the same.

Crane's (2000) view regarding transparency can be rejected by following the argument of intermodal intentionalism. It states that the differences between two different modalities happen due to the differences in the content of the experience. When a person sees a wooden cube he has the visual experience of the cube. Again when he closes his eyes, he has the tactile experience of the object. Here the subject undergoes two different experiences. The two experiences have two different representational properties. When the subject sees the cube she perceives the represented properties like shape, colour, size etc. Again when she touches it she feels the hardness of the cube. The word 'modal' here comes from sensory modalities like sight, touch etc and does not refer to Crane's (2000, 2009) sense of 'mode'.

There are certain representational properties that can be attended to only via sight. It can never be gained by the sensation of touch. For example, the represented property of a colour of an object can only be known by sight. If a person is blind by birth then he cannot

³¹ Byrne, A. (2001, April). Intentionalism Defended. *The Philosophical Review*, 110(2), 199-240.

gain knowledge about color perception by sight. Similarly, a person who has lost the sensation of touch cannot fathom the features of an object just by looking at it. Imagine while buying shoes we check whether the shoes are comfortable by scrutinizing the sole of the shoe. Usually softer soles are preferred than the hard one. A person who has lost sensation in her feet can never know the representational properties of tactile experience only by looking at the shoes themselves. On the other hand, a person who is blind by birth can never know the colour of the shoe by holding the shoes. Here the objects are the same but they can generate two different representational properties.

Similarly, in the case of pain sensation we find that seeing and feeling pain sensation may give rise to two different representational properties. Feeling of a sensation has different representational properties. It is distinct from the sensation of seeing. The representational properties of the feeling of the pain sensation can never be grasped by sight. Even though both seeing and feeling the pain sensation represents bodily damage.

There are differences in the represented properties of the experience. We know that the represented properties of the objects are the constituent of the content. Hence, we conclude that the differences in the content give rise to two different experiences in the subject. Here we can restore the claim of transparency.

3.9) Conclusion

In conclusion I have shown how the transparency intuition is misinterpreted by philosophers. Both Martin (2002) and Crane (2000, 2009) have tried to defend the phenomenal character of experience from different perspectives. None of them could successfully prove that the transparency intuition is incompatible with the claim of strong intentionalism.

Dretske's representationalism (1997, 2003) and the theory of 'displaced perception' (Dretske, 1994) which is supported by the transparency account of self-knowledge presuppose the perspectival features of perception.

Firstly, Dretske (1997) in his theory of representationalism talks about learning of several concepts and it certainly includes the perspectival features of experience. The perspectival features of perception depend on acquiring several background beliefs. It can be ultimately explained in the context of representationalism. Secondly, I have already shown in the previous chapter how Dretske's theory of displaced perception (1994) supports the transparency account of self-knowledge. Therefore, we can reject Martin's (2002) phenomenal transparency and accept that transparency is compatible with the claim of strong intentionalism. We find that the transparency account of self-knowledge helps us to defend the claim of strong intentionalism. Thus, in the end, the theory of strong intentionalism avoids the objections raised against it.

On the other hand, Crane (2000, 2009) accepts 'mode' for explaining the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. Byrne's (2001) argument of intermodal intentionalism and the instance of cross modal perception suggest that with the differences in the modalities the subject experiences the different representational properties. The representational properties are content specific. Hence a visually impaired person by birth can never experience colour. It implies that representational properties determine the content. Transparency supports strong intentionalism.

Chapter Four

Phenomenism³² and the Transparency Debate

4.1) Introduction

The various objections leveled against the claim of strong intentionalism will be discussed in this chapter. There are many contemporary philosophers who do not accept transparency intuition. They believe that representationalism is not only about the phenomenal character of the experience. The purpose of this chapter is firstly to discuss the arguments of those philosophers who accept the distinctiveness of the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience. Secondly to check whether by appealing to the transparency intuition we can defend strong intentionalism. How the transparency intuition answers all the challenges raised by these philosophers against the claim of strong intentionalism will also be expounded upon in this chapter.

The first section which is 4.2 discusses how the phenomenist like Block (1996, 2003, 2007, 2010) argues that the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience cannot be reduced into the representational character of the experience. There is a distinctive existence of the phenomenal character of the experience which we sometimes refer to as 'qualia'. Several counter examples provided by Block against representationalism have been cited. In section 4.3 Jackson's (1982)³³ argument against the claim of strong intentionalism has been discussed. Jackson's counter instances prove how strong intentionalism is false and it refutes the intuition of transparency consequently. Section 4.4

³² Block, N. (1996). Mental Paint and Mental Latex. *Philosophical Issues, Perception*, 7, 19-49.

³³ Jackson, F. (1982, April). Epiphenomenal Qualia. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 32(127), 127-136.

explores Speaks' (2011)³⁴ argument for strong intentionalism which exhibits that the inverted spectrum cases cannot prove strong intentionalism false. The view of James John (2005)³⁵ who supports representationalism has been discussed in section 4.5. John refers to his particular view on representationalism as intuitive view. This section examines how John's intuitive view is supported by the transparency account of self-knowledge. In the last two sections 4.6 and 4.7 of the chapter, Jackson's and Block's argument against strong intentionalism has been refuted by using the transparency account of self-knowledge.

4.2) Block's phenomenism and the refutation of representationalism

Block (1996, 2003, 2010) accepts that perceptual experience has representational character. He refutes the view that representational content determines the phenomenal character of the experience. The phenomenal character is not wholly representational in nature. Block's (1996, 2003, 2010) preference for the distinctiveness of the phenomenal character is referred to as "phenomenism"³⁶. Block (1996, 2003, 2010) tries to establish his view on "phenomenism" by providing the instances of inverted spectrum case, bodily sensations and so on. Few examples from Block (1996, 2003, 2010) will be cited to check the claim of strong intentionalism.

Block's (1996, 2003, 2010) view on "phenomenism" states that phenomenal character is something distinct from representational content. The representational content of the experience exists in addition to the phenomenal character of the experience. The existence

³⁴ Speaks, J. (2011, December). Spectrum Inversion Without A Difference In Representation Is Impossible. *Philosophical Issues: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition*, 156(3), 339-361.

³⁵ John, J. (2005, Spring). Representationism, Phenomenism and the Intuitive View. *Philosophical Topics*, 33(1), 159-184.

³⁶ Block, N. (1996). Mental Paint and Mental Latex. *Philosophical Issues, Perception*, 7, 19-49.

of “qualia” is necessary for explaining the perceptual experience from a subjective point of view.

The argument regarding the intentional content as defined by the representationalists to defend the claim of strong intentionalism has first been put forth by Block (1996, 2003, 2010). The discussion is made with reference to the internalists’ and externalists’ position. If Block’s (1996, 2003, 2010) argument rejects the claim of strong intentionalism it will thereby refute the transparency intuition which supports the strong intentionalism in this regard.

4.2.a) Internalist

Internalists believe that the intentional states depend on our intrinsic properties. Internal states may be caused by some external or environmental factor but having an intentional state is an internal physical state.

According to Block some representationalists hold that the ‘intentional content’ is narrow content. The ‘intentional content’ is in the head. These philosophers are the functionalists who believe that narrow mental content supervenes on the internal physico – chemical configuration of brain. They claim that there can be no change in the narrow intentional content without any change in the causal interactions in the internal physical- chemical configuration of the brain or the corresponding internal –physical state. They deny the existence of ‘qualia’. This view can be understood in two different ways:

- i. Functional organization can be interpreted the way common sense mental state interacts. For example, a subject after seeing a street dog sitting on the sidewalk may try to avoid the vicinity. The change in the behavior of the person happens due to the perception of a dog which may generate the feeling of fear in the mind

of the subject. He behaves accordingly. If there were no dogs on the footpath then the subject may not have avoided that place. We can conclude that the change in the causal interaction in the internal physical state determines the change in the narrow intentional content.

- ii. Functional organization can happen by a causal network of computational states. For instance, I may start screaming after seeing a bull dog. The intentional object causes the internal physical state. It generates the feeling of fear which in turn manifests certain functional changes. The intentional object stimulates my sensory nerves and the central nervous system. It carries out certain functions and gives rise to the manifestation of certain behavior or the behavioral changes accordingly. As a result I start screaming and it generates a function or activity in me. Therefore, the internal physical state here also determines the change in the narrow intentional content.

Block (1996, 2003) suggests that phenomenists can be functionalist. He denies that 'qualia' supervenes on functional organization. As suggested by Block (1996, 2003), internalists' view on the functional cognitive state can be challenged by considering an example. Suppose, a child named Julie is raised in a room where the color surface changes every few minutes. Julie has no idea about the changing surface colors. She has no standing belief about the changes of the color that takes place every few minutes in her room. She would be unable to recognize the changes in color that takes place. When she undergoes the perceptual experience of changes in the colors functionally she would not be able to distinguish the different colors. However it may happen that she can name the color successfully while undergoing the experience of different colors. She might as well pick up the name of the different colors accordingly.

Now the question arises if the subject has no standing belief about the color then it means that she is ignorant about the intentional content. The subject's introspective awareness accesses the changes in the color and differentiates the color successfully. It challenges the intentionalists view that the change in the intentional content gives rise to the change in the phenomenal character of the experience. Block (1996, 2003) states that there is no difference in the functional role. Although there is a change in the phenomenal character of the experience. Therefore it is hard to say that the representational content outruns the phenomenal character or 'qualia'.

In defense of representationalism one might say that differences in the color content triggers changes in the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience. It may happen that the different colors stimulate our nervous system. There might occur some behavioral changes when we see the color red, green or blue and so on. The perception of the color red might make us nervous whereas the perception of green can be a soothing experience for us. Block (1996, 2003) suggests that these are all empirical speculations. It is hard to confirm the fact whether the representations of colors or the intentional content is responsible for such behavioral changes. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the perceptions of different color content functionally determine the changes in the phenomenal character.

Internalists in defense of their theory might suggest that there are actually no differences among Julie's color experiences. The reactions to all the color experiences are the same for the observer. The way the color red appears to Julie might be similar to the color green. She might name the color randomly while undergoing the visual experience of different colors. Block (1996, 2003) suggests that this type of assertion is also an empirical speculation. According to Block this is an 'unsupported empirical speculation'. Hence,

Block (1996, 2003) finds this view dissatisfying. He moves on to externalists' view of representationalism.

4.2.b) Externalist

Externalists believe that mental content is relational. The mental content represents something which is about the external world or the external environment of the subject. When I see a red flower my visual experience represents it as a red flower. Block (1996, 2003) examines whether this view on perceptual experience can rule out the distinctive existence of qualia or the phenomenal character of experience. An example is suggested by Block (1996, 2003) which proves the distinctiveness of the phenomenal character of experience.

Suppose a person is born and raised on Twin Earth for up to 18 years of his life. The environment on Twin- Earth looks quite similar to Earth. The biotic features like trees and animals as well as the abiotic components like water, soil, air are similar to that of the earth. The person while living on Twin Earth experiences as the twin - water and not as water from earth.

The same individual when on Earth experiences water in the ocean for the first time, which is represented to him as Twin-water. After living on Earth for many years he is quite familiar with the terms. Now when he looks at the water on Earth it is represented to him as water. Since the Twin- water and water looks similar; the representational properties are the same. The introspective awareness of water continues to represent the Twin –water. The representation of water still looks like Twin Earth to that person. Although now he refers to it as water. The representation of water in this regard is similar to any inhabitant of Earth. The representational content of Twin- water and water are

different. Therefore, it counters the representationalist theory that the phenomenal character of the experience is determined by the representational content of the perceptual experience. Consequently, it questions the claim of strong intentionalism in this regard. The representational content is changed but the phenomenal character remains the same. Thus, it also counters the transparency intuition that the phenomenal character of the experience is exhausted by the representational or the intentional content.

Representationalists may refute this view by giving the following interpretations. Suppose a person is born and raised on Twin Earth upto 18 years of his life. On Twin Earth when he looks at the Twin-water his experience of the Twin- water represents it as Twin –water. After emigrating to Earth when the person looks at the water in the ocean for the first time it is represented to him as Twin-water. Thereafter, living for many years on Earth he is now quite familiar with the terms. When he looks at the water on Earth it is represented to him as water. The representation of water is similar to any inhabitant of Earth and Twin-Earth. Even though the representational content is changed, the subjective experience or the phenomenal character remains the same. The reason behind the phenomenal character remaining the same is the similarity of the observational properties i.e. color, taste etc. between water and Twin- water.

Block (1996, 2003) states for whatever reasons the representationalists fail to show that the phenomenal character is exhausted by the representational content. The example contradicts the fundamental claim of strong intentionalism. The claim being that the representational content establishes the phenomenal character of the experience. It proves the transparency intuition false. Therefore, if the representational content fails to determine the changes in the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience then we

need to accept the distinctive existence of qualia over and above the representational content.

4.2.c) Supervenience

The thesis of representationalism can be responded to by using the arguments of the supervenience. Supervenience suggests that a set of properties supervenes on another set of properties. In which case the one set of properties cannot differ without differing or changing the other set of properties. For example, a set of properties A supervenes on another set of properties B, if and only if, there cannot be any change in A without altering B.

Block (1996, 2003) holds that if the phenomenal character supervenes on the brain state then it will be problematic for representationalism. For instance, there is a swampman who is identical from molecule to molecule with any other human being on earth. The swampman has no representational content. The swampman lacks the informational state. If the swampman is asked about a particular person, say Bill Gates, how would he provide information about him?

The question arises that if he has no causal connection or information about Bill Gates how would he refer to Bill Gates successfully? The swampman can identify Bill Gates only after he has seen him on television or have met him. On earth we can identify Bill Gates as Bill Gates but the swampman cannot do that. The swampman lacks the appropriate information about Bill Gates.

The problem being that the swampman is identical from molecule to molecule identical to us, any human being living on earth. The representational content regarding Bill Gates gives rise to the change in the phenomenal character of the experience in the mind of any

human being like us. Since the swampman is identical from molecule to molecule like any other human beings the change in the phenomenal character of experience of the swampman must be similar to us.

We find that the same representational content generates two different phenomenal characters of the perceptual experiences. The physical information about the content is inadequate to explain why the differences actually occur in these two cases. The above instance proves that the representational content cannot determine the phenomenal character of the experience. Therefore, the differences in the subjective experience prove the distinctive existence of qualia. It also dismisses the intuition of transparency consequently.

The instance of the brain in a vat will be appropriate. It is easy to understand the fact why the representational content cannot outrun the phenomenal character of the experience. The bathtub brain is an artificial brain but it has a similar configuration like any other human brain. However, the bathtub brain lacks the representational content. When a person looks at a tomato the person has both the representational and phenomenal character of experience. The bathtub brain lacks the representational content but it has the phenomenal character of the experience of a tomato. It can be pointed out that the representational content cannot determine the phenomenal character of experience. The subject's introspective awareness accesses the properties of the experience in the absence of representational content. Therefore, it proves the existence of 'qualia'. Following representationalists we cannot say that the phenomenal character of experience is entirely determined by the representational content. It refutes the claim of strong intentionalism. Since the absence of the representational content generates the phenomenal character of the experience, it also discards the intuition of transparency.

4.2.d) Paint and latex

According to Block (1996, 2003) the latex in paint entails the existence of phenomenal character over and above the representational character of experience.

When we see a tree our introspective awareness accesses certain qualities of the tree i.e. color, shape, etc. that the tree instantiates. This example is suggested by Harman (1990). Apart from these properties we do not have access to any other property of experience. For instance if we need to explain a visual experience of tomatoes then while explaining the experience we refer to the several properties of the tomatoes that it instantiates. Apart from those properties there is nothing which can be defined by attending to the properties of the experience itself. Harman states that representational character or the properties instantiated by the intentional objects exhaust the phenomenal character of experience.

There is no access to mental paint according to Harman (1990). The perception of mental paint (Harman, 1990) entails the perception of the properties of experience. We have elaborated upon the fact that introspective awareness can attend to the properties instantiated by the intentional objects. If that is so then we need to accept that while undergoing the perceptual experience we do not have access to mental paint. According to Block (1996, 2003) this is a very narrow version of the explanation of perceptual experience.

Block (1996, 2003) refutes the view by stating the following points:

1. The question then arises whether we can be aware of any mental paint? Shoemaker contends that we do not have access to mental paint. He agrees with the fact that we have indirect awareness of mental paint through the intuition of inverted spectrum. Suppose we can imagine a person called Jim. He denotes the color green as red. His lack of awareness makes him denote the color green as red. Although we are not

directly aware of the color red which appears green to Jim but indirectly it does give us access to the inverted spectrum. Hence, there is a mental paint. Additionally, it proves that the representational content is different but the phenomenal character is the same.

Block (1996, 2003) holds this is a vague explanation of the phenomenal character of experience. The phenomenal character of experience determines the phenomenal properties experienced by the subject. Hence, if there is anything like the phenomenal character of experience we must be aware of it. The subject must be directly aware of the phenomenal properties represented in the experience.

2. A phenomenal experience or orgasm is partly non-representational. Block (1996, 2003) raises the question whether there can be a phenomenal character without the representational content? Block (1996, 2003) introduces latex print. The pigment represents the color but the latex represents nothing. Paint has a base but the latex has no base. Provided we are aware of the representational features of experience then one could be unaware of latex. In reality we are actually aware of both the paint and the latex. The latex is the coating used for painting.

Block (1996, 2003) states that the same is also applicable for color experience. The color experience of something “red” represents “red” quale for me. The same color experience of “red” may be represented as “blue” to some other person. For instance a person who is color blind experiences color differently from others who are not color blind. Further, Block (1996, 2003) suggests that the color experience of something “pink” represents “pink” quale while it represents nothing to the brain –in-vat. The following instances show the same representational content leading to the awareness of different phenomenal character of experience to different individuals. Therefore, representationalism is proved false.

How does Harman (1990) explain the cases of illusions where the intentional object is non-existent? In case of illusions the subject cannot get the access to the properties of the intentional objects. The subject needs to attend to the properties of the experience itself.

In response Harman (1990) might suggest that we are aware of intentional objects rather than intentional content. Block (1996, 2003) points out the case of shared intentional content. What if there are two experiences having the same intentional content or an intentional object? For example the case of perceiving a red tomato. According to Block (1996, 2003), Harman (1990) needs to accept that for shared intentional content the subject is actually aware of some mental properties which cannot be reduced into the properties represented by the intentional objects.

The view can be interpreted in the following way. Perception of the same red tomato can generate two phenomenal characters in two different individuals. One may perceive it as a bulgy, round red object while another person who has defective eyesight might see it as a red spot. If in the process of perceptual experience we are just aware of the properties of the intentional objects then it would not be possible for two subjects to experience the same content differently. Therefore, it means that in the process of perceptual experience we are not only aware of the intentional objects but also aware of some mental properties or quale.

According to Harman (1990) both mental paint and mental latex both are representational.

Harman asserts that there are three things which needs to be figured out:

1. In the process of perceptual experience when we look at the objects our experience also represents the color of the perceptual objects. For example if I look at a rose my experience represents the rose as pink colored.

2. Mental properties which represent the rose as pink are called mental paint. Block argues that the phenomenal character of experience is the mental property. Due to mental property the rose is represented as pink. Block (1996, 2003) holds that we can have access to this phenomenal character of experience which cannot be completely determined by the representational character of the experience.
3. Further there are some mental properties which do not represent anything. According to Block (1996, 2003) one such mental property is latex which does not represent anything. Block (1996, 2003) is not sure whether the same is also applicable to the color properties or not. The same is also true for bodily sensations like orgasm.

4.2.e) Bodily sensations

Orgasms are phenomenally impressive. The intensity and the preference of orgasm is something which matters phenomenally³⁷. In the process of having sex the individual's involved might experience orgasms in different intensity and proportions. Each orgasm is unique and pleasurable to the concerned person. The way the orgasm seems pleasurable to me might be a matter which occurs phenomenally.

Some representationalists like Tye (1992, 1995, 1996, 2008) suggest that the feeling of pleasure can be identified 'in part' as something that is happening 'down there'³⁸ (body part). The feeling of pleasure can be explained in terms of increasing intensity of gratification. Therefore, Tye (1992, 1995, 1996, 2008) implies that an orgasm can be explained in the context of representationalism. The phenomenal character of the

³⁷ "Mental Paint" by Ned Block, in *Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge* edited by Martin Hahn and Bjorn Ramberg, MIT Press, 2003.

³⁸ "Mental Paint and Mental Latex" by Ned Block, *Philosophical Issues*, Vol. 7, Perception (1996), pp. 19-49.

experience of bodily sensations like orgasm can be explained in terms of the intentional or representational content as well.

Block (1996, 2003) expresses the view that the representational content of the ‘body part’ of an orgasm may seem pleasurable to me but it may not feel phenomenally pleasurable. The location of orgasm ‘down there’, the perception of the orgasm of my partner and my own feeling of orgasm all differs from each other. The representational features can never explain why the perception of orgasm of my partner and my own feeling of orgasm actually differs. The intensity, the pleasure of the feeling of orgasm cannot be explained with reference to the representational content of the experience of orgasm.

4.2.f) Perception of modalities

Some representationalists suggest that the differences in modalities between touch and vision can be explained in terms of the function that they play. The functional role that they play in case of the perceptual experience are different. For example, the function of the visual experience of seeing a green emerald is to represent its properties like the color and the shape. While the function of the tactile experience of this object is to represent the properties like the hardness and the shape. Therefore, the differences in the modalities are determined by the functions that they perform. Block refutes this view of representationalism.

Block (1996, 2003) suggests that we can imagine hearing something and seeing the auditory experience in our peripheral vision. The auditory experience has certain properties like loudness. Block states that we can imagine ourselves as solely focused on the attention of the perceived location. While undergoing such experience we may find

differences between the auditory experience of that location and the visual experience of the same. The differences occur due to the differences in the modalities of the experience.

Further, there is a difference between seeing a dog and touching a dog. According to some representationalists like Tye (1992, 1995, 1996, 2002) the visual experience represents the color, shape etc.. Tactile experience represents the same object having certain tactile properties like temperature, texture and so on.

It is suggested by Block (1996, 2003) that if we move our hands in the vicinity of our ear then our eye perceives it as something moving without noticing the color or shape of the object. The auditory experience will surely perceive it as having a certain loudness. The visual experience on the other hand perceives it differently. This is quite different from the way we generally perceive an object or the properties of objects in the visual experience. According to Block (1996, 2003) the changes that we perceive with differences in the modalities (i.e. visual and auditory experience) are the changes in the phenomenal character of the experience. These changes cannot be explained in terms of the representational character of the experience. Therefore, the argument rejects the claim of strong intentionalism.

4.2.g) Externalist memory

Let us consider the twin- earth argument once again and see how it counters the argument of strong intentionalism.

For instance when an individual first landed on earth from the Twin earth she used to refer to the water on earth as Twin-water or Twater. After residing on earth for many years now when she perceives water, she refers to it as water. Though the visual experience represents it as Twater but the subject now refers to it as water. Therefore, the phenomenal

character remains the same but the representational content changes. Following strong intentionalism we cannot argue that the representational content determines the phenomenal character of the experience.

The example of “inverted earth” is used by Block (1996, 2003) in order to refute the claim of representationalists. Suppose a person lands from earth on inverted earth. The inverted earth is different from earth in two ways. Firstly, the color concepts on inverted earth are inverted corresponding to the color concepts that exist on earth. For example the sky is orange and the grass or leaves are pink. Secondly, the people of inverted earth speak in inverted language. The inhabitants of inverted earth refer to blue as orange, they refer to green as pink and so on. Hence, if a person orders the “blue” paint from inverted earth he needs to select the color orange on earth.

Now suppose a chip is imported from the inverted earth and it is inserted unknowingly into the body of an individual who lives on earth. We shall notice that the body pigments of the individual will go through changes. The subject will notice the colors differently and as a result she will notice no differences in color on the inverted earth.

The same individual now lands on the inverted earth. After noticing the grass, if she still refers to the color as “green” then she is wrong. The grass on the inverted earth is “pink”. The instance of this color reference would be considered as a mistake. It is for the same reason that a person living on earth visits the twin-earth and refers to the Twater as water.

Let us consider that the same person adopts the new terminology of inverted earth and lives on the inverted earth for 5/6 years. After living on the inverted earth for so many years her reference of the color “green” or “pink” will shift. The subject can now identify

the colors correctly. The representational content of the color “pink” and “green” will change.

The thought experiment reveals that the phenomenal character remains the same but the representational content changes. Representational content changes along with the change in the external environment and the language community. Block (1996, 2003) points out that the mental paint remains the same but the representational content changes.

Why the argument of mental paint is considered to be a challenge for the representationalists? With the acceptance of the new language phenomenal character stays the same but representational content changes. The person from earth who comes to live on the twin earth cannot figure out the differences in the phenomenal character of the color experience. There is a change in the external environment or the representational content. As the language community changes which the person eventually adapts to on the inverted earth the representational character of the color “green” shifts to “pink”. The phenomenal character and the introspective awareness of the color “pink” will be the same. The representationalists fail to explain why the phenomenal character of experience remains the same even though there is a change in the content. It counters the claim of strong intentionalism. The phenomenal character of experience is something over and above the representational content. Thus, it also dismisses the transparency intuition.

4.2.h) Inverted spectrum

According to Block (1996, 2003, 1999), the instance of inverted spectrum is a serious challenge against the theory of representationalism. The cases of inverted spectrum show that the same representational content can lead to changes. These changes occur in the phenomenal character of the perceptual experiences in different persons. The same color

of an object or the mental paint may appear differently to several people. Hence, we can prove that the perception of color is not something which is the representational character of experience. Rather it is an intrinsic property of experience itself.

For example, cases like inverted spectrum indicate that the object which appears green to others may seem red to Tom (a subject). The perceptual experience of anything green leads others to believe that something green is presented before them or something green is represented before them. The objects represented as green appear as red to Tom. The color which appears as red to others appears as green to Tom. Tom is unaware about the peculiarity of his own inner experience. Tom knows what each color refers to and can apply the words associated to signify each with the particular color correctly. Hence, when Tom sees the tomato he refers to the color of the tomato as red. Again when he sees the basil leaves he refers to the colors of the leaf as green. The instance suggests that as compared to others Tom's experience of something green is represented as red to him and the vice versa. Therefore the way he encounters the color red and green is different from others.

The above instance showcases that Tom's experience of the representational content is similar to others. The experience can be said to be different with respect to the subjective viewpoint. The phenomenal character of the visual experience of Tom is different from others. The introspective awareness of the perceptual experience differs from the representational content of the experience. The intrinsic property in virtue of which Tom's perceptual experience represents the color as red or green cannot be similar to us. It can be concluded that due to the intrinsic property of Tom's experience i.e. quale he experiences the colors differently.

Therefore, the instance also proves that the representational content of the experience fails to determine the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience. As a result we cannot say that the phenomenal character of the experience is exhausted by the representational character of the experience. It also proves the intuition of transparency as false which supports the basic claim of strong intentionalism.

4.3) Jackson's argument against representationalism

Contemporary philosopher Frank Jackson (1982) has raised several objections against the claim of strong intentionalism. Frank Jackson (1982)³⁹ refuted the idea of physicalism. He elucidates why the existence of qualia needs to be apprehended for explaining the nature of experience from a subjective point of view. By “physical”⁴⁰ Jackson (1982) refers to the information about the world or the environment. More specifically the information that is provided by science or the scientific information. Therefore the term “physicalism” means physical information or scientific information about the environment.

Jackson (1982) suggests that there are certain facts about bodily sensations or the perceptual experience where physicalism fails to explain the facts with reference to the scientific physical information available. Jackson (1982) accepts the representational character of the perceptual experience but at the same time he also admits to the distinctive existence of the phenomenal character of the experience or ‘qualia’.

Jackson (1982) provides examples in order to check whether there is a distinctive existence of ‘qualia’ which cannot be explained in terms of the representational character of experience.

³⁹Jackson, F. (1982, April). Epiphenomenal Qualia. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 32(127), 127-136.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

4.3.a) First time color experience

Nilopher is a brilliant scientist. She lives in a black and white room. She acquires knowledge about the world via a black and white television. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and has all the scientific and physical information about color perception. If Nilopher is exposed to the world where she perceives different colors will she learn something new? It is plausible that when she perceives a color for the first time she will experience something new. ‘What it is like to see a color’, which is distinct from the physical information of color perception that she has.

Nilopher will surely learn something new when she sees the color for the first time. It is undeniable that Nilopher’s previous scientific knowledge on the color concepts is incomplete. Though Nilopher has all the relevant physical information regarding colors, her perception of color or the introspective awareness of color perception adds something new. The knowledge of it is distinct from all the relevant physical information that she had gathered earlier. This distinctiveness of color perception cannot be explained in terms of the informational or conceptual knowledge possessed by Nilopher. Jackson concludes that a similar type of argument related to knowledge is also applicable to the cases like bodily sensations, taste, hearing, feeling and all mental states. Therefore, it assumes the distinctive existence of the phenomenal character or the ‘qualia’. The distinctiveness of ‘qualia’ cannot be explained with reference to ‘physicalism’.

4.3.b) The ability to distinguish the shades of color

Jackson (1982) states that the role of ‘qualia’ is not only important for learning something new but the ability to distinguish the different shades of a same color also prove its existence.

The potential of a person may vary in understanding the variations in color perception. For instance, a person named Fred can name each and every variation of a color in a catalogue. Anthony has the ability to recognize the different shades of a color. If someone gives ripe tomatoes to Anthony, he can immediately categorize the color of the tomatoes into two groups. Usually this cannot be done by others. According to Anthony, all ripe tomatoes do not look similar to him. He can categorize the colors into groups like red₁ and red₂. He explains that red₁ and red₂ are different from each other and all the other colors. Anthony's peculiar knowledge about color perception is subjective which helps him to categorize the different shades of colors.

Now the question arises what kind of experience Anthony has when he distinguishes two shades of color? Jackson (1982) contends that the physical information (content of experience) about Anthony's optical and brain system can never explain this fact. We know that to a certain wavelength of the color red Anthony responds differently. Though it cannot explain his peculiarity of color experience. Generally, given the same wavelength of any color other people cannot distinguish the different shades of color. Physical information of the color i.e. the particular wavelength cannot explain the fact as to what sort of experience Anthony undergoes when he is exposed to that particular shade of the color red. The intentional content itself is inadequate to determine the change in the phenomenal character of the experience or 'what it is like to undergo the specific color experience'.

Jackson (1982) asserts that there is something about Anthony's experience of color which cannot be explained in terms of the physical information. This instance of color perception challenges the theory of physicalism.

Jackson (1982) defends ‘qualia’ which are properties that have nothing to do with the physical information about the representational content. The presence of ‘qualia’ may affect the other mental states but still it cannot lead to any change in the physical state or the information state of the subject.

In both the cases we see that the perceptual experience of color leads to the change in the phenomenal character of the experience. There is no change in the subjective physical information about the experience. Nilopher’s physical information regarding the color was same to both the before and after of perceiving the real color. It did not lead her to acquire some new information about color perception. Hence, there is a change in the conscious character of experience. In order to know the change she needs to refer or to attend to the intrinsic features of experience. In Anthony’s case we see that he cannot explain the peculiarity of categorizing his color experience by referring to merely the physical information. The peculiarity lies in the conscious character of his color experience for which he needs to attend to the intrinsic property of the color experience.

Therefore, both Block (1996, 1999, 2003) and Jackson (1982) explicates it is not the representational content but the distinctive features of the phenomenal character of experience which constitutes the conscious character of the perceptual state. They reject the idea that perceptual experience is transparent with respect to the intentional content.

Considering all the objections leveled against representationalism can we answer these arguments following the transparency thesis which supports the strong intentionalism. The questions will be discussed in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

4.4) Inverted spectrum cases and restoration of representationalism

Block (1996, 1999, 2003) uses the argument of ‘inverted spectrum’ as a counter instance to representationalism. Jeff Speaks advocates that “Spectrum inversion without difference in representation is impossible” (2011). Spectrum inversion is impossible without referring to the change in representational content. Speaks in his paper supports the claim of strong intentionalism.

Speaks (2011) believes that the perceptual experience has both the representational content and the phenomenal character. According to Speaks (2011) the way experience is represented or is presented to the world is as it is which is referred to as the ‘content of the experience’. Speaks (2011) suggests that any change in the phenomenal character of the experience results from the change in the representational content. He takes the cases of spectrum inversion and checks whether it successfully satisfies strong intentionalism.

Speaks (2011) states that the relationship between the content and the phenomenal character of experience can be viewed as Interpersonal intentionalism.

4.4.a) Interpersonal intentionalism:

Necessarily if two experiences of any two subjects (of the same sense modality) differ in phenomenal character, then they differ in content.

The view does not claim that the phenomenal character is identical with the content. It does not entail that the phenomenology is reducible to the representational content. It states that two experiences can have the same phenomenal character if and only if they have the same representational content. In a nutshell it can be said that within any perceptual modality the phenomenal character supervenes on the representational content.

Speaks (2011) postulates that the spectrum inversion has its reference in Lockean theory (1689). Locke (1689) claims that the same object can produce different ideas in the mind of different people. These ideas are private and subjective since these ideas can never be transferred to the mind of other people. The view entails that the same object may produce the perception of several phenomenal characters of experience. The same content can lead to the perception of various phenomenal character of the experience. Therefore, Locke (1689) subscribes to an anti-intentionalist view.

Contemporary color theorists reject Locke's (1689) opinion on color- experiences that objects have single-color. If the color relativism is true then the argument against intentionalism fails.

Speaks (2011) raises the question of whether spectrum inversion is possible without any change in the representational content. To inquire further two questions have been addressed as follows:

- a. Whether color relativism is true
- b. Whether change in the color properties in the case of spectrum inversion is possible without any change in the representational content.

Speaks (2011) disproves the Lockean interpretation of spectrum – inversion which in turn proves intentionalism as true.

Speaks (2011) mentions various forms of anti-intentionalism theories and checks whether they can establish “spectrum inversion is possible without any difference in the representational content”.

4.4.b) Radical Anti-intentionalism

Let us suppose that the spectrum inversion without misrepresentation is possible. Additionally assume that two experiences can be alike with respect to the content but there can be changes in the phenomenal character.

Supporters of this claim might suggest that the representational content and the phenomenal character are independent aspects or factors of the perceptual experience. The change in the phenomenal character of experience can occur without any change in the representational content. Believers of this view uphold that there can be beings or creatures for whom there is no systemic connection between the content and the phenomenal character. Speaks argues that radical anti-intentionalism cannot be accepted as true.

For example a subject is looking attentively at a surface. It occupies his whole visual field. While undergoing the perceptual experience her experiences change from feeling bright red to feeling bright blue and from bright blue to bright purple within a few minutes. This pattern is repeated continuously.. Throughout this period of time her visual experience represents the color of the wall to her as yellow. Hence, the represented color (content) is constant.

Now the question follows whether the subject can experience the change in the phenomenal character of experience with respect to the representational content. More specifically, whether the change in the phenomenal character of experience can occur with respect to the representational content which remains constant throughout the experience.

Speaks (2011) explicates that the subject may believe or think that the wall represented to her seems to be yellow throughout the experience. It might not be the case that the

experience of the wall is constantly yellow to the subject. Therefore, Speaks (2011) suggests that there must be something represented as changing color which changes with the change in the phenomenal character of experience.

4.4.c) Moderate Anti- intentionalism

Speaks (2011) introduces the moderate view on anti-intentionalism to check whether their objection against intentionalism can be accepted as true.

Let us consider another example. There are two subjects who use two different languages for the same color. There is an inversion of the vocabulary for the usage of the color. One uses 'blue' in the context where the other refers to it as 'pink'. We find that in the same context the two subjects are referring to the same color differently. There is a change in the phenomenal character of experience with respect to the same color (object) represented in the experience. In the above example the subject is not misattributing the color. The subjects have the concepts of that particular color with which they are familiar. They look at the color, apply the concept of color and then refer to the color accordingly.

The view of moderate anti- intentionalism can be defined in the following way:

*“For any subject, there is some relation R which is such that experiences with color phenomenology F represent color-property G if the F - feeling experiences bear R to G .”*⁴¹

R is thought to be the one to one relation that holds between the phenomenal character and the color properties represented by the perceptual experience.

Let us consider the following situation carefully:

⁴¹ Speaks, J. (2011, December). Spectrum Inversion Without A Difference In Representation Is Impossible. *Philosophical Issues: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition*, 156(3), 339-361.

Suppose a subject under the influence of drugs is looking at a lighted surface or an illuminated wall. The subject's perceptual experience has the same phenomenal character like any other individual who has the same color perception of something green. Nonetheless, the subject's perceptual experience does not represent the color. When the subject's phenomenal character of the experience changes from green to red which is quite similar to any person, the perceptual experience does not represent the changed color. The change in the phenomenal character of the experience does not occur with the change in the representational character of experience. This changes which generally materializes in case of other human beings. However, the changes in the phenomenal character of experience takes place like any other human being.

The question arises whether the change in the color experience of the phenomenal character is possible without any representational content. Moreover, whether such change in the phenomenal character can occur in the absence of color content represented in a perceptual experience. We know that in the absence of any color it is difficult to explain how the changes in the phenomenal character of experience takes place. The change in the phenomenal character can occur only with respect to content represented. The perception of intentional object or the represented object which constitute the content can lead to changes in the phenomenal character of the experience. If a subject's experience represents nothing to her then how could the subject experience the change in the phenomenal character of the experience? We can reject such a possibility of the color experience. In the absence of the represented content there cannot be any change in the phenomenal character of experience. If there is any change in the phenomenal character of the experience then there will be a change in the representational character of the experience as well.

Another possibility can be to see whether the absence of representational content is compatible with the changes in the phenomenal character of perceptual experience.

Suppose there exists a creature. When it comes across a yellow object under the right conditions the experience generates yellow phenomenal character. Sometimes it also generates the color pink as a phenomenal character. Both the properties of color do not co-vary with the color property itself. The occurrence sometimes generates the experience of yellow and sometimes it generates the experience of pink. It fails to co-vary with its respective color property. It implies that due to inconsistency or the irregularity in the change in the phenomenal character the experience cannot change with respect to the representational content i.e. the color property. Within the same subject we notice an irregularity in the change in the phenomenal character which seems to be implausible. Therefore, we cannot accept moderate anti-intentionalism. It also fails to refute the claim of strong intentionalism.

4.4.d) Quietest Moderate Anti- Intentionalism

The moderate anti- intentionalists distinguish among the three following types⁴²:

i. Intrapersonal time - restricted intentionalism

Necessarily if two experiences of a single subject within minimum time interval t differ in phenomenal character, then they differ in content.

ii. Intrapersonal time- unrestricted intentionalism

Necessarily if two experiences of a single subject (whatever the time interval between them) differ in phenomenal character, then they differ in content.

⁴² Speaks, J. (2011, December). Spectrum Inversion Without A Difference In Representation Is Impossible. *Philosophical Issues: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition*, 156(3), 339-361.

iii. **Interpersonal intentionalism**

If two experiences (whether of a single subject or two varied subjects) differ in phenomenal character, then they differ in content.

The radical anti- intentionalist rejects all the three types whereas the moderate anti-intentionalists reject the third one.

Consider that quite moderate anti- intentionalist adheres to Intrapersonal Time Restricted Intentionalism and denies Intrapersonal Time Unrestricted Intentionalism.

Then what follows is if a subject undergoes two experiences of the same color content, then two experiences must have the same color phenomenology. If two experiences differ in minimum time interval; call this time interval – t , then chances are that the experiences have the same content but different phenomenal character of color experiences.

According to the above assumption, t is the minimum time interval between two experiences which can have the same color content but different phenomenal character. Two experiences cannot have the color content to the subject's experience prior to t . Additionally as per the same argument two experiences cannot have the color content to the subject's experience subsequent to t . Further it cannot be said that there is an alternate third color experience because it would entail that within this minimum time span the subject will experience no color content. It would violate our assumption and make the full color phenomenology plus no content possible. Therefore, the above assumption does not hold ground and is rejected.

Suppose, $t = 0$, it will allow psychedelic phenomenology + constant content possible. Although we have already repudiated it.

Thus, anti-intentionalist should not reject intrapersonal unrestricted time intentionalism unless they reject intrapersonal restricted time intentionalism. Thereby the position of radical intentionalism is approved. Since the changes in the phenomenal character of the experience cannot occur without the change in the representational content (given the specific time interval), the anti-intentionalists cannot prove it to be true.

Speaks (2011) elucidates that inverted spectrum cannot prove the claim of strong intentionalism. With references to all the instances we find that inverted spectrum cases cannot exhibit a single event where the change in the phenomenal character of the experience occurs without any change in the representational character of the experience. The representational character of the experience determines the phenomenal character of the experience.

Finally, inverted spectrum cases showcase that the change in the phenomenal character corresponds with the representational character of experience. The color experience of the subject corresponds to the representational features of the experience. Representational character exhausts the phenomenal character of the experience. Hence, it supports the transparency intuition of perceptual experience.

4.5) Intuitive view and the restoration of representationalism

James John's (2005)⁴³ view on representationalism has been discussed in this section. John (2005) suggests that there is a difference between the sensory experiences like visual, tactile, gustatory etc. and the mental states like belief, thought etc. The difference is explained in terms of the sensible qualities that we perceive in the course of perceptual

⁴³ John, J. (2005, Spring). Representationism, Phenomenism and the Intuitive View. *Philosophical Topics*, 33(1), 159-184.

experience. The differences in the experience of the sensible qualities do not dismiss the thesis of representationalism.

James John (2005) rejects phenomenism. He defends a particular version of representationalism. he defends the intuitive view⁴⁴ of representationalism According to John (2005) the version of representationalism supported by him addresses a “Common Worry”. The “Common Worry” expresses that either experiences do not have any phenomenal properties or they are “non-experiential” states like thought, belief, desire etc. John (2005) claims that ‘intuitive view’ avoids this problem and defends representationalism successfully.

John (2005) explains the perceptual awareness of an experience from a subjective point of view in the following manner. According to John the perceptions of green objects or things produce “green feeling” which can be called phenomenal character or ‘qualia’. John (2005) states that the veridical perception of “green feeling” is associated with the qualitative character, say, Q_G . Similarly the veridical perception “red feeling”, “yellow feeling” are associated with the qualitative characters like Q_R and Q_Y respectively.

Suppose we have two experiences E_1 and E_2 . The visual experience of E_1 is the experience of a yellow banana and the visual experience of E_2 is the experience of a clear blue sky. Corresponding to each visual experience the thought T_1 and T_2 are associated respectively. The qualitative difference between these two experiences can be interpreted in two ways. One type of qualitative difference is found between E_1 and E_2 . Another type of qualitative difference is found between E_1 and T_1 and E_2 and T_2 respectively. The difference between the qualitative characters is also associated with the mental states that are experientially

⁴⁴ John, J. (2005, Spring). Representationism, Phenomenism and the Intuitive View. *Philosophical Topics*, 33(1), 159-184.

associated with each experience. E_1 is associated with a qualitative character like Q_Y . E_2 is associated with the qualitative character like Q_B . Although the experience of E_1 and E_2 is experientially connected with qualitative character, there is no corresponding qualitative character associated with T_1 and T_2 . T_1 and T_2 are ‘qualitatively flavorless’⁴⁵. Both T_1 and T_2 lack the phenomenal properties. Therefore, the mental states associated with the perceptual experiences lack the corresponding phenomenal or qualitative properties.

According to John (2005) the representational content of experiences are propositions. Perceptual experiences are representational. They are “of” or “about” objects, properties and states of affairs. The veridical experience of “green feeling” has corresponding qualitative character Q_G . The experience also has a representational character. The experience represents something which is green.

Phenomenism (Block, 1996, 1999, 2003) while combining internalism and representationalism with reference to externalism can form an inconsistent triad according to John (2005). Phenomenal internalism suggests that the subject’s experience of phenomenal properties supervenes on the subject’s intrinsic properties. They identify phenomenal properties as “narrow” which depend on the subject’s internal constitution of mind. On the other hand, representational externalism suggests that the subject’s representational properties are “broad” which partly depends on the subject’s causally related environment.

Suppose there are two people, Sally and John. Sally’s experience represents something red. She is having “red-feeling”. On the other hand John’s experience represents something blue. He is undergoing the “blue- feeling”. Let us assume that there are Swamp

⁴⁵ Representationism, Phenomenism and the Intuitive View” by James John, *Philosophical Topics*, Spring, 2005, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 159- 184.

Sally and Swamp John who are identical from molecule to molecule with Sally and John respectively. According to phenomenal internalism, Swamp Sally will have the experience of “red-feeling” while Swamp John will have the experience of “blue – feeling”. Since Swamp Sally and Swamp John are created in the swamp the experiential externalism will claim that both Swamp Sally and John lack representational properties of their experiences. The experience of Swamp Sally and Swamp John are representationally non-distinct but phenomenally distinct. Sally and Swamp Sally are phenomenally having the identical phenomenal character but Swamp Sally has no representational property of experience. The same is applicable to John and Swamp John. The example showcases that phenomenal character of experience cannot be determined by the representational properties of experience. In the above instance we find that despite identical phenomenal character the absence of representational properties of the experience. If phenomenal internalism and experiential externalism is true, then it makes representationalism false. What is the alternative?

4.5.a) Intuitive View

According to the intuitive view the qualitative characters are sensible properties. Q_P is identical with the color pink, Q_T is identical with the shape triangular, and so on. For every phenomenal character there is a corresponding qualitative character. Secondly a subject can experience sensible qualities when she is actually perceptually aware of that particular quality. It implies that the phenomenal properties or qualities are relational. For instance a veridical perception of the color pink can only be experienced by the subject, if she is aware of the color pink.

The intuitive view advocates that the awareness of particular properties is how the qualitative characters are instantiated by the things. The objects or things appear to us as having various properties. The objects or things therefore instantiate the qualitative characters. For instance we perceive the rose as pink which means that it instantiates the qualitative character pink.

The above discussion suggests that in order to have a veridical perception of an object which instantiates a particular property, say x the object must appear to us as having that particular property x . Hence, the veridical pink- feeling of rose indicates that the subject is aware of the color pink, the color which the object instantiates. The rose looks pink to the subject.

The intuitive view expounds that the qualitative aspect of the phenomenal character is relational and mind independent. They are neither mental nor mind-dependent.

The veridical perception facilitates the perceptual awareness of the qualitative aspect. The qualitative aspect of perception suggests that we are aware of various mind – independent sensible properties. Furthermore we are not aware of the experience themselves or any intrinsic properties of experience. It implies that these qualitative properties are out there in the world. Phenomenism is incompatible with the intuitive view. The intuitive view suggests that we are only aware of the properties that are relational and mind-independent. It has a similarity with the transparency intuition of experience. The transparency intuition also suggests that in the process of perceptual experience the introspective awareness accesses the property represented by the intentional objects of experience. The intentional objects which constitute the representational content of the experience are relational.

4.5.b) Phenomenism and the incompatibility with the intuitive view

Different forms of phenomenism are discussed in this section. Evidence to why phenomenism is incompatible with the intuitive view which ultimately supports representationalism has been elucidated upon.

There are two types of phenomenism: awareness phenomenism and possession phenomenism. Both the views are incompatible with the intuitive view.

According to awareness phenomenism qualia or the qualitative character is not the sensible property. It is the intrinsic property of experience. In the case of the perception of the qualitative property like the color green (Q_G), Q_G is the G- quale and not the color green. The color green is the sensible property. It can be experienced visually but quale is the intrinsic property. The veridical perception of Q_G suggests that the subject must be aware of the Q_G . The awareness phenomenists distinguish between the phenomenal properties and the qualia. They hold that the veridical experience of green feeling implies the instantiation of the G-quale, the G-quale is considered as the object of perceptual awareness.

The awareness phenomenism is incompatible with the intuitive view. Awareness phenomenism identifies qualitative properties with the phenomenal properties which are intrinsic. Whereas the intuitive view identifies qualia with sensible properties like color. The object of perceptual awareness in an intuitive view is sensible properties. The intuitive view rejects awareness phenomenism.

Possession phenomenists holds that qualia and phenomenal properties are identical. Unlike awareness phenomenists they deny that the subject is aware of the qualitative character/quale/phenomenal properties. They believe that the only perceptual properties of

which the subject is aware is the color green. For instance, in cases like the phenomenal inverted spectrum, John's visual experience represents yellow and thus generates a yellow- feeling. On the other hand, John's inverted visual experience represents the color orange and it generates orange – feeling. Both John and John's inverted spectrum are aware of yellow. John's perceptual awareness of yellow is flavored with the Y – quale while John's inverted perceptual awareness of experience is flavored with the O – quale.

According to John (2005), phenomenism is incompatible with the intuitive view. Therefore, the question arises, what is the alternative? We need to examine whether representationalism is incompatible with the intuitive view?

The representationalism can be interpreted in three ways⁴⁶:

- i. A pure representationalist**
- ii. A modality impure representationalist (MOD impure)**
- iii. A mode of presentation- impure (MOP – impure) representationalist**

- i. Pure representationalist**

The theory identifies the phenomenal character of experience with the representational properties. For instance they identify the property of having red- feeling with the representational properties like the property of being red- representing.

- ii. MOD- impure (a modality impure representationalists)**

The view suggests that the phenomenal property is identical with the representing property which visually represents the property or the properties that are revealed

⁴⁶ John, J. (2005, Spring). Representationism, Phenomenism and the Intuitive View. *Philosophical Topics*, 33(1), 159-184.

by the appropriate or the specific modalities. Tye's theory of representationalism can be viewed as MOD-impure.

iii. A mode of presentation (MOP-impure) representationalists

MOP- impure representationalists also identify the properties like the feeling pink with something representing the color pink. They associate the verb like "visually" not with the sensory modalities but consider the verb like "visually" or other perceptual experiences similar to Fregean mode of presentation. "identical with the property of being a mental state with the content that something is green" is how MOP impure representationalists explain the feeling of green. Green is represented as a visual mode of presentation which M. Chalmers accepts a form of MOP.

John (2005) explores the arguments of the three views and examines if they are compatible with the intuitive view.

As suggested by John (2005), pure representationalism is incompatible with the intuitive view. For a subject being perceptually aware of the sensible quality like orange means that the content of the experience represents something orange or has the feeling - orange. Awareness of Q_O means that the perceptual experience represents something as Q_O . It excludes the higher- order conscious mental states like thought or judgment. These mental states do not have immediate access to the sensible qualities.

The view fails to explain the cases of mental states like belief, desire, fear and so on. These intentional states can represent the color orange but none of these states have the feeling - orange.

MOP impure representationalists identify the property of being purple with the property of being the mental state with the content that something is purple. The property purple is

presented under the visual mode of presentation M. This view is inapplicable to certain mental states like belief, desire and so on. In case of these mental states no purple feeling is associated with these states. Therefore, the problem persists.

The question is whether MOP- impure representationalists deny that M is the object of perceptual awareness. They hold that M has qualitative aspects which suggests that the only thing we are “aware of in having the properties in having veridical experiences- V are the properties V represents things as having” (John, 2005, p. 175). We cannot simply be aware of M but the awareness of M implies having certain properties, awareness of some properties like green, purple etc. It is similar to Block’s phenomenism which agrees that awareness of experience involves awareness of certain properties. He also uses the term ‘mode of presentation’ for proving the distinctive existence of ‘qualia’. The representationalists deny that we are aware of any mental properties. Hence, MOP – impure representationalism is rejected.

John (2005) concludes that MOD – impure supports the intuitive view. What are the grounds for accepting MOD-impure representationalism? Let us take an example and explain it.

When we SEE and TOUCH something square we not only become aware of the property of squareness but we also become aware of the property of the square represented by the object. Each sensory experience makes us aware of the specific property represented by the experience. Awareness of the experience of sight and touch represents the modality specific to the properties respectively.

John (2005) supports representationalism. He accepts that experience has both representational and phenomenal properties. According to him, intentional states like

thought, judgment, belief etc. lack phenomenal properties. He states that the thought while accessing the experience prevents access to phenomenal properties. Experience can represent sensible qualities but the thought regarding the same is unable to do so.

In conclusion John's intuitive view (2005) also suggests that the perceptual experience requires the coordination of both sensory and conceptual representation. There is a difference between the sensory representations and the intentional states which involves the sensory representation in the process of perception. The intentional states like thought, belief etc. are the representational states about the sensory representation. The intentional states cannot access the sensible property of the sensory experience immediately. They access the memory and the several concepts or representational facts in this regard.

Therefore, we can state that John's intuitive view (2005) in a way supports the transparency account of self- knowledge for explaining the perceptual experience. Evans' transparency method (1982) of self- knowledge also accounts for the role of both sensory and conceptual representation (belief, thought) for explaining the knowledge of our mental state. The perceptual experience is not about the sensory data but it needs the second-order mental states which are conceptual.

The discussions of both Speak (2011) and John (2005) elucidates that phenomenism is not acceptable and therefore we should stick to representationalism. The question arises, whether representationalism accepted in this regard can avoid all the challenges raised by Block (1996, 1999, 2003) and Jackson (1982). Could we accommodate the intuition of transparency with representationalism in order to solve these problems? The following questions will be addressed in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

4.6) Reply to Jackson

4.6.a) First time color sensation

Jackson (1982) points out that the color perception involves something distinct which cannot be reduced into the representational or the intentional content. According to Jackson (1982), when Nilopher for the first time perceives the color she learns something new which cannot be explained in terms of the scientific knowledge of the color that she possesses.

On perceiving the color for the first time Nilopher experiences the properties represented by the color. Despite having all the scientific or the physical information about color, does Nilopher learn something new about color perception? Representationalists advocate that learning about a perceptual state about a color signifies learning certain information or facts about the color which constitutes the states of affairs. For example, learning about a particular color like red implies learning certain facts about the color red. Scientific facts about the color indicate that it has certain reflectance properties like it has certain point for color saturation, hue and so on.

Some philosophers (Locke, 1690) suggest that colors are the secondary property of objects. Locke (1690) distinguishes between primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities like shape are qualities that subside in the object whereas secondary qualities are suggested as less real and mind- dependent qualities. The perception of secondary qualities are observer dependent.

From Locke (1690) we may conclude that if the perception of a color is something observer-dependent and less real then the perception of the color can only be explained in

terms of the phenomenal character of the experience. ‘What it is like to undergo color experience’ cannot be explained in terms of representational content.

In order to solve this problem Egan (2006)⁴⁷ suggested the idea of ‘self-locating’ belief which states that the perception of something observer-dependent can be explained with reference to the content of different types.

Egan (2006) expounds that the mental states distinguish between the different possibilities and attributes. The possibilities are the different content of the mental states (belief, desire, etc.). The content constructs different possible worlds. Content of belief can be viewed as a possible world. It is the set of possible worlds which asserts the way it is believed to be so.

In a possible world the content of my mental states and the property of an object play a distinctive role while picking out the particulars. The property determines a set of worlds i.e. the world in which an object has certain property. For example in the case of red apples, the property like red apple determines a set of worlds in which all apples (particulars) are red.

Further the function of a possible world is also to determine the extension. For example, given a world *w* where the apple is red it is the function of the world to determine the extension. Here all apples are red in *w*. Given a proposition, ‘apple is red’ apple is the extension of being red in *w*. Iff *w* is a member of the proposition expressed by the sentence ‘apple is red’.

⁴⁷Egan, A. (2006, January). Secondary Qualities and Self-Location. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 72(1), 97-119.

The properties can be viewed as functions from world to extensions. The representation of the function of the possible world content is to determine the attribute that it assigns to the objects. For instance, let us consider the proposition 'lily is a flower'. The function of the proposition is to pick out a set of worlds where the lily has the property of being a flower. A mental state like belief in this regard has the content which represents lily as having certain features i.e, being a flower.

Egan (2006) suggests that the mental states like belief not only have possible world content but they also have the centered world contents. My mental representations can have a centered world location. Belief about my locations or time cannot be captured entirely by possible world content. Possible world cannot capture my location (spatial and temporal) within that world. We need a centered world.⁴⁸

Egan (2006) believes that the propositional content can have centered world content.⁴⁹ Possible world content of representation are described in terms of the properties that the object are represented as having certain properties. For example, in the case of the representational fact like 'apple is red' when we pick out a class of possible worlds it implies an all encompassing and only worlds -where all the apples are red.

Egan (2006) for defining 'self-locating' belief introduces the idea of a centered world. The centered world can be viewed as a pair of individuals. The way a person locates or relates themselves with the current experience. According to Egan (2006) a particular centered world fixes an individual's current location in the world. He suggests that it is difficult for an individual to locate himself in a centered world for a very long period of time. For

⁴⁸Egan, A. (2006, January). Secondary Qualities and Self-Location. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 72(1), 97-119.

⁴⁹ Egan, A. (2006, January). Secondary Qualities and Self - Location. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 72(1), 97 - 119.

example, if I consider myself located in a centered world it would be considered as (priyanka, @ 2:13 am). Features of centered worlds are set theoretical functions from centered worlds to extensions.

When I represent self-locating belief I not only ascribe properties to certain objects as having the properties but I ascribe certain perspectival features like far away, nearby and so on. Properties determine the function from world to extensions. Properties like ‘nearby’ or ‘far away’ determine our own location within the world.

In the case of possible worlds we find that the properties of an object of the same type are applicable to all the objects of the same category that exist in that particular world. For instance, let us consider the proposition like ‘apple is red’. The property red is applicable to all the apples that exist in the world *w*. In a world *w* if *x* and *y* are humans and if something is nearby to *x* it may be far away from *y*. It includes certain perspectival aspects of the perceptual experience which cannot be reduced into the properties of the objects in the ordinary sense.

If these features were thought to be ordinary properties then we would not have been able to distinguish between different positions within the same world. These features are viewed as the functions from the centered world to the extensions. In a centered world which is represented by the property of being nearby is determined by the particular location in that particular world at that particular time. By ‘nearby’ we refer to all the objects that occupy the particular location in that particular world at that particular time. This property-like thing⁵⁰ is referred to as ‘centering features’ by Egan (2006). The roles

⁵⁰ Egan, A. (2006, January). Secondary Qualities and Self - Location. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 72(No. 1), 97 - 119.

of centering features are not only to select the world but to fix the centre as well. These also include the features associated with the sensation of smell, taste etc.

The question arises whether by accepting the ‘self-locating belief’ or the centering features the perception of color can be explained in terms of the representational content of experience.

According to representationalism all the relevant facts about the color red constitute the content of the perceptual experience of color red. If that is the case then we need to state that all the relevant physical information about the color red constitute the intentional content of experience. When Nilopher perceives a color for the first time she discovers or experiences the fact that how she is related to the color content. It suggests that Nilopher is learning about the indexical properties of the color red, i.e. how the color red is appearing under these circumstances. Indexical properties can be referred to as appearance properties. Appearance property is not outrightly the physical property but it depends on the physical property. These indexical properties are certain perspectival properties as well.

When Nilopher studies the scientific facts about the color it generates certain thoughts or belief states in her mind. While perceiving the color she also applies the belief that she possesses about the color. She relates herself to her current experience of the color red. Egan’s (2006) centered world content implies that Nilopher, while perceiving the color, locates herself. She relates her belief state with her current experience of the color at that particular moment.

The question arises how the intuition of transparency works? Nilopher relates her belief state with her current experience of color perception and applies the concept (scientific

information) which constitutes the state. It entails that in the course of perception of the color Nilopher does not learn anything new. Her belief state relates herself with the perspectival properties of her current experience. In the introspective awareness Nilopher accesses certain reflexive properties of the experience. Nilopher therefore can relate her current experience of color to the scientific knowledge of color that she previously possessed.

Chapter three discusses that perspectival aspects are dependent on learning of several representational facts. The facts can be explained in terms of the intentional and representational content. Moreover, perspectival features can be explained with reference to Dretske's displaced perception (1994) which supports the transparency account of self-knowledge (Evans, 1982). The transparency account of self-knowledge subscribes to the claim of strong intentionalism.

4.6.b) Ability to distinguish the shades of color

According to Jackson (1982) a person's ability to distinguish the shades of color cannot be explained in terms of physicalism or the scientific information available in this regard.

Jackson's (1982) argument against strong intentionalism can be rejected on the following grounds.

If Anthony has the ability to distinguish the different shades of a color it signifies that by looking at the representational properties of the color he distinguishes it. According to Egan (2006) mental representations can have centered world location. Anthony relates himself with the properties of the color red that appear in front of him. He therefore concludes that two ripe tomatoes appear as different to him. Anthony, while distinguishing the two different shades of the same color relates himself to the appearance properties of

the color of tomato. He does not look at any intrinsic property of the experience but he perceives the appearance properties of the color which depends on the physical property of the color.

Furthermore, it might be the case that Anthony has good eyesight due to which he can distinguish the different shades of color quickly. With respect to the appearance properties his retinal nerve might react differently as a result of which he can differentiate the color. He categorizes them correctly. The perception of this type can be explained in terms of physical process.

In both the cases Anthony does not look into the intrinsic properties of experience. The appearance properties relate the individual to the centered world content which is related to their current experience. The appearance properties are not the intrinsic properties of the experience. Being related to the appearance properties the subject needs the access of several representational facts. These facts are essential for generating the intentional states like belief. The subject on being related to the appearance properties by default has access to the intentional state provided the subject has fine memory. Therefore, it signifies that the centered world content has representational features. It can restore both the intuition of transparency and strong intentionalism.

4.7) Reply to Block

4.7.a) Internalism

Answers to the argument proposed by Block (1996, 2003) against the internalists are as follows. Julie who is raised in a black and white room has no standing belief about changes in color. Julie successfully refers to the color when she undergoes the experience

of change in color which occurs every few minutes in her room. If Julie can refer to the name of the color it signifies that by looking at the intentional content she can identify the color. She might not have any standing knowledge about the color yet she might randomly pick the name of the color which turns out to be true. This instance cannot prove strong intentionalism to be false. Whatever changes occur in the phenomenal character of experience it occurs due to the changes in the representational character or the representational content of experience. On the basis of the intentional content she identifies the color and differentiates it accordingly. It leads to changes in the phenomenal character of her experience.

Further, the intentional content determines the phenomenal character of the color experience. It is difficult to conceive the fact that a person who is ignorant about the color content can successfully identify the color. Although the fact coincidentally turns out to be true it occurs due to change in the intentional content. In order to refer to the color the subject does not need to look into the intrinsic property of experience. Therefore, in the introspective awareness the subject accesses the representational content. The representational content exhausts the phenomenal character of experience. Following the transparency intuition we can restore the claim of strong intentionalism.

4.7.b) Externalism

The transparency intuition along with strong intentionalism refutes the argument given by Block (1996, 2003) against externalist positions regarding the perceptual experience.

Counter instances provided by Block (1996, 2003) can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, the twin-water looks exactly the same as water on the earth. The objects represented on earth and twin earth look exactly the same to the subject. The representational content

generates phenomenal character accordingly. Therefore, we admit that the perception of the representational content leads to the change in the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience. Changes in the intentional object which constitutes the representational content is so subtle that the person fails to notice the change in the representational content. The representational content necessarily determines the phenomenal character of experience. It signifies that the awareness of perceptual experience accesses no intrinsic features of the experience over and above the representational properties or the intentional object. Hence, the transparency intuition restores the claim of strong intentionalism.

Secondly, after living on the earth the person gets acquainted with several terminologies that are used by the people on earth. Eventually she learns that the transparent, colourless liquid is referred to as water on earth which she previously used to refer to as twin- water on the twin earth.

The intuition of transparency of self- knowledge (Evans, 1982) helps us to understand the claim of strong intentionalism. Intentional state presupposes cognitive ability like memory, application of appropriate concepts and so on. It is not only the sensory experience but also the learning of the appropriate concepts that helps the subject to refer to the name of the appropriate terminologies. It ultimately generates the thought or judgment in the mind of the subject. The person gradually learns to refer to the colourless transparent liquid as water. In conclusion Evans' transparency account of self - knowledge states that the sensory experience which is non- conceptual along with cognitive ability of learning explains the knowledge of our mental state. Learning of certain terminologies explains the reason for the change in the phenomenal character of experience. The knowledge or the appropriate account of the representational content leads to the change in

the phenomenal character of the experience accordingly. Transparency account of self – knowledge (Evans, 1982) refutes the counter argument against the claim of strong intentionalism.

4.7.c) Supervenience

The argument of supervenience cannot be considered a serious threat against representationalism. A set of properties A supervenes on another set of properties B, if and only if, changes in A leads to changes in B.

The swampman who is identical from molecule to molecule with other human beings lacks the representational state. What does being identical from molecule to molecule imply? They are alike in physical aspects with reference to other human beings. They look like us. Would this be considered as a hindrance in establishing the claim of strong intentionalism? The answer is no.

The swampman lacks the informational state which implies that the swampman lacks the access to the intentional content. The similarity entails that given an opportunity to learn about the informational state he would encounter the information about Bill Gates. It generates a change in the phenomenal character of experience. The similarity assumes that the swampman has the cognitive capacity to learn or access the information like other human beings.

For example, suppose in a family there are twins (Tw_1 and Tw_2). The twins have been brought up in two different communities with different languages. Tw_1 lives in a community where the people speak Japanese whereas Tw_2 lives in a community where the people speak German. Tw_1 cannot speak German and she lacks the information about the

language. Similarly, Tw_2 cannot speak Japanese and therefore lacks information about the language.

The physical similarity between Tw_1 and Tw_2 cannot prove that the person living in a different community will share all the relevant information. Further being identical from molecule to molecule implies that even the swampman would have the relevant information about Bill Gates even without coming across him. This proposition is quite absurd.

In conclusion, the absence of the intentional or the representational content is unable to generate any phenomenal character regarding Bill Gates in swampman. Counter instances provided by Block (1996, 2003) against representationalism assumes that the intentional content determines the phenomenal character of the experience. The absence of the representational or the informational content about Bill Gates leaves the phenomenal character of experience as blank in the mind of swampman. Whatever may be the phenomenal character of the experience it is exhausted by the intentional content. It proves the transparency intuition to be true which supports strong intentionalism.

A similar argument is applicable for the case study of the brain in a vat (Block, 1996, 2003). If the bathtub brain has a similar configuration like the human brain then it would also have access to the informational state. For instance, the memory of computers can function like the human brain. The memory of the computer requires the entry of the relevant data or relevant information. It provides information about the data entry. The computer therefore needs access to the content.

The instance of the brain (Block, 1996, 2003) in a vat proves that it is the intentional content which plays a significant role. Absence of the intentional content does not

generate any phenomenal character of experience. The intentional or the representational content determines the phenomenal character. Thus, the transparency intuition avoids the objection against the claim of strong intentionalism.

4.7.d) Perception of latex

According to Block (1996, 2003) latex represents nothing. Paint has a base whereas latex does not have a base. He states that if latex represents nothing then while perceiving the painting we become aware of both the latex and the paint. It refutes the fact that representational content determines the phenomenal character of experience.

In defense of representationalism while experiencing the paint when we see the coated or the glossy surface; the painting itself represents the property of glossiness. It cannot be ascertained that latex represents nothing. Paint can be of different types like matt and glossy. When we use the coating in a paint it has the representational property like glossiness or the shininess in it. The matt paint lacks the property of being glossy. For example, wood polish can be of two types. They are matt finished or glossy. In order to get the glossy effect on wood a certain solution is used in the wooden polish. Usually lacquer is used for the glossy effect on wood. In the absence of lacquer the glossy effect on wood cannot be perceived. In case of wooden paint the pigment represents the color and the lacquer represents the latex or the coating. In such a scenario, the property of glossiness becomes the base for latex. Glossiness is therefore the property represented by the intentional object. In conclusion the intentional content determines the phenomenal character of the experience for paint as well. The experience of latex does not need attending to the intrinsic property of experience. It is the property which can be explained in terms of representational content. The experience of latex cannot be explained without a

reference to the intentional content. Therefore, the instance of latex supports the transparency intuition.

Prior knowledge is required to the subject in order to comprehend the glossy effect of paint. Mere experience does not guarantee the knowledge of glossiness. For example, the mixture of the color yellow and blue yields a green pigment. By looking at the color yellow and blue separately one cannot apprehend that both of them yield the color green. The phenomenal character cannot be determined by the representational properties. In chapter two we have already discussed that the introspective awareness of an experience does not always result from looking directly at the intentional object. Whatever changes occur in the phenomenal character of the experience depends on some prior knowledge. In order to explain the change in the phenomenal character of experience the aid of some second order knowledge i.e. conceptual representation is required. These conceptual representations are dependent on several first order informational fact or non-conceptual representations. This is Dretske's 'displaced perception' (1994). 'Displaced perception' (Dretske, 1994) is grounded on Evan's (1982) transparency method for self- knowledge. The transparency method of self - knowledge suggests that we need the help of both the non-conceptual and conceptual information to recognise our own mental states. The transparency method of self-knowledge (Evans, 1982) rejects Block's (1996, 1999, 2003) objection against representationalism. In conclusion the representational content exhausts the phenomenal character of experience which is proved by the connection between the two types of representations conceptual and non conceptual that occurs in the process of perceptual experience.

4.7.e) Experience of illusion or the non-existent things

Block (1996, 2003) suggests that in illusion the subject cannot access the properties of intentional objects. Intentional content cannot determine the phenomenal character of experience. By using the argument in favor of strong intentionalism Block's (1996, 2003) objection regarding the case of illusion is refuted.

Illusion is the distortion of our senses or the sensory experience. For instance, in the absence of light we may perceive a rope as a snake. What could be the reason behind the misinterpretation of sensory experience? It occurs due to the similarity of representational properties between the rope and the snake. The misrepresentation does not occur simply by looking at the intrinsic properties of the experience. In the introspective awareness the subject accesses the representational properties and misinterprets it as a snake. It leads to the changes in the phenomenal character of the experiences accordingly. Hence, the intentional content determines the subject's phenomenal character.

In case of perception of a non-existent thing a similar line of argumentation is applicable. For instance, in case of the perception of a mirage, a type of hallucination occurs in the mind of a person in a desert. It occurs due to certain geographical and environmental conditions that are specific to a desert. The person experiences the appearance of a lake or water in the desert. It generates the phenomenal character of the experience accordingly. The misinterpretation of the desert as having a lake does not occur by accessing the intrinsic property of the experience itself. The person to whom the appearance of the lake in the desert occurs needs to refer to the intentional content.

Moreover, the person who interprets it as mere reflection of the sky also needs access to the intentional content. Hence, in both the cases we find that the person needs to refer to

the representational or the intentional content for explaining the phenomenal character of the experience.

The question arises as to how the intuition of transparency functions?

The person who hallucinates a lake in the desert concludes it on the basis of the representational or the intentional content. Whatever phenomenal character occurs in this case can be explained in terms of the representational content. The transparency intuition is therefore used in the context of perceptual experience.

On the other hand, the person who takes the experience of mirage as mere appearance or the reflection of the sky applies the coordination of both sensory representation and conceptual representation. It generates the phenomenal character of the experience accordingly. Therefore, the transparency intuition of self-knowledge (Evans, 1982) is used.

Moreover, sometimes the experience of hallucination can occur due to some brain disorder, psychological condition or drug usage. Due to certain neuro-physical conditions the person seems to experience hallucination. The defect in the neuro-physical system is responsible for such misinterpretation of the experience. The changes are triggered in the phenomenal character of the experience. The signal from the stimuli vitalises the nervous system. It carries out the signal to the brain. The brain interprets it accordingly and generates the phenomenal character of the experience. The central nervous system functions as the intentional content. The person who has a disorder in the brain misinterprets the perceptual experience in the absence of intentional objects. Due to the disorder in the brain such perception occurs. By referring to the representational content we can explain the phenomenal character of experience. Both Tye (1992, 1995, 1996,

2002) and Dretske (1997) have accepted such a neuro-physical explanation. The claim of strong intentionalism can be restored by using the arguments of the transparency intuition of perceptual experience.

4.7.f) Bodily sensations

According to Block (1996, 2003, 2005), bodily sensations of certain types like orgasms prove that there is a phenomenal character over and above the representational characters of experience. The feeling of pleasure post orgasm experienced by two persons having sex is different.

Having an orgasm is a physical process. During sexual climax the genital gets stimulated. There is secretion of hormones which leads to the changes in the phenomenal character. The question arises, irrespective of the same neuro-physical process, how do two people involved in the same act experience the orgasm differently. Orgasm is comparatively a complex process and it is difficult to explain as to how many and what nerves get stimulated. Each orgasm is unique to the individual. Even the same person can experience an orgasm differently each time during different sexual encounters. Orgasms stimulates the sexual organs which send electrical impulses throughout the body. The nervous system acts as the representational content.

Each individual is distinct and hence the neuro-physical constitution although the same still produces different neural firing. According to Egan's self-locating belief (2006) the appearance properties of the sensation of orgasm differs from person to person. The function of 'centering features' is to fix the centre so that each individual can 'self-locate' his/her intentional state with his/her current perceptual state of sensation. In the process of doing so the person does not look into the intrinsic features of the experience. Following

the centered world content the individual ‘self-locates’ his/her feeling of sensation which may differ from his/her sexual partner. Thus, the experience of orgasm differs from person to person.

The variation of feeling of the sensation is also applicable to all other forms of perceptual experience. For instance, while looking at a bright light-sun (stimuli) two persons experience the same neuro-physical process. Both of them will eventually turn away or shut their eyes. What differs is the duration of tolerating the bright sun on one’s face. One of them might be able to look at the sun longer than the other. Despite being exposed to the same stimuli the changes in phenomenal character might still be different. Although the constitution of the neuro-physical system is the same, the neural firing to produce sensation varies from person to person.

The same is also applicable for gustatory experience. Two persons may taste the same dish. One may find it terribly spicy while the other may not find it spicy. It depends on the food habits. If a person regularly consumes spicy food, her taste buds adapt itself to the spice. Therefore, she may not find the same dish terribly spicy while others find it spicy.

The reactions of two people differ with respect to the same representational or the intentional content. There are changes in the phenomenal character of experience. While explaining the different reactions of the two persons we do not need to access the intrinsic property of the experience. In both cases we refer to the intensity (neural firing) of the experience. It explains the changes in the phenomenal character of the experience of the two individuals. The intensity of the experience has its source in the content being represented. It can be explained in terms of the appearance properties. An individual relates the appearance properties with his/her current experience. It can be explained in terms of Egan’s (2006) centered world content.

The intensity (neural firing) cannot be explained in terms of the intrinsic property of the experience. Therefore in the case of bodily sensations the content represented plays a vital role in determining the perceptual experience. We can restore the claim of strong intentionalism. The changes in the phenomenal character of the experience occurs with respect to the intentional content. Since the changes in the phenomenal character cannot be explained without referring to the representational character of the experience, we conclude that it supports the transparency intuition.

4.7.g) Perception of modalities

Representationalists and the strong intentionalists believe that the perceptual experience with different modalities like the touch and sight can be explained in terms of the intentional content. A subject encounters different representational properties with respect to different sensory modalities. Some of the properties of the intentional object represented in different modalities are mutually exclusive. For instance the person who is blind by birth cannot experience the color of an intentional object. Whereas the person who has a problem in the spinal cord might lose the sensation in some body part which could lead them to not feeling the representational properties as gained by the sensation of touch of the same object. The representational properties constitute the content of the experience. It entails that with the experience of the different representational properties the subject experiences various representational content. Therefore, the intentional content determines the phenomenal character of the experience.

According to Block (1996, 2003), when we move our hand in the vicinity of our ear our eyes experience it differently. The auditory experience perceives the properties of sound like loudness. The visual experience without noticing the shape, color etc. perceives it

differently. The difference can only be explained by referring to the distinctive features of the phenomenal character of experience.

In support of representationalists one can say that the visual experience can perceive the motion, i.e. the shift of the object from one place to another. It cannot perceive the sound or the loudness. The auditory experience can perceive the properties of sound. After perceiving the sound of an object in motion; the person can assume the motion of the object. On the basis of some previous knowledge the subject assumes the same. Hence the example showcases that the subject needs the help of ‘displaced perception’ i.e. coordination of both the non-conceptual and the conceptual representations. ‘Displaced perception’ (Dretske, 1994) is supported by the transparency thesis of self-knowledge (Evans, 1982).

Therefore, the claim of strong intentionalism is true which is supported by the transparency intuition.

4.7.h) Externalist memory

The example of externalist memory as suggested by Block (1996, 2003) cannot reject the theory of representationalism.

The subject who arrived on the inverted earth from earth encounters the objects with an inverted reference. Without prior knowledge a chip was inserted in the subject. As a result her experience of pigment altered. The objects which she previously used to refer to as “green” on the inverted earth are now referred to as “pink”. On the inverted earth she mistakenly refers to it as “green”. The reference of the color will now be considered as wrong on the inverted earth.

Due to the insertion of the chip she notices the “green” object as “pink”. On the inverted earth the “pink” is referred to as “green”. Therefore the representational content determines the phenomenal character of the experience.

After living on the inverted earth for many years she can now refer to the colors correctly. Block (1996, 2003) points out that the representational content changes but the phenomenal character remains the same.

As an old inhabitant of the inverted earth she learns the color concept of the inverted earth thoroughly. She now refers to the color correctly. Earlier on the basis of her knowledge of the color concept of earth she used to refer to the color “green” as “green”. Moreover, due to the insertion of the chip she used to perceive the color “green” as “pink”.

The instance showcases that the subject’s phenomenal character of experience alters with respect to the intentional content of the experience. Hence, the intentional content of experience determines the phenomenal character of the experience. The introspective awareness of the experience accesses only the representational properties of the experiences. It only determines ‘what it is like to undergo a certain color experience’ in the inverted earth. Whatever might be the phenomenal character of experience it is exhausted by the properties represented by the intentional object. Therefore it proves that the strong intentionalism is true and is supported by the transparency intuition.

4.7.i) Inverted spectrum

The cases of inverted spectrum as suggested by Block (1996, 2003) cannot prove the claim of strong intentionalism as false.

The object which appears red to one person appears as green to Tom and vice-versa. Tom is unaware about this peculiarity of his own visual experience. When Tom perceives the red tomato he can correctly refer to it as red but his visual experience represents it to him as green.

The instance suggests that Tom's optical nerve has certain defects due to which he perceives it differently. When he perceives the red object it stimulates his optic nerve. The optic nerve represents the color as green. The peculiarity of Tom's experience can only be explained in terms of the neuro physical process. The introspective awareness does not access the intrinsic properties of the experience which is non-physical in nature. The phenomenal character is determined by the representational content (optic nerve). Therefore it dismisses the distinctive existence of 'qualia'. If there is any phenomenal character of experience it is exhausted by the representational character (the optic nerve) of the experience. Thus, it is also compatible with the transparency intuition of the perceptual experience.

4.8) Conclusion

The chief concern of this chapter is to verify the objections against representationalism. It tries to provide satisfactory answers to the objections. Various avenues are explored to support the intuition of transparency.

The philosophers who accept the distinct existence of the phenomenal character of the experience over and above the representational properties of experience have emphasized on the color perception and the bodily sensations. With reference to the history of modern western philosophy the perception of these properties are thought to be observer-dependent. These properties are not considered as the real properties of the object. Locke

(1689) states that these properties are observed as the power of mind to produce certain ideas or sensations in mind.

Contemporary philosophers Block (1996, 1999, 2003, 2010) and Jackson (1982) believe that the perception of these observer-dependent properties needs the access of the intrinsic properties of experience. The claim of representationalism becomes false if representational properties of objects or the content of experience fail to determine certain observer-dependent properties. The experience of color, the bodily sensations are private. The perceptions of these properties vary from person to person. The experience of something which is private cannot be entirely determined by the representational content of the experience. It is something external to the observer and therefore it cannot determine the phenomenal character of the experience.

The chapter deals with the uniqueness of the subjective experience in terms of the content which is not the intrinsic character of the experience. A distinction has been made with reference to Egan (2006) between possible world and the centered world to address the problem regarding the subjectivity of experience.

The perceptual experience of an individual includes the perception of both the properties of objects represented and the properties of perspectival aspects. The perspectival aspects are the way the subject or the individual is related to her current experience. The perspectival aspects include the indexical or the appearance properties via which the subject relates herself to her current experience. The indexical properties or the appearance properties cannot be straightforwardly reduced into the physical properties of representational content. It depends on the facts regarding the physical properties. The centered – world content is considered to be a set of pairs between the individual and the

way she is related to the properties appearing before us. This property maps the individual spatio- temporal location in the world.

The intentional states like belief, thought, etc. have the centered- world content. The significance of Egan's (2006) centered-world revolves around the subject's unique position or the current experience in a world. Yet this uniqueness of experience is explained with reference to the content. The uniqueness or the observer- dependent features of the experience is elucidated in terms of the individual's location at a particular time in the world. These features are part of the content and not any intrinsic features of the experience.

Egan's (2006) idea of a centered world is introduced to argue that the perception of observer- dependent properties can be explained with reference to the content of different types. The claim of strong intentionalism is proved to be true. The content determines the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience. The subject can successfully relate to the appearance or the indexical properties with her current experience provided she has a conceptual background regarding the properties. The conceptual background helps her to identify the appearance properties and relates to them accordingly. It includes certain representational facts which she might recollect or access while successfully relating herself to her current experience. Therefore, the perception of observer- dependent features is a package of both the sensory and the conceptual representation. It supports the transparency account of self- knowledge. Thus, Egan's (2006) idea of 'centered- world' is deeply connected with the transparency account of self-knowledge. The 'centered- content' without accommodating the transparency account of self-knowledge cannot prove the strong intentionalism as true.

Chapter Five

Conclusion

The thesis has focused on two main topics:

- i. It has investigated whether the transparency intuition is true
- ii. It has examined whether the transparency intuition supports strong intentionalism.

The detailed investigation shows that the answer is “yes” to both the questions. Arguments have been provided to explicate that intuition of transparency supports strong intentionalism. The thesis has undertaken the following tasks.

A distinction has been made between two types of transparency thesis. The first is the intuition about the transparency of experience, while the second is the transparency account of self-knowledge (Evans 1982). The novelty of this thesis lies in its claim that strong intentionalism is better supported by appealing to the transparency account of self-knowledge than by merely appealing to the transparency of experience.

The philosophers who defended strong intentionalism have their theories grounded on the transparency account of self-knowledge rather than the transparency intuition of experience (Harman, 1990; Tye, 1992, 2002). The philosophers like Byrne (2001) also defend strong intentionalism and appeals to a transparency account of self-knowledge (Evans, 1982). Although Byrne (2001) has not explicitly mentioned it in his defense of strong intentionalism. The example which has been used by Byrne (2001) in the defense of strong intentionalism can be satisfactorily explained by referring to the transparency account of self-knowledge.

Furthermore, philosophers like Dretske's (1994, 1997, 2003) 'displaced perception' supports representationalism and strong intentionalism. It suggests that the perception of many states of affairs may not be explained by looking at the intentional content or the intentional objects of perception. The perception can be explained by referring to certain facts or states of affairs which are representational in nature by considering the thoughts (belief, judgment). Dretske's 'displaced – perception' (1994) is strongly connected with the transparency account of self-knowledge as suggested by Evans (1982).

The opponents of strong intentionalism have also argued that strong intentionalism cannot satisfactorily explain the cases of hallucinations and illusions especially if strong intentionalism is motivated by appealing to the transparency of experience. However, the transparency account of self-knowledge indicates that the perception of intentional content requires the knowledge of intentional objects and of facts about those objects. The former is sensory representation and is non-conceptual while the latter is conceptual. The transparency account of self-knowledge portrays that the perception of intentional content requires some conceptual background which helps in explaining the perceptual experience as a whole. The perception of intentional content avails the second-order thought (belief, judgment, etc.). For example, when a child looks at a horizon, they tend to believe that the sky and the water meet in reality. Whereas, an adult is usually aware that such a phenomenon never occurs where the sky and sea would meet. It is merely an illusion. At the level of sensory representation both find the horizon where sea and sky meet. Although, the adult acquires the conceptual background of what a horizon is which makes him believe to be so. The child lacks the conceptual representational facts about the object, hence he believes that the sky and water meet in actuality.

Evans's (1982) transparency account of self-knowledge also suggests that we learn about our own mental state by considering the role of both the sensory experience and the conceptual background (belief, thought, memory).

The perceptual experience needs to avail the second-order thought which are conceptual in nature. The coordination of both sensory experience and conceptual background are needed in order to defend the strong intentionalism in the context of perceptual experience. Hence, these two types of transparency thesis are deeply connected. The discussion proves that the claim of strong intentionalism can be established satisfactorily by appealing to the transparency account of self-knowledge.

In chapter three it has been argued that the perspectival aspects can be explained by following representationalism in the context of strong intentionalism. The perspectival aspects can be explained by referring to Dretske's 'displaced- perception' (1994). Some philosophers like Martin (2002) hold that the perceptual experience cannot be explained in terms of intentional content. The perceptual experience involves the perception of perspectival aspects. Perspectival aspects cannot be reduced into the representational properties of the experience.

Martin (2002) supports a type of naïve realism. This chapter also points out a similarity between naïve realism and strong intentionalism. Both reject the intrinsic features of perceptual experience. Although their grounds for the rejection of the intrinsic features of experience are different.

The perception of perspectival aspects can be revealed by both imagination and the sensory experience although there is a difference between imagination and sensory experience. However, Martin (2002) suggests that with reference to the intentional content

we cannot actually distinguish the differences between these two types of experiences. The differences lie in terms of the immediacy that is felt by the subject. Therefore, we need to accept the phenomenal character of the experience over and above the representational properties of the perceptual experience.

In this chapter it has been proved that these perspectival aspects are features of the perception of representational content. The perception of these aspects can be explained by referring to Dretske's (1994) 'displaced –perception'. Whereas in the previous chapter (chapter two) it has already been substantiated that Dretske's (1994) 'displaced-perception' strongly supports the transparency account of self-knowledge (Evans, 1982). Therefore in chapter three it has been demonstrated how the perception of perspectival aspects can be explained by appealing to the transparency account of self-knowledge which supports the claim of strong intentionalism. If that is the case, then we can prove that perspectival aspects are nothing but they depend on perception of several representational facts.

Further, it has been explored that the differences in the modalities of the perceptual experience can also be explained in the context of strong intentionalism by appealing to the transparency intuition.

Finally, the thesis explicates the cases where the perceptual experience of exclusively observer-dependent objects and properties can also be made compatible with strong intentionalism and the intuition of transparency. Perceptual experiences of this type do not require for us to have any kind of access to the intrinsic non-representational properties of the relevant experiences. They can be explained by referring to the intentional contents of the experiences. This type of intentional content although observer-dependent is still

personal and objective content. It is self-locating content i.e., content about oneself or one's spatiotemporal location which can be represented using the "centered worlds" framework as discussed by Egan (2006). Thus, perceptual experiences of this kind are compatible with strong intentionalism and the transparency intuition.

The fourth chapter discusses the perception of perspectival aspect from the subjective point of view with reference to Egan's 'self-locating' belief. The purpose is to restore the claim of strong intentionalism i.e. the representational content determines the phenomenal character of the experience. Moreover, it has also shown how this accommodates the transparency account of self-knowledge. The subject while relating herself to the indexical or appearing properties may recollect the concepts that she has learnt previously. This background knowledge depends on the perception of several representational facts. The coordination of both (sensory and conceptual representation) relates her to her current perceptual experience of color, bodily sensation and so on. The transparency accounts of self-knowledge shows that the content determines the phenomenal character of the experience yet it is very much observer-dependent. Therefore, in this chapter the claim of strong intentionalism is restored successfully by appealing to the transparency account of self-knowledge.

While enquiring into the primary question of the thesis both the 'narrow' and 'wide' content of intentional states have been touched upon. The 'narrow' content includes the individuals' internal physical state and the 'wide' content represents the external world which is relational. The thesis does not delve into the nature of either 'broad' or 'narrow' content. The categorization of the content is required to showcase the fact whether there exists any distinctive phenomenal character of the experience over and above the representational character of the experience.

Perception of intentional content includes perception of the intentional objects and its properties represented in the experience. The content of this type represents the external environment of the subject. The intentional content also includes the subject's internal physical state which is unique and exclusive to the subject. The perception of the content of this sort (self-locating content) accommodates the features of an individual's internal physical state. The thesis proves that this internal physical state of the individual is something which is unique and can be explained in terms of the neuro-physiological process. Hence in order to explain the phenomenal character of the experience we do not need to refer to the intrinsic properties of the experience. The perceptual experience of this type leads to the changes in the phenomenal character of experience. This change can be explained with reference to the physical facts about the internal state of the subject. For example, the person who is color blind experiences the color differently. The color appears as different before the person and it may happen due to some defect or damage to the optical nerve. Therefore the uniqueness of the perceptual experience can be established by referring to the physical facts about the experience. This physical fact includes the individual's unique internal physical state. Although the characterization of 'broad' and 'narrow' content have been done by different philosophers variously, the detailed discussion of these two content would lead to digression.

The thesis focuses on showing that intuition of transparency accommodates the observer-dependent cases of perceptual experience which may be viewed as the acceptance of the distinctive existence of the phenomenal character of the experience. The detailed analysis of the problems indicate that the intuition of transparency accommodates both 'wide' and 'narrow' content of the perceptual experience in the context of strong intentionalism. It rejects the distinctive existence of the phenomenal character of the experience. The

transparency intuition accommodates the ‘narrow’ content in terms of the internal structure of the neuro-physiological system of the individual. Thus the intuition of transparency establishes that the physical facts about the environment of the individual or the internal physical state or sometimes both actually determine the changes in the phenomenal character of the perceptual experiences of the individual.


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